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Sol Worth and the Study of Visual Communications
Larry Gross
The central thread that runs through Sol Worth's research
and writings is the question of how meaning is communicated through visual images. 1 Coming to academic life
after careers in painting, photography, and filmmaking,
Worth was imbued with the conviction that visual media
were forms of communication that, while fundamentally
different from speech, could and must be seriously
examined as ways human beings create and share meanings. Focusing on film he began with the question, "What
does a film communicate, and how does this process
work?" (1966:322). The answers he began with grew out
of his practice as a teacher of film.

Teaching Film as Communication
In Worth's initial experience in teaching film, as Fulbright
Professor in Finland (1956-1957), he had utilized a
method he later described as follows: "The teacher would
make a film; the students would work along with him,
learning and doing at the same time. Class discussions
would be held in which the various aspects of the film
were developed and demonstrated" (1963:54). The film
he made during this process of teaching was Teatteri,
now in the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art. When he came to the Annenberg School of
Communications at the University of Pennsylvania to set
up and teach a course in documentary film, however,
Worth adopted a different approach: the students would
make a film. This choice was decisive in orienting him
toward questions and perspectives that influenced all his
subsequent work. It led Worth to consider problems few
film scholars had posed or pursued.
The most immediate consequence of this pedagogical
decision was a concern over the inexperience of his students:
The young men and women in my class were bright, but they
had never before made a film. They had never used a camera,
edited a shot, or written a script. There was not enough time.
And I was worried. If I made a film, I could control it; if I let thE
students make their own films, they could fail. The films migh1
be bad or unfinished, the cameras and equipment might be
ruined, film might be wasted. [1963:55]
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This concern proved unfounded. The students succeeded in making films and the workshop technique
seemed to engage them in the process Worth deemed
appropriate to a school of communications:
The process of changing back and forth from conception as
paramount, to the actual visual document as paramount,
seems to me the key learning process in the Documentary
Film Workshop. It is the way in which the students learn to
see. It is the process by which they train themselves to find a
meaningful visual image in relation to a concept which is
usually literary or philosophical in nature. The purpose of the
Workshop is not to produce films (this is our pleasure), but
rather, to provide an environment in which students learn to
see filmically; to provide an environment where they can learn
about the techniques and the thinking necessary to communicate ideas through the filmed image. [1963:56f]

It was the final stage in the Workshop, however, that led
Worth to the next set of questions. When the films were
completed, they were screened before an audience of
students, friends, and faculty. "It is in the period after the
lights go on, when the comments are made, that the student begins to know how very complex and difficult the
art of film communication is" (1963:57). The students
weren't alone, as Worth himself became increasingly intrigued by a pattern he found in the responses of diverse
audiences to the films made by his students:
The greatest involvement, identification, and understanding
seems to come from the young and the untrained. The
greatest hostility and incomprehension seems to come from
the adult professional in the communication fields .... Adolescents find these films easier to understand than do adults.
[1965:12]

The Bio-Documentary
In trying to make sense of this unexpected pattern of
responses Worth first clarified the nature of the films he
was screening. He realized that the inexperience of the
student filmmakers (their lack of socialization in traditional film codes), and his insistence that "the subject
~atter evolves from the student's own interests and expenences" (1963:56), lead to a particularly subjective kind
of film. Worth called this kind of film "bio-documentary":
... a film that can be made by a person who is not a professional filmmaker; or by someone who has never made a film
before. It is a film that can be made by anyone with enough
skill, let's say, to drive a car; by a person of a different culture
or a different age group, who has been taught in a specific '
way to make a film that helps him to communicate to us, the
world as he sees it, and his concerns as he sees them.
[1964:3]
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In posing the concept of a bio-documentary Worth was
clearly concerned with analogies between subjective
films and dreams as forms of visual imagery:
A bio-documentary is a film made by a person to show how he
feels about himself and his world. It is a subjective way of
showing what the objective world that a person sees is really
like . . .. In addition ... it often captures feelings and reveals
values, attitudes, and concerns that lie beyond the conscious
control of the maker. [1964:3]

But it wasn't enough to see the bio-documentary as a
subjective, individual statement by a novice filmmaker.
That might explain why adults could not "understand"
these films, and especially why "hostility seems to be
found most frequently among filmmakers, film critics, and
communications professionals . .. (e.g. 'I think you are
intellectually irresponsible to teach young people to
make films like this ... I think the whole thing is a hoax
.. .')" (1965:7). After all, it is hardly a novel observation
that those most engaged with a set of conventions in art
are the most outraged at innovations or variations that
ignore, challenge, or undermine these conventions.
It still remained to ask why young viewers responded
with enjoyment and understanding; after all, even if they
were not professionals, they were used to seeing "conventional" films. Worth decided that there was something
in the subject matter and the structure of the films that
was comprehensible to young viewers because it was
closer to their way of talking and thinking. In particular he
felt that the films used ambiguities and hints in a fashion
that adults were no longer comfortable with, but which
younger viewers found "safer and more c.omfortable fo~.
certain themes than [they] would an outnght statement
(1965:18).
.
Although he himself probably d1d not see the Implications of his inquiries at this point, Worth was laying some
of the foundations for an important analytic shift that
gradually became explicit in his thin~ing. I b~lieve that he
was already expressing some uneasmess w1th the psychological approach noted above-e.g., bio-documentaries as "dream-1 ike" revelations of the unconscious. Although much of Worth's research on film during th.e rest of
the 1960s is clearly dominated by the psychological
model of individual expression, he increasingly focused
his attention (often simultaneously, even contradictorily)
on film as cultural communication. Even at this point,
then, Worth was beginning to formulate two rel~te.d sets
of questions which he pursued for the rest of h1s l1fe.
First, he was led to tackle the question of how m~aning
can be communicated in various modes and med1a: are
visual images in general , and film in particular, b~tter.
understood in light of an overall theory of commun1cat1on
as symbolic .behavior; and what would this theory look
like?
0
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Second, he understood that his experience with novice
fi-lmmakers suggested a radical innovation in the way
the film medium could be used as a research tool. If
anyone could be taught to make a film that reflected his
or her own world view, and the values and concerns of his
or her group, then the direction of the film communication
process could be reversed. This meant using the medium
"to see whether the visual world offers a way of communication that can be used not only for us to communicate to
them, but so that we might make it easier for them to talk
to us" (1965:19).
Although these two sets of questions were pursued in
tandem, and their interconnections formed the basis of
much of Worth's intellectual development, it will be necessary for the purpose of exposition to discuss them separately.

The Navajo Project
The first fruits of the bio-documentary approach and the
realization of the potential it offered for communication by
"them to talk to us" were not long in coming. In his first
exposition of the bio-documentary film concept, at the
1964 Meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology,
Worth already saw the possibility of using this method to
explore the world view of another culture.
In a documentary film about the Navajo you look for an objective representation of how they live as seen by an outsider. In
a Bio-Documentary about the Navajo, the film would be made
by a Navajo. One would not only look to see how the Navajo
live, but one would also look to see how a Navajo sees and
structures his own life and the world around him. [1964:5]2

•

In this capsule "proposal" for a research project, Worth
later realized he was obeying Malinowski's injunction that
"the final goal, of which an Ethnographer should never
lose sight ... is, briefly, to grasp the native's point of
view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world"
(1922:25). In this context, it is interesting to note Worth's
sensitivity to one of the most important but often neglected problems in anthropological theory and practice:
the influence of the researcher's own values and biases.
The proposed use of the bio-documentary approach was,
to use a term that achieved currency in later years, reflexive:
Of course no view by one man of another is entirely objective.
The most objective documentary film, or report, includes the
view and values of the maker. The standard documentary film
tries, however, to exclude as much as possible of this personal value system. The Bio-Documentary, on the other hand,
encourages and teaches the filmmaker to include and to be
concerned with his own values .... The Bio-Documentary
method teaches the maker of the film to search for the meaning he sees in his world and it encourages the viewer to
continue that search by comparing his values with the values
expressed by the filmmaker in the film. [1964:5]
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This interest in what "other people had to say about
themselves through film , and how one could teach them
to say it" (Worth and Adair 1972:30) led to the Navajo
Filmmakers Project conducted in the summer of 1966 by
Worth in collaboration with John Adair, an anthropologist
long familiar with the Navajo, and assisted by Richard
Chalfen, then a graduate student working with Worth.
The project addressed a series of research objectives
and issues:
1 To determine the feasibility of teaching the use of film to
people with another culture. [Worth and Adair 1970:11]
2 To find out if it was possible to systematize the process of
teaching; to observe it with reference to the maker, the film
itself, and the viewer; and to collect data about it so as to
assist other ongoing research exploring the inference of
meaning from film as a communicative "language." [ibid.:12]
3 [To test the hypothesis that] motion picture film , conceived ,
photographed, and sequentially arranged by a people such
as the Navajo would reveal something of their cognition and
values that may be inhibited, not observable, or not analyzable when investigation is totally dependent on verbal
exchang8-€specially when it must be done in the language
of the investigator. [ibid.]
4 [To] create new perspectives on the Whorfian hypothesis,
work on which has for the most part been limited to linguistic
investigation of cognitive phenomena. Through cross-cultural
comparative studies using film as a mode of visual communication relationships between linguistic, cognitive, cultural
and visual phenomena might eventually be clarified. [Worth
and Adair 1972:28]
5 [To see whether] the images, subjects and themes selected
and the organizing methods used by the Navajo filmmakers
would reveal much about their mythic and value systems. [It
was] felt that a person 's values and closely held beliefs about
the nature of the world would be reflected in the way he edited
his previously photographed materials. [ibid.]
6 To study the process of "guided" technological innovation
and observe how a new mode of communication would be
patterned by the culture to which it is introduced. [Worth and
Adair 1970:12]

The Navajo project was enormously successful. The
films made by the Navajo filmmakers were widely
screened and discussed as "a breakthrough in crosscultural communications" (Mead 1977:67). Worth's involvement with anthropology deepened after the completion of the project and the publication of its results (Worth
and Adair 1967, 1970, 1972). He became increasingly
identified with the revitalization of a subfield, the anthropology of visual communications, a term he proposed
as an alternative to the earlier term visual anthropology.
Worth felt that most anthropologists viewed film and
photography only as ways to make records about culture
(usually other cultures) and failed to see that they could
be studied as phenomena of culture in their own right,
reflecting the value systems, coding patterns, and cognitive processes of their maker. His experience with biodocumentary films had clarified this distinction for him

and he saw it as crucial to the understanding of visual
communications. Pursuing this distinction leads to three
issues which Worth was concerned with:
1 The denial of the possibility of an objective, value-free film
record and the assertion of an inherent cultural bias of a
filmmaker raises serious questions about the way we all
view photographic images, and our tendency to accept
them as evidence about the external world . In particular
Worth was disturbed by the lack of understanding and
sophistication on the part of anthropologists regarding
their own use of visual image technologies.
2 The use of these technologies to record the lives of others
for our purposes, and the purveying to others of our own
cultural products and technologies (again, usually for our
own profit), raise serious ethical issues about the power
and the use of media which we ourselves do not
adequately understand.
3 There is a need to understand the nature of film as a
medium of communication-is there a film code and
what are its properties?
I will begin with the last of these, which takes us back
to the question of how meaning is communicated through
film.

Film as Communication
In the process of analyzing the early bio-documentary
films made by his students, Worth had realized that although they were subject ive they were not wholly
idiosyncratic. In his discussion of these films he noted
that "the films all employ similar grammars (in the sense
of editing devices and filmic continuities) ... grammars
of argot rather than of conventional speech" (1965:18). As
I have noted , the decision to view these films as social
rather than merely individual expressions led to the question of whether there were underlying rules for the shaping and sharing of meanings in film.
Worth began by employing a communications theory
model , in which film is seen as "a signal received primarily through visual receptors, which we treat as a message
by inferring meaning from it" (ibid .:323, emphasis in original). The implications of this last point were to become
increasingly central in Worth's work, but he already was
insisting that "there is no meaning in the film itself ... the
meaning of a film is a relationship between the implication of the maker and the inference of the audience"
(ibid.). But how did this process of implying and inferring
meanings actually occur? In two of his early papers
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(1966, 1968) Worth laid out an initial mode l, some of
which was retained and developed in future work, and
some of which was mod ified or discarded as his thinking
progressed.
Because much of the model of film communication
presented in these papers is repeated in the paper "The
D_evelopment of a Sem iotic of Fil m" (1969), I will briefly
d1scuss some aspects of the earlier papers which were
less prominent in the later effort. In addition, I will focu s
on what I feel are the weaknesses as well as the
achievements of Worth 's approach as represented by al l
three of these papers.
In these initial papers Worth drew heavily upon a psychological framework for understanding film , again making an analogy to the dream as an "i ntrapersonal mode of
communi cat ion through image events in seq uence. The
fi lm is a simil ar mode of communication but most often
extended to the interpersonal domain" (1968:3) . He proceeded to outline :· an intuitive experient ial model " of film
as a process which beg ins with a "Feel ing Concern ... to
communicate something ," a concern "which many psychologists feel is almost a basic human drive" (1966:327).
This feeling concern should not be seen as an explicit
message that one wants to commun icate ; it "i s most often
imprecise, amorphous, and internalized. It cannot be sent
or received as a film in th is internalized, 'fee ling' state"
(1968 :4) .

Here Worth makes a further po int which he did not
pursue at the time, but wh ich can be seen as an early
indicator of what later became an important part of his
view of communicative phenomena:
Obviously, inferences can be made about internal feel ing
states by observing a subject's gestures, body movements,
and so forth . ... [However] there is an important d ist inction
which must be made between the inferences we make from a
person 's own behavior, wh ich can have a great v.ariety of
reasons explaining and motivating them , and the inferences
we make from a coded expression in linguistic or paral ingu istic form whose purpose is primarily communicat ive. [ibid.]

If the filmmaker is to communicate this feeling concern ,
then, Worth continued, the "sender must develop a Story
Organism-an organic unit whose basic function is to
provide a vehicle that will carry or embody the Feeling
Concern" (1966:327). In practice, the story organism may
be a story in the usual sense of the word , even a shooting
script, but Worth was dealing more with the "organization
into a system of those beliefs and feelings that a person
accepts as true and related to his Feeling Concern"
(ibid. :328).
The final stage in the encoding process occurs when,
"after recognizing the feeling concern and finding the
story organism, ... the communicator [begins] to collect
the external specific Image Events which, when sequenced, will become the visible film communicati on"
(1968:4).

5

Meaning as Mirror Image
Worth then proceeds to define the receiving process "as
a kind of mirror image of the sending process" (1966:328).
Because I feel that this position contains a fundamental
error (and one which Worth later recognized) , I will quote
it in full:
The viewer first sees the Image Event-the sequence of
signals that we call a film . Most often he knows nothing of
what went on before. He doesn't know the film-maker and his
personality, and he usually doesn't know what the film is
about, or is meant to communicate. Should our viewer choose
to treat these signals as a message, he will first infer the Story
Organism from the sequenced Image Events. He will become
aware of the belief system of the film-maker from the images
he sees on the screen.
From this awareness he will , if the communication "works," be
able to infer-to invoke in himself-the Feeling Concern.
As you can see from th is suggested view of the total process, the meaning of the film for the viewer is closely related to
the Feeling Concern of the film-maker. The single Image
Events of the film are the signals, these specifically sequenced Image Events are what we treat as messages, and
our inference about the Feeling Concern of the maker is what
we ca ll the meaning of the film. [1966:328]

This view is explicitly tied by Worth to a psychological
model of communication in art enunciated by Ernest Kris
in his Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art (1952). Worth
quotes Kris's statement that communication "lies not so
much in the prior intent of the artist as in the consequent
recreation by the audience of his work of art. What is
required for communication therefore is similarity between the audience process and that of the artist."
The primary problem with this argument is that it does
not, in fact, represent the experiential realities of film
communication. 3 Simply put, it is unreasonable to ever
expect the process of viewing a film to mirror the process
of making that film. Given Worth's own model of the
filmmaking process, it should be clear that the maker
interacts with the film in the process of creation in a way
which can never be repeated by himself or by anyone
else. The very acts of filmmaking are different in time,
space, and pace from any act of viewing . Moreover, the
model implies a static, unchanging feeling concern
which leads to a fixed story organism, which in turn is
represented by a sequence of image events. In reality, of
course, the process of filmmaking-as Worth's own descriptions show-often involves changes and modifications in what one wishes to say and how one tries to say it.

6
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The filmmaker's experience is one of choosing among
alternatives, attempting to realize intentions, and assessing achievements as a means of confirming or altering
those intentions. The viewer confronts only the arranged,
final set of images, and can only deal with them in terms
of conventional and specific expectations, and in light of
assessments of the filmmaker's control and skill in choosing, sequencing, and implying meanings. This is hardly
the same thing as "[reversing] the process by which the
encoder made the film" (1969:290).
But if this position is so patently untenable, why did
Worth hold to it for several years and repeat it in a series
of papers? I think there may be several reasons for this.
First, I believe that Worth was heavily influenced by his
e~periences in teaching students in his Documentary
F1lm Workshop. His method of teaching concentrated on
forcing the students to clearly articulate their intentions
and their decisions in selecting and arranging images in
order to convey ideas and feelings. The model of a feeling concern that leads to a story organism which is embodied in a sequence of image events may not capture
the experience of all filmmakers, but it does characterize
the method used in Worth's workshop-.
Second, the influence of the student workshop experience may have contributed another flaw of the mirrorimage model: the implication that films are typically
made by individual filmmaker-communicators. This "mistake" is all the more odd given Worth's years of experience as a professional filmmaker. There is no doubt that
he was aware that film is among the most collective of
media and that most films could in no way be described
as the embodiments of any one author's feeling concern .
Worth was certainly not a naive auteur theorist· rather 1
thi~k we can see here, again, the influence of the psy~ho
loglcally based, individually oriented communications
theory Worth was using at that time.
In his 1969 paper Worth had already begun to retreat
from his claim of isomorphism between the receiver's and
the sender's experience of a film. In this paper he gives
~everal examples of possible viewer interpretations of a
film (Red Desert by Antonioni) and concludes:
Most film communication is not. .. that perfect correspondence between the Fee!ing Concern, ~he Story Organism 1
and t.he Image Ev~nts t.hey ?1ctate, and the1r reconstruction by .
the v1ewer. Most.film s1tuat1ons, depending as they must on
the ~aker and h1~ context (both social and psychological),
the v1ewer and h1s, and the film itself, are imperfect communicative situations. [1969:295]

Note, however, that perfect communication is still defined
as the achievement of isomorphic correspondence; contex~ and other factors are still viewed as "imperfections"
wh1ch muddy the communicative stream.

Film as the Language of Visual Communication
Despite their unfortunate devotion to the mirror-image
model, these early papers were valuable for an understanding of film as communication. By using an approach
that drew upon linguistics, communications theory, and
psychology, Worth was explicitly differentiating himself
from the evaluative concerns of film theorists who approached film primarily as an art form. The title of his
1966 paper, "Film as a Non-Art," was meant to assert
provocatively this emphasis on looking "at film as a
medium of communication , rather than as an art or an art
form" (1966:322). He was determined that we understand
t~e. "difference between evaluation and meaning"
(1bld.:324):
My concern is not whether film is art or not, but whether the
process by which we get meaning from film can be understood and clarified .... While all art might be said to communicate, all communication is certainly not art. [ibid .]

Having elaborated a model of the film communication
he saw as the next step the analysis of the
med1atmg agent-the film itself.
proc~s~,

The study of the Image Event. .. -its properties, units, elements and system of organization and structure that enable
~s t~ infer meaning from a film-should be the subject of our
1nqu1ry, and of our professional concern. [ibid.]

lnyursuit of this inquiry Worth followed the analytic paths
la1d down by linguists in describing and analyzing the
structure and functionings of lexical communication. He
adopted, in fact, the heuristic strategy "that film can be
~tudied as if it were the 'language' of visual communication, and as if it were possible to determine its elements
and to understand the logic of its structure" (ibid.:331).
Worth called this visual analogue to linguistics vidistics ,
and proceeded to elaborate a model of filmic elements
and principles based on those of structural linguistics.
Vi?ist!cs in this early stage is concerned , first, with the determmatlon and description of those visual elements relevant to
the process of communication. Second, it is concerned with
t~e de.termination of the rules, laws and logic of visual relationship that h~lp a vi~wer to infer meaning from an Image
Ev~n~, and the mteract1on of Image Events in sequence. Film
as 1f 1t were language, ~~studied vidistically, is thus thought
of as t~e study of spec1f1ed elements, elements in sequence,
operat1ons on these elements, and cognitive representations
of them that act as a mediating agent in a communication
P.rocess between human beings-between a filmmaker and a
v1ewer-between a creator and are-creator. [ibid.]
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Worth presented his solution to the first of these
questions-the identification of the basic filmic unit, or
visual element-through an account of the development
of the film medium and of the theories that accompanied
its growth. This account, given first in his 1968 paper,
"Cognitive Aspects of Sequence in Visual Communication ," was elaborated in the 1969 paper "The Development of a Semiotic of Film." After presenting various
theorists' positions, Worth casts his vote with Eisenstein, who isolated the "shot" as the basic element-"the
smallest unit of film that a filmmaker uses" (1969:297).
This seemed "the most reasonable" choice, "not only because it is the way most filmmakers construct films, but
because it is also possible to describe it fairly precisely
and to manipulate it in a great variety of controlled ways"
(1969~ 299).

Moreover, the Navajo filmmakers "who were taught only
the technology of filmmaking without any rules for combining units seemed 'i ntuitively' to discover the shot as
the basic sign for the construction of their films" (ibid.).
However, as Worth himself noted in his historical account, the first filmmakers saw the "dramatic scene" as
the basic film unit. This was essentially a theatrical concept: "the first filmmakers pointed the camera at some
unit of action and recorded it in its entirety" (1968:9). It
look several years before Porter, in 1902, "discovered"
that "isolated bits of behavior could be photographed
and glued together to make a scene" (ibid.:10). In retrospect, we might wonder how naive the Navajo actually
were (most had seen at least some commercial films), or
whether Worth had been able to limit his instruction, as
intended, to "the technology of filmmaking without any
rules for combining units."
Worth used the term videme for Eisenstein's basic unit
of film communication, previously called an Image Event,
"that is accepted by viewers as something that represents the world" (1968:13). However, Worth then argued
that a finer distinction was required "if we are to attempt
further scientific analysis .... The shot is actually a
generic term for two kinds of shots: the 'camera shot' and
the 'editing shot' " (1969:299). The camera shot, which
Worth called the cademe, is "that unit of film which results from the continuous action of the movie camera ...
from the moment we press the start button to when we
release it" (ibid .). The editing shot, called the edeme, is
"formed from the cademe by actually cutting the cademe
apart and removing those segments one does not wish to
use" (1968:14). The process of filmmaking, then, involves
the shooting of cademes and their transformation (in
whole or part) into edemes. It is then possible to sequence these resultant edemes in ways that are determined by the individual filmmaker, his communication
needs, his particular culture, and his knowledge of the
"language."
The edeme thus becomes the hypothesized basic
element and building block of the language, upon which
all language operations are performed, and a basic
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image event from which all meaning is inferred (1968:14).
Much of the balance of the 1968 paper was devoted to a
discussion of parameters along which this basic element
can vary. This discussion has much in common with the
work of other writers on film (e.g., Spottiswoode 1935)
who used the "film language" concept. However, Worth
felt that "none of these authors developed a theory of
grammar embodying 'linguistic' elements or rule-like organization capable of syntactic structures" (1968:12).
In Worth's linguistic analogy, the parameters of motion,
space, and internal time are thought of as semantic elements. Sequence, however, including the manipulation of
apparent time, belongs to a discussion of the syntactic
aspects of the film "language" because it deals with more
than one edeme at a time. "Sequencing edemes can be
thought of as applying syntactic operations to edemes.
This does not in itself imply a code, a set of rules, or a
grammar-but it does make it possible to test visual
communication phenomena along these lines" (1968:17f).
Sequence becomes the fulcrum upon which Worth supported his analysis of filmic communication:
Sequence is a strategy employed by man to give meaning to
the relationship of sets of information, and is different from
series and pattern. As I will use the word here, sequence is a
deliberately employed series used for the purpose of giving
meaning rather than order to more than one image event and
having the property of conveying meaning through thesequence itself as well as through the elements in thesequence . . .. Man imposes a sequence upon a set of images
to imply meaning. [1968:18] 4

However, at this stage, Worth was still preoccupied
with the quest for a universal vidistic syntax analogous to
those identified by linguists and psycholinguists in the
analysis of lexical communication. Following Chomsky
(1957), he saw the goal of vidistics as the development of
a grammar of film syntax, "whose rules we can describe
in such a way that we can distinguish between what is a
grammatical sequence and what is an. ungrammatical
sequence" (1966:334). Unfortunately for this enterprise,
Worth admitted that he found "it almost impossible at this
point to construct a sequence of shots that an audience
will say is ungrammatical" (ibid.). Not willing to discard
the concept of grammaticality in film , Worth hoped to
utilize the notion of a semantic space having dimensions
of meaning such as that developed by Charles Osgood,
to arrive at "a grammar of probability, a system of possible, of more or less meaningful, sequences based on a
concept of dimensions of syntax" (ibid.). ·
This prospect was explored in a series of studies Worth
conducted along with Shel Feldman, a psychologist then
at the Annenberg School. Some of this work was
sketched in his 1968 paper, and further publications were
promised, but events led him to other approaches and
this line of investigation was dropped.
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The Semiotic Model
Two factors played a role in shifting Worth away from the
attempt to formulate a psychological and linguistic
model of film communication. First, the Navajo project,
which might have served to intensify his search for a
universal "psycho-logic" of visual syntax "determined by
cognitive processes that all human beings share"
(1966:339), demonstrated instead that members of a culture developed film "syntax rules" which could be related
to their lexical syntax and to their patterns of story-telling
and their systems of value and belief.
Second, as he read more widely in linguistics and,
increasingly, in the literature of semiotics-de Saussure,
Pierce, and Morris-Worth found his central concern
shifting to the role of social and cultural influences and
away from the cognitive and psycholinguistic models he
had earlier employed. 5 Rather than a grammar of film as
the language of visual communication, he now looked to
the broader scope of semiotics for an understanding of
the rules by which we make inferences from sequences of
signs.
... the development of a semiotic of film depends not on
answering linguistic questions of grammar, but on a determination of the capabilities of human beings to make inferences
from the edemes presented in certain specified ways.
[1969:317]

This shift permitted Worth to place the linguistic model
in a perspective which had previously eluded not only
him but many other film scholars. As he noted, "most
theoreticians from Eisenstein to Bazin have at one time or
another used phrases such as 'the language of film', 'film
grammar', and 'the syntax of film' " (1969:302). More insidiously, these metaphoric uses often served more as a
hindrance than an aid to the understanding of film communication. Film was all too often stretched on a Procrustean bed of linguistic models and its contours destroyed
in the attempt to fit it to an uncongenial frame. Worth
came to the realization that tremendous care must be
taken if one is to use "that most scientific of sign disciplines" for the study of film . He returned to his initial
conception of the linguistic approach as a heuristic strategy with a far more modest estimate of its utility. The
strategy had, however, led him to a better understanding
of how film might be scientifically analyzed.
I am suggesting, then, that linguistics offers us some fruitful
jumping-off places for the development of a semiotic of film,
but not a ready-made body of applicable theory leading to
viable research in film. If we accept Chomsky's definition of
language we must be forced to conclude that film is not a
language, does not have native speakers, and does not have
units to which the same taxonomy of common significance
can be applied as it can to verbal language. At this point our
aim should not be to change the definition of language so as
to include the possible rules of film, although this may well be

a result of further research in film, but rather to develop a
methodology and a body of theory that will enable us to say
with some certainty just how it is, and with what rules, that we
make implications using film signs with some hope of similar
inferences. [1969:318f]

In most of his work after 1969 Worth followed this prescription , but his focus shifted from film in particular to
the larger class of visual images in general and, although
the-two sides of the communications process were always taken into account, increasingly his primary objective was to understand better how meaning is interpreted
by viewers rather than how it is articulated by the imagemaker. Before discussing these investigations, however, I want to turn to some important papers in which
Worth applied the lessons of his theoretical research to
the practice of those engaged in the use of visual media
in anthropology and education.

The Politics of Anthropology
The most immediate application of Worth 's emerging
semiotic approach to film communication was in the field
of anthropology. I have already mentioned his involvement with the sub-discipline of visual anthropology. With
the completion of the Navajo project Worth found himself
near the center of a growing "invisible college" of anthropologists interested in going beyond the limited uses
of visual media characteristic of most work in the field.
Visual anthropology, despite the important early contributions of Bateson and Mead, had come , for the most part,
to mean the taking of photographic or film records in the
field , and the use of these materials as illustrations to
accompany verbal accounts or as "evidence" uncritically
accepted as objective records of objects and events.
In a paper presented to the American Anthropological
Association in 1968, entitled "Why Anthropology Needs
the Filmmaker," Worth took strong exception to these assumptions and to the biases and limitations they entailed .
In the first place, he maintained that we could not simply
accept photographic or film images as "evidence" because they always reflect human decisions (conscious
and unconscious) and technological constraints.
Further, he argued that by defining film exclusivelyand naively-as a record about culture, anthropologists
tended to ignore the study of film as a record of culture ,
".reflecting the value systems, coding patterns and cognitive processes of the maker" (1972a). Here, in addition to
the obvious echoes of the Navajo project, Worth is explicitly drawing upon Hymes's concept of the "ethnography of communication" in which one is interested in
what things are said (or not said), why, to whom , and in
what form .
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As a corollary of this position, Worth was led to the
view that any film can be used for ethnographic
analyses-of the culture of the film's subjects or of the
filmmaker, or both; consequently,
[t]here can therefore be no way of describing a class of films
as "ethnographic" by describing a film in and of itself. One
can only describe this class of films by describing how they
are used , and assigning the term "ethnograph ic" to one c lass
of descriptions. [1972a]

Worth's argument was controversial , for it implicitly denied the inherent ethnographic validity of much "anthropological film "-it was not ethnographic just because
an anthropologist made it. In fact, he went much further
and attacked the "visual anthropologists" for their lack of
sophisti cation in the use of film , a condition which he
attributed in part to their naive view of film as "objective
record":
The only group or professionals involved in the making and
use of anthropological films who have no training AT ALL in
the making, analysis, or use of film are anthropologists. One
can count on the anthropologists who are trained to study
films, not as a record of some datum of culture, but as a
datum of culture in its own right. [1972a:359]

By the late 1960s Worth was actively engaged in efforts to
change this state of affairs. He was involved with the
American Anthropological Association 's (AAA) Program
in Ethnographic Film (PIEF) and in 1970, in collaboration
with Margaret Mead and others, he helped found the Anthropological Film Research Institute at the Smithsonian
Institution. In the summer of 1972 he organized and
taught, along with Jay Ruby, Carroll Williams, and Karl
Heider, a summer institute in visual anthropology funded
by the National Science Foundation. That fall , at the annual meeting of the AAA, Worth was instrumental in the
transformation of PIEF into the Society for the Anthropology of Visual Communication. He served a term as president of the society and was the founding editor of its
journal , Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication. 6 The society and the journal provided a continuing form and context for Worth and others to advocate
and demonstrate the rich potential of the approach they
represented.
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The Ethics of Anthropology
The issues Worth was raising in the late 1960s and early
1970s did not exist in a vacuum; in a real sense they were
in the air. Anthropologists along with the rest of academia
were facing political and social realities which cast into
question many of the untested assumptions of their disciplir.e. !n 1972 a volume of essays appeared under the title
Reinventing Anthropology, edited- by Dell Hymes, in
which sixteen authors discussed the field as a product of
"a certain period in the discovery, then domination, of the
rest of the world by European and North American
societies" (Hymes et al. 1972:5). The essays in the book
addressed many assumptions, biases, and limitations of
anthropological theory and practice, exposing flaws and
ethical problems and questioning whether it was possible to "reinvent" a more responsible and self-conscious
discipline.
Worth contributed a chapter to this book in which he
explicated many of his concerns about the way anthropologists have used and misused, understood and
misunderstood the visual media in studying and reporting about various groups around the world. He identified
a series of intellectual and ethical problems that have
resulted from the development and diffusion of visual
communication technologies.
For the field of anthropology Worth argued that "an
ethnography of communication developed on the basis
of verbal language alone cannot cope with man in an age
of visual communication" (1972b:349). He maintained, as
I have already noted, that the naive belief in film as objective record must give way to a more sophisticated understanding and use of visual media as research tools and of
visual images as research data.
Worth also criticized the inertia of academic disciplines which leads us to "continue examining and thinking about only inherited problems, rather than those
problems and modes our children, our students, and
even ourselves pay most attention to" (ibid.:350). We
cannot ignore the growing centrality of the visual media
in all cultures, not only in Western industrial society. He
spelled out in this paper some of the ways in which social
scientists can become more sensitive students of contemporary, "visual culture."
The ethical problems he articulated are more difficult
to resolve. When Worth first began to develop the biodocumentary method, he saw it as a way to learn "how
others see their world," to "make it easier for them to talk
to us" (1965:19). The Navajo project was an expression of
his belief in the potential of film to reverse the one-way
flow of most anthropological communication. But, in this
paper, he reveals a considerably less sanguine view of
the role of visual media in the lives of "others" in the
modern world.
The Navajo project had as one of its aims the study of
the "guided" introduction of a communications technology into a new cultural context. In the 1972 paper Worth is
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all too aware of the realities of technological diffusion in
the modern world. For most cultures and societies the
question is not whether they will encounter and come to
live with these new visual media, but when and how.
In teaching people to read, we implicitly teach them what to
read .. . . The use of a mode of communication is not easily
separable from the specific codes and rules about the content of that mode. [1972b:351]

One central problem, therefore, is that our technologies
may carry with them "our conceptions, our codes, our
mythic and narrative forms" (ibid. :353) unless we also
make clear to other cultures that these new media "need
not be used only in the ways of the ... societies that introduce them" (ibid.).
Another ethical question raised in this paper focused
on the importance of control over information as an instrument of power. Worth noted that "anthropologists
are notorious for studying everyone but themselves"
(ibid. :355). Is it appropriate for us to encourage others to
reveal themselves when we do not? As visual technologies spread to groups in our society and to other
cultures unused to manipulating these media,
what is our responsibility to help them to understand a world
in which their every act of living can be televised and viewed
by a watching world? .. . Should we teach them not only to
make their own films but to censor ours as well? The problem
as I see it is: What reasons do we have not to insist that others
have the right to control how we show them to the world?
[ibid. :355-358]

Film in Education
Although I have concentrated on Worth's extensive involvement with anthropology, some of his earliest
academic endeavors were in the field of education. His
interest in this area was revived in 1971 when he was
invited to contribute to a Yearbook which was to focus on
communication and education. He agreed to write a
paper on the use of film in education and he took the
opportunity to draw together and to clarify several
strands in his previous and current thinking.
Worth began by examining three perspectives which
he saw as exercising major-and pernicious-influence
on "the educational and film communities but with very
little research evidence in their support" (1974a:273).
First, and most intensely, he takes issue with Rudolf Arnheim 's position, which he characterized as "visual primacy." Worth argued that Arnheim's theory of "visual
thinking" carries to an unreasonable extreme the "reasonable assertion that visual perception contains or is
part of what we normally call'thinking"' (ibid.).

1 believe that this is a fair characterization of Arnheim's
work, and Worth goes on to pinpoint some of its major
flaws. Rejecting in Arnheim an extreme version of the
psychological, perceptual-cognitive "bias" he himself
had earlier manifested (although he never expressed
such a strongly "Gestalt" position), Worth concluded that
Arnheim "underestimates or denies the extent to which
symbolic systems or conventions mediate our knowledge
of the world" (ibid.) .
The particular error Worth located in Arnheim was most
clearly manifested in his denial of the cruc ial role of culture in determining what and how we "see":

True visual education presupposes that the world can present
its inherent order to the eye and that seeing consists in understanding this order. [Arnheim 1966:148]

In contrast to this position Worth aligned himself with
most contemporary thinkers in saying that
what we see and what we think about is determined at the
least as much by our symbolic systems and convent ions for
representing that universe as by the universe itself.
[197 4a:278]

Worth went on to outline the other two perspectivesthat of certain film theorists (represented by Gene
Youngblood) and film educators-which he felt were as
inadequate and misleading in their own areas as Arnheim was in his. What these criticisms have in common is
Worth's dismay at the failure of so many researchers and
educators properly to understand or utilize film as a
process of communication.
In the remaining sections of the paper Worth presented
his own current view of how film could be understood as
communication and how knowledge of this process enables us to use film in the very process of education
itself. He restates an abbreviated version of the feeling
concern/story organism/image event model (these terms
are not used), but with several significant modifications.
In this account the complexity and non-linearity of the
filmmaking process are now emphasized, moving the
model away from the somewhat misleading implication
that the filmmaker moves in strict, irreversible steps from
feeling to story to image sequence. However, the model
is still conceived in "single author" terms. This is shown
explicitly when Worth describes the completion of
filmmaking:
At some point he decides to "release" his film. It is now no
longer a personal act but a public and social one; it is a
symbolic form available for participation in a communication
process. [ibid.:285]
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Worth was also ready to abandon the mirror-image
model of viewer reception , if somewhat re luctantly:
When another person sees this fil m, he must (depending on
how one talks about such acts) receive it, decode it, or recreate it. Since meaning or content does not exist within the
reel of acetate, the viewer must recreate it from the forms,
codes, and symbol ic events in the fil m.... For communi cation to occur, meaning must be implied by the creator and
inferred by the viewer or re-creator. [ibid.]

Note that, while perfect communication is no longer
defined in terms of the viewer's ability to trace the
filmmaking process in reverse and reach the author's
feeling concern , the term inology suggests an ambivalence that probably reflects a genuine state of intellectual
trans ition. Worth shifts between "receive ," "decode," and
"re-create" to describe the viewer's role in the process of
communication , still echoing the isomorphic implications
of "recreation " as he had used the term in earlier papers.
Yet he also makes explicit the role of "conventions
through which meaning is transmitted between people
by a process of implication and inference" (ibid.).
Worth was now coming to focus more and more on the
process of interpretation-how meaning is created by
viewers-rather than on the process of articulation by
imagemakers (as in the bio-documentary and Navajo
projects). In order to clarify the importance of this shift, I
have to backtrack to an earlier stage in Worth's work.

Ignoring Interpretation
In one of his earliest papers Worth had introduced a discussion of audience reactions to his students' films with
the comment, "Perhaps, in an attempt to understand a
particular act of communication we can approach understanding by examining the reaction to the act, rather than
the act itself" (1965:3). However, in most of his work over
the next six years Worth focused more on the act of making than on that of interpreting meaning from images. In
the study of bio-documentaries made by various groups
in our society (reported in Worth and Adair 1972, Chapter
15), and in the Navajo project, it was the films and the
activity of the filmmakers, not the viewers, that Worth was
interested in.
In his 1966 paper, "Film as a Non-Art," Worth appeared
willing to forego the investigation of the interpretive side
of the communicative process:
This particular area of study-the interaction between persons and groups, and the stimuli they relate to-has been
undertaken by the social and behavioral scientists. Although
relevant to our interests, the specific study of the relationships
between peop!e and events cannot be the professional concern of those interested in visual communicat ion. [1966:330]
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Although I believe he was primarily distancing himself
from an overly subjective approach which centers on individual viewers' reactions, Worth is clearly advocating
the priority of the "study of the Image Event" itself. The
extent of this "bias" is shown by the perfunctory way in
which Worth and Adair assessed the reactions of other
Navajo to the films made by their fellows. The account
given by Worth and Adair of the films' world premiere on
the reservation (attended by 60 Navajo) is the shortest
chapter in their book (1972:128--131), but it is most
revealing.
They make clear the fact that the idea of holding the
screening at all originated with the filmmakers, not the
researchers. More importantly, the account reveals how
unprepared they were for this crucial opportunity to investigate the interpretations and responses of the Navajo
viewers. Only nine viewers were questioned, and the
questions failed to explore fully their reactions.
Two of the Navajo reported that they did not understand
certain of the films. These were films judged by Worth
and Adair to be "somewhat outside the framework of
Navajo cognition" (ibid.) either in form or subject matter.
The way these viewers expressed their lack of understanding was to say that they didn't get the meaning because the films "were in English." This is a most intriguing
response, considering that none of the films had any
sound at all. However, Worth and Adair continue:
Since these interviews were conducted in Navajo, we didn't
see the translated tapes until we left the reservation, and have
not been able to question our informants further along these
lines. [ibid.:131]

By the early 1970s, in contrast, Worth was clearly insisting on the need to include the perspectives of both the
interpreter and the imagemaker within the scope of investigation . In part, as I have indicated, this insistence was
influenced by Hymes's advocacy of an "ethnography of
communication." 7 However, in order to fully describe the
development of Worth's work at this time, I have to discuss my own involvement with it.
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Personal Interlude
I met Sol Worth in the spring of 1968 when I visited the
Annenberg School for the first time. My decision to join
the faculty of the school (as opposed to taking a job in the
field-social psychology-in which I had just received a
Ph.D.) was motivated in large part by Worth's presence. It
was immediately clear that we shared a strikingly similar
set of interests and intellectual inclinations; and it was
Worth who convinced me that my interests in the study of
art and culture could be pursued far more readily in a
communications program, where they were seen as central, than in a psychology department where (I already
knew) they would be seen as peripheral. Certainly, my
experience with the psychology of art subfield had been
disappointing: those who seemed to have a feeling for art
used poor psychology (e.g., Arnheim), while those who
were psychologically rigorous did not seem to understand art (e.g., Berlyne). The field of communications-at
least as it was represented at the Annenberg Schoolappeared to offer a framework in which the varieties of
symbolic behavior (especially the kinds we call art)
could be studied with a sensitivity to the role of psychological, social, and cultural determinants.
From the outset Worth and I engaged in discussions
and arguments which helped both of us clarify and, I
hope, improve our understanding of communications
phenomena. In these discussions, I made clear my belief
that the interpreter's role was at the center of the communicative process. Put most simply, I argued that before
one could become a "sender" one had to become a "receiver." The competence needed for articulation derived
in large part from one's prior experience in interpretation.
Specifically, in the realm of art I maintained that "the
process of artistic creation itself presupposes and arises
out of the process of appreciation" (Gross 1973:115).
This position reflected two basic considerations. The
first was the simple fact of ontological sequence: we all
encounter symbolic events first as consumers and only
later, if at all, as producers. "Only upon the basis of the
competence to appreciate meaning presented in a symbolic mode can one hope to achieve the realization of
creative potential in that mode" (Gross 1974:71).
Second, I was arguing that symbolic behavior occurs
in a variety of distinct modes, and that meaning can be
understood or purposively communicated only within
these modes. "These modes are partially but not totally
susceptible to translation into other modes. Thus they are
basically learned only through actions appropriate to the
particular mode" (ibid.:57).

Two papers which I wrote in 1971-1972 presented the
outlines of a theory of symbolic competence and aesthetic communication which incorporated this position
(1973, 1974). These papers and the theory they presented
owed much to Worth's influence. At the same time my
views and emerging theoretical formulations helped
shape his views on a number of isues. The paper Worth
wrote on film and education reflects our discussions. By
the fall of 1971 these discussions had led-via an informal research seminar we conducted-to collaborative
projects carried out by several of our students, and eventually to a joint paper.
Th is paper, written in 1972-1973 and publ ished in 1974,
presents the out Iines of a theory of interpretation-the
assignment of meaning to objects and events. Because I
feel that the presentation in the paper is often unclear and
overly terse , and because the model introduced in th is
paper figures importantly in Worth's subsequent writings,
I will risk the appearance of immodesty and attempt to
remedy some of the paper's defic ienc ies by discussing
its contents in somewhat greater detail than I have devoted to the other papers.

Interpretive Strategies
The questions we focused on in our discussions and research centered around the pecu liar properties of visual
images. Although our paper addressed the general issue
of how people assign meaning to objects and events, in
retrospect it seems clear that our concerns were mostly
directed towards the visual mode in general , and film or
photographic images in particular. The basic question
we were asking might be phrased as: what can we
"know" from these images and how can we know it? We
felt that the first step towards an answer was to draw two
basic d istinctions in describing interpretive processes.
The first distinction we made was between those objects and events which do and those which do not "evoke
the use of any strategy to determine their meaning "
(Worth and Gross 1974:29). Most of the objects and
events we encounter are interpreted "transparently" in the
sense that we "know what they mean" without any conscious awareness on our part of any interpretive activity.
We generally respond to their presence (or absence) in a
way which ind icates (analytical ly) that a process of tacit
interpretation has occurred: our behavior has been affected by the presence (or absence) of some object/event
in some fashion . We simply haven't needed to "think
about it." Such tacit interpretations range from our "unthinkingly" extending our hand to open a closed door
when we leave a room , to our ability to drive a car along a
familiar route wh ile absorbed in conversation or reverie.
Worth and I used the term "non-sign events" to identify
the events that we ignore or code "transparently." The
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objects and events which do evoke an interpretive process we called sign events. However, we continued , these
are not predetermined or fixed classes :
It is important to note that the distinction between sign and
non-sign events must not be taken as a categorical classification of persons, objects, and events. Any event, depend ing
upon its context and the context of the observer, may be
assigned sign value. By the same token , any event may be
disregard ed and not treated as a sign. [ibid .]

The purpose of this first distinction, therefore, was not
to isolate two kinds of objects and events in the world, but
two ways in which we respond to the presence or absence of objects and events. Having made this distinction we turned our attention to the ways in wh ich sign
events are interpreted. Our second discrimination was
between those sign events we called natural and those
we called symbolic.
Natural events, as we used the term , are those wh ich
we interpret in terms of our knowledge (or bel ief) about
the conditions that determine their existence. The meaning of these events for us, in fact, can be said to deri~e
precise ly from those existential conditions. They are Informative about the stable and/or trans ient conditions of
the physical , biolog ical , and/or social forces that determined their occurence (or non-occurrence) and configuration. The important point here is that, while we assign
meanings to such events on the basis of knowledge (or
belief) about the forces that caused them to exist, we do
not see them as having been caused (to any important
degree) in order to convey these meanings to us_. Therefore, while they inform us about those factors wh1ch we
assume (or know) to have caused their occurrence, we do
not sense an authorial intent behind them.
Natural events may be produced by either human or
non-human agency. "However, the signness of a natural
event exists only and solely because, within some context, human beings treat the event as a sign" (i~id.) : To
give a simple example, if I observe a tree bendmg 1n the
wind , my knowledge of meteorology may lead me to
interpret it as a sign of a coming storm. My interpretation
is based upon my knowledge of the forces that caused
the event to occur.
Similarly, I may decide that a person I observe on the
street is a former member of the armed forces because I
notice that he has a crew cut, very erect posture, and
walks with a slight limp. In this case I would be basing my
interpretation upon stereotypic knowledge of the f_ac_tors
that would result in this configuration of charactenst1cs.
Needless to say, I could be mistaken. The point, of
course, is that I would be treating the signs I attende~ to
as informative about stable and/or transient charactenstics of the persons I observe and/or their interactions with
the situations in which I observe them.

13

In contrast, symbolic events are events we assume to
have been intended to communicate something to us.
Further, we assume that these events are articulated by
their "author" in accord with a shared system of rules of
implication and inference. That is, they are determined
not by physical or psychological "laws" but by semiotic
conventions. To assess a sign event as symbolic, then, is
to see it as a "message" intended by its "author" to imply
meaning(s) which can be inferred by those who share the
appropriate code.
If I were to observe, for example, that the man I saw on
the street, in addition to having a crew cut, erect posture,
and a slight limp, wore a lapel pin which read "V.F.W.," I
could then draw the inference that he was, in fact, a
veteran and , moreover, that he was communicating rather
than merely revealing this fact (I leave aside the obvious
possibility of deception, both communicative and "existential").
Worth and I called the interpretation of natural events
"attribution" and the interpretation of symbolic events "inference." The former term was adapted from the area of
attribution theory within social psychology. Originally developed by Fritz Heider in the 1940s, and revived in the
late 1960s by Harold Kelley (1967) and others, attribution
theory focuses on the process by which individuals interpret events "as being caused by particular parts of the
environment" (Heider 1958:297). However, our use of the
term attribution as a label for the interpretation of natural
events is narrower than that used in social psychology,
because we limited it to those interpretations which do
not assume authorial intention .
On the basis of these distinctions we proposed a definition of communication which , in effect, is limited to the
articulation and interpretation of symbolic events:
Commun ication shall therefore be defined as a social process, within a context, in which signs are produced and transmitted , perceived , and treated as messages from which
mean ing can be inferred . [Worth and Gross 1974:30]

Although I have presented these distinctions and definitions in a rather general fashion, we had in mind a
particular set of events and situations-those not obviously and easily defined as natural or as symbolic. We
were interested, that is, in what we termed ambiguous
meaning situations.
Most of the time there is little difficulty in deciding
whether an object or event we notice is natural or symbolic. Most people who might observe the wind bending
a tree outside their window and decide to take an umbrella when they go out would not think the wind was
"telling" them that it might rain. Similarly, if we meet
someone who speaks English with a distinct accent we
may attribute foreign origin to the person but we are unlikely to decide that the accent was intended to communicate the speaker's origin (however, if we find out that
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the speaker left his or her native country many years
before at an early age, we may wonder about that assessment).
When we encounter a symbolic event, on the other
hand, we are likely to see it as intentionally communicative. We usually have little difficulty recognizing these as
communications addressed to us as individuals or as
members of a group, provided we know the code. And we
usually have little difficulty interpreting them, again providing we know the code. Traffic lights are rarely mistaken for Christmas decorations.
One further clarification needs to be made. We were
focusing on the perspective of the person who observes
the sign event and interprets it. A sign event is symbolic
(i.e., communicative) only if it is taken as having been
formed (to an important degree) with the intent of telling
something to the observer. That is, if the observer is
watching two people converse and knows that they are
unaware they are being observed, their conversation ,
while it is a communicative event for them, is a natural
event for the observer. It was not intended to tell the observer anything, and so it can only be seen as informative
about the speakers' stable and/or transient characteristics as revealed in that situation. Of course , certain aspects of the observed event, such as the participants'
clothing or hairstyles, might be assessed as being "messages" addressed not just to the other participant but to
the "public" at large; these aspects might then be assessed as symbolic vis-a-vis our observer.

Life vs. Art
With all these concepts in mind, we turn to events we
encounter not through direct observation but through
photographs or film. Here we find the situation to be more
complex and more interesting. The point of the exercise,
really, was to develop a way of dealing with the interpretation of those mediated events (although mediation can
occur through words and paintings, etc., as well, photographic mediation is the most ambiguous and therefore
the most interesting case).
In our paper we make the suggestion (supported by
empirical studies) that there is a learning process by
wh1ch we come to know how to interpret mediated symbolic events such as films. At the simplest level we
merely recognize the existence of persons, objects, and
events in the film and rnake attributions about them
based on our stereotypic knowledge of such things in
real life. With somewhat more sophistication we can see
relationships between objects and events that are contiguous in time and/or space-they go together. The cru-

cial step, then, is to see this contiguity as the result of an
intention to tell us something-to see it as a sequence or
pattern which is ordered
for the purpose of implying meaning rather than contiguity to
more than one sign event and having the property of conveying meaning through the order itself as well as through elements in that order. [ibid.:32]

The final stage in this hierarchical process is when we
recognize the structure of a sign event, an awareness of
the relations between non-contiguous elements and their
implicative-inferential possibilities: the beginning and
end of a story, variations on a theme, prosodic
patterns, etc.
When we look at a scene recorded on film we need
to decide whether the event was (among other possibilities): (1) "captured candidly" as ~t unfolded naturally
in front of the camera, with the participants seeming not
to know they were being filmed ; (2) photographed unobtrusively so that, while the participants knew about it, it
was done in such a way that they "almost forgot" they
were being filmed; or (3) scripted, staged, and directed
by an "author" working with actors.
If we settle on the first alternative, we are likely to feel
justified in making attributions about the persons in the
film (their characteristics, their feelings, their relationships, etc.). If we choose the second alternative we may
feel somewhat less col}fident in making such attributions,
as we wi II feel that the behavior we observe was somewhat constrained by their knowledge that they were
being filmed. That is, their behavior may be less informative because we know it is also "messageful."
If we take the third alternative we are unlikely to make
attributions of the former sort; here we will interpret the
scene in light of our knowledge of dramatic conventions.
These conventions may be nearly the same as the attri butional stereotypes we use in the first two instances (consequently they might lead us to similar interpretations),
and this is not surprising: naturalistic conventions in
?rama aim precisely at evoking attributional knowledge
1n order to convey "lifelikeness" to characters and situations. However, they need not be the same. We may
" ~now" that the cowboy in the black hat is the bad guy
Without also believing that anyone we see in real life
wearing a black hat is a criminal.
The point is that, although events encountered in "life"
and in "art" may look the same, we make different assumptions about the factors that determine their occurrence and configuration. Because the conclusions
reached may be the same, in order to decide whether an
interpretation is attributional (the observer is assessing
the event as "life"-a natural event) or inferential (the
observer is assessing the event as "art"-a symbolic
event), we need to know the grounds on which it would be
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justified. If asked how we know something we have con?luded about an event we have observed, we might say it
IS because of what we know about the way such things
happen (attributional interpretation); or we might say we
know it because we are assuming the event was made to
happen that way in order to tell us something (communicational inference).
We hoped that this model would clarify some issues
Worth had addressed in earlier papers. Most immediately, it allowed us to say that the tendency to see
films as objective records of events rather than as a
filmmaker's statement about events derived from a confusion of interpretive strategies. The naivete Worth had attacked in many anthropologists and others who were filmically unsophisticated took the form of assuming filmed
events could uncritically be interpreted as natural. What
such viewers failed to understand was that all mediated
events are to some degree symbolic. There are always
decisions made by the mediating agent-what to shoot
(and consequently, what not to shoot) and how; and having shot, how to edit the footage (one rarely sees raw
footage); and finally when, where, and how to exhibit the
finished film.
A sophisticated viewer will recognize that the persons,
objects, and events in a film are there at least in part
because the filmmaker included them intentionally; that
the sequence of events in the film has been ordered by
the filmmaker's intention to say something by putting
them in that order (which may not be the order in which
they actually occurred) ; and that the overall structure of
the film reflects the filmmaker's intention and ability to
use implicational conventions in order to communicate to
viewers who are competent to draw the appropriate
inferences.
From this perspective it should be clear why Arnheim's
statement that "the world can present its inherent order to
the eye and that seeing consists in understanding this
order" so infuriated Worth. He saw this view as contributing to the kind of approach to film represented by
Youngblood's advocacy of a cinema which was "entirely
personal . .. rests on no identifiable plot and is not probable. The viewer is forced to create along with the film"
(Youngblood 1970:64). Worth's response to this was
fierce :
Tyros in the arts always forget that creation and originality
cannot even be recognized (or perceived) except within a
context of convention and rule-like behavior-especially in
the arts. It is not within the context of an ordered universe that
art exists, but rather within the context of man's conventions
for ordering that universe.[1974:282]
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Cracking the Code
In the period following the initial development of our
theory of interpretation Worth devoted much of his attention to the elaboration and extension of this approach to
understanding how people derive meanings from visual
images. He was interested in exploring both the properties which were unique to visual communication and
those which could be generalized to other symbolic
modes. One of his first efforts in the latter direction came
in response to a request that he prepare a commentary
on a special issue of New Literary History devoted to
metaphor.
Worth began his paper with the observation that "every
author [in the issue] 'assumes' that metaphor is a verbal
event-a verbal 'thing' of some sort" (1974b:195). He then
posed the question of whether-and how-the concept
of metaphor could be applied to events in other modes.
The answer he gave was that "metaphor is a structure
composed of elements in any mode ... related in certain
ways" (ibid.:196). The rest of the paper was largely directed towards an analysis of the metaphoric possibilities
of visual images and the argument that "visual structures
can clarify a general and abstract notion of metaphor"
(ibid. :197).
Worth described several examples of filmic metaphors
and said that the problems they raise are those of "syntactic forms for nonverbal matters for which we have very
little social agreement" (ibid.:199). How do we know what
such metaphors mean?
When Eisenstein used a sequence in his film Strike in
which a close-up of a factory foreman (who has informed
the cossacks about a coming strike) is followed by a
close-up of a jackal, audiences interpret this as "akin to
the verbal notion of 'the informer is a jackal"' (ibid.:198).
Or, to repeat an earlier example, we "know" that the cowboy in the black hat is the bad guy. Worth's point here
was that the understanding of metaphor depends upon
our ability to apply the correct interpmtive strategy to
infer the implied meaning:
Metaphor is a communicational code depending upon the
recognition of structure and the assumption of intention on the
part of the "articulator" ... of the form we are to treat as
metaphor. [ibid.:200]

For example, it is our recognition of metaphoric intention that tells us Eisenstein has sequenced his shots in
order to imply that foreman= jackal, and that we should
not read these as merely contiguous events. In this case,
the brief introduction of the jackal shot as a "break" in the
plot signals us that it is a metaphoric comment rather
than a narrative development. "The important point is that
every culture provides its 'native speakers' in any mode
with a code for interpretation" (ibid. :202).
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Worth devoted the second half of the paper to an
analysis of caricature as visual metaphor. Using Sparshott's conception (in the collection he was discussing)
that metaphor is "talking about something as it is not,"
Worth suggests that
metaphor might most fruitfully be understood in comparison
with theories and concepts of caricature rather than with
theories of representation. [ibid.:204]

Noting that verbal metaphors are statements which are
neither literally true nor false, Worth says that a caricature
is
a structure that reveals a set of meanings intended to communicate a certain set of relationships within some understood or understandable context and bounds .... A caricature is . . . a structure that relates several elements on one
level (in shorthand-that of "reality") with elements on another
level (the symbolic). It puts things together both as they are
and as they are not, and the point of caricature, like that of
metaphor, is that neither is only a "portrait." [ibid.]

Metaphor, in Worth's analysis, thus becomes a central
component of the structural code we learn "for the intentional creation of meaning within specific contexts"
(ibid. :209). It is a particularly rich syntactical device for
implying and inferring meanings in each mode of symbolic experience.
Knowing about metaphor means knowing how to organize the
universe within our minds, knowing systems of myth, of
grammar, of behavior, value and art as they are defined by our
group now, and have been in the past. [ibid .:208]

What Pictures Can Say
The larger questions raised by Worth's analysis of
metaphor were addressed in his next paper, in which he
set out "to begin an exploration into how, and what kinds
of things pictures mean" and also to explore "how the way
that pictures mean differs from the way such things as
'words' or 'languages' mean" (1975:85). 8
The title of the paper, "Pictures Can't Say Ain't," signals
one of its main arguments, namely that among things
pictures cannot imply are negative statements. But before
getting to that point, Worth began by discussing the general status of pictures as symbolic events.
Using the model of symbolic vs. natural events first
presented in our joint paper, Worth argued that a picture
is never a natural event, but always a "created social
artifact." He then recounts the notions of attribut ional interpretation as contrasted with communication inference,
making the point that an appropriate interpretation of any
picture always assumes that it was structured intentionally for the purpose of implying meaning. Worth invokes
Grice's classic analysis of intention and meaning, quoting Grice's view that not merely must a symbolic event
have been articulated "with the intention of inducing a
certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an
audience to recognize the intention behind the utterance"
(Grice 1957:382).
The next point Worth emphasizes is that we must learn
to interpret pictures by learning the system of conventions-the code-used by their makers to imply meanings. Pictures cannot be taken as merely "corresponding "
to reality, and therefore we do not merely "recognize"
what they mean ; we infer meanings on the basis of
learned conventions.
Worth here is arguing against two groups who have
denied that pictures carry intentional meaning: certain
logical positivists and linguists who believe that only "the
linguistic mode is capable of meaning" (Worth 1975:93),
and others, including some artists, who feel that pictures
can mean anything anyone sees in them. "No artistic
impl ication should .. . become a grab bag for everyone
to reach into and pull out what he himself has put in"
(ibid. :97).
It we take art seriously as communication, we must
acknowledge the separate roles and respons ibilities of
the artist and the audience. Each performs a distinct and
complementary task in the communicative process. The
audience doesn't make the work, but interprets it:
. . . the reader ... does not write any part of the poem, any
more than the viewer paints the picture or makes the film. The
reader (viewer), if he can participate in a communicat ions
event, recogni zes the work's structure, assumes an intention
to mean on the part of the creator, and proceeds to his extremely comp lex job of making inferences from the implications he can recognize. [ibid.]
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Turning next to the question of what "pictures cannot do
that words can do," Worth answers that "pictures cannot
deal with what is not"; they can't say ain't. After disposing
of several trivial examples of what might be seen as pictorial negation, calling these "linguistic uses of visual form
which become sign events in a special language" (e.g.,
"no smoking" images), he discusses the general concept
of what pictorial images affirm or deny.
Although much of "what is pictured is often valued for
what it negates by leaving out," pictures cannot specify,
out of all the things that are not shown, which the painter
means to say are not the case. "All that pictures can show
is whatis-on the picture surface" (ibid .:98).
On the other hand, pictures should also not be taken as
necessarily affirming the existence of what they do show.
Worth draws a connection between the fact that pictures
seem to show us things-particularly photographs, which
we tend to believe are the product of a machine that "tells
it like it is"-and our tendency to see "false" pictures not
as negations but as false affirmations.
Pictures in and of themselves are not propositions that make
true or false statements; that we can make truth tables about,
or that we can paraphrase in the same medium. Pictures, it
must be remembered , are not representations or correspondences, with or of, reality. Rather, they const itute a "reality" of their own. [ibid. :102]

But, if this is the case, how do we make sense of pictures? What do they tell us and how? Worth gives two
answers: first, pictures imply-and we infer-an existential awareness of particular persons, objects, and events
that are ordered and structured so as to imply meanings
by the use of specific conventions ; second, "what Larry
Gross [1973] has termed the communication of competence." Pictures communicate the skill and control with
which their structures have been manipulated according
to a variety of rules, conventions, and contexts.
Pushing the argument further, Worth reiterates the point
that "matching to the real world is insufficient to explain
how pictures mean," and goes on to say that
correspondence, if it makes any sense as a concept, is not
correspondence to "reality" but rather corresponde~ce to
conventions, rules, forms and structures for structunng the
world around us. What we use as a standard for correspondence is our knowledge of how people make picturespictorial structures-how they made them in the past, ho~
they make them now, and how they will make them for vanous
purposes in various contexts. [ibid::104]

Worth's answer, then, to the question he had posed at the
beginning of the paper is that pi~tur~s commu.nicate "the
way picture makers structure the1r d1alogue w1th the
world."
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Toward an Ethnographic Semiotic
Worth's theoretical investigations did not draw him away
from his concern with the development of a discipline
which studies visual communications in a fashion compatible with that theory. In 1976 he delivered a paper at a
symposium honoring Margaret Mead on her 75th birthday (1980). That paper adressed the need for scholars to
understand properly the uses and the limitations of visual
communications.
He distinguished between the use of visual images
and media as research tools and as research material. In
the case of the former he used Margaret Mead's work with
Gregory Bateson as an example of how pictures can be
used by a researcher to illustrate patterns of culture . The
point he felt needed to be emphasized once again-it is
a point we all forget too easily-is that "the photo is not
the pattern" but something we use as evidence to illustrate pattern.
Taking photographs, or looking or taking notes are tools for
articulating and stating patterns we, as anthropologists, wish
to show to others. [ibid .:17]

And there is an important corollary: the value of the photograph lies in the analysis. The researcher-photographer
who understands what patterns he or she wishes to present will take photographs which will be capable of showing these patterns to others. Success is not a matter of
luck but of training , skill, and intention. Bateson's and
Mead's photographs are valuable because of their
knowledge of what they were photographing and why
they were photographing.
The reason their photographs and films are records is that
they were taken in ways which allowed them to be analyzed
so as to illustrate patterns observed by scientists who know
what they were looking for. [ibid .]

The second use of photographs and films is as objects
and events which can be studied in the context of the
culture within which they were used. Here the pattern is in
the picture and the context(s) of its making. These images are analyzed as parts of culture in their own right,
"just as conversations, novels, plays, and other symbolic
behavior have been understood to be" (ibid.).
This latter approach is one Worth was later to call
ethnographic semiotics, the study of how actual people
make and interpret a variety of visual images and events.
These images and events range from the personal and
private to the collective and public, from painting and
sculpture through television, movies, and photographs
(including home movies, snapshots, and photo-albums),
store windows, and other forms of everyday presentation
of self through visual means.
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Here one looks for patterns dealing with, for example, what
can be photographed and what cannot, what content can be
displayed , was actually displayed, and how that display was
organized and structured. Was it arranged according to how
these people tell stories? To how they speak, or to the very
language and grammar that they use? [ibid.]

In the last two years of his life Worth gave considerable
attention to the formulation of an empirical application of
his concept of an ethnographic semiotics. He was determined to demonstrate rather than merely to advocate the
feasibility and validity of l:lis aproach to the study of visual
communications. At the time of his death he was preparing two grant applications. The first was for a fellowship
that would give him a year in which to write a book,
Fundamentals of Visual Communication, which would
present a framework through which the process and
structure people use to make interpretations of our visual
universe might be understood.
The second application was for a grant to support a
project he proposed to conduct with Jay Ruby. That project, to be carried out over a period of three years, was to
be a study of the visual symbolic environment of a small
American community in central Pennsylvania. This was
an enormously ambitious and exciting project, proposing
to use as the unit of analysis not specific symbolic products but the "context-the community and the community
members' interaction with visual symbolic events."
In his paper honoring Margaret Mead Worth noted, "I
am aware that, even as we try to develop a history in this
field, we also are in many ways that same history." Sol will
remain an important part of the history of studying visual
communications.
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In the preparation of this introduction I benefited from comments and
suggestions by George Custen , Paul Messaris, Jay Ruby, and Tobia L.
Worth . I also drew upon Richard Chalfen's paper, "The Contributions of
Sol Worth to the Anthropology of Visual Communication."
The choice of the Navajo in this example was not accidental. Worth
had already been discussing this idea with John Adair, a longtime
student of the Navajo, who later collaborated with him on the project.
I should mention here the fact that Worth's later repudiation of the
mirror-image model was in large part the resu lt of many discussions
between the two of us during the period 1968-1972. The arguments
summarized in this paragraph represent the position I maintained in
opposition to the implication on Worth's part of sender-receiver
"isomorphism " in the communication process.
I should alert the reader that later, in our joint paper, "Symbolic Strategies" (1974) , this terminology was significantly altered. Needing a
general term for intentionally articulated arrangements of elements,
Worth and I used "order" for this purpose, using "sequence" to designate temporal orderings and "pattern" to designate spatial orderings of
sign elements. In contrast to "order" we used the term "contigu ity " to
designate the "juxtaposition of units or events over time, space or
position" (1974 :32) where the perceiver does not assume that this arrangement was intended to imply mean ing(s).
A major influence on Worth's thinking at this time was the emerging
field of sociol inguistics. In particular, he was impressed with the work
of Dell Hymes, who had come to the University of Pennsylvania in
1965.
As of the Spring 1980 issue (6:1), the name of the journal was changed
to Studies in Visual Communication.
Richard Chalfen , who had assisted on the Navajo project, was at that
time conduct ing dissertation research which combined the approaches of Worth and Hymes. Chalfen used the term "soc iovidistics"
to designate an "ethnography of film communicat ion" (Cha lfen 1974,
1977).
Many of these questions were also addressed in a later paper, "Man Is
Not a Bird " (1978) .
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Introduction

Editors' Note: This article was completed by Gregory
Bateson in 1945 as part of a multidisciplinary research
effort called "The Study of Culture at a Distance" (see
Mead and Metraux 1953 and Metraux 1980 for a description of the projects). Until now only excerpts of the work
have appeared in print (Bateson 1943, 1953). The first
three reels of Quex (approximately 45 minutes) with Bateson's analytic titles are available for rent from the
Museum of Modern Art Film Library, 11 West 53rd Street,
New York, N.Y 10019. All illustrations in this article are
frames from the film that were added by the editors.
Frame enlargements are by courtesy of the Museum of
Modern Art. The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Mary Corliss, Stills Archivist, Museum of
Modern Art.
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1980
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Gregory Bateson (1904-1980) was a naturalist, ethnographer, and pioneer researcher into human and
animal communication. Among his many achievements are the "double-bind" hypothesis about the origins of schizophrenia; his collaborative studies with
Margaret Mead on Balinese nonverbal communication; and his work in cybernetics.

This essay is an experiment in film analysis, and it consists in the detailed examination of a single Nazi film,
Hitlerjunge Quex, which was released in Berlin on September 19, 1933. Other workers have applied other scientific methods to the analysis of film material; in particular,
Dorothy Jones (n.d.) has examined American films statistically, noting especially the frequencies of various types
of sociological events in film plots, and comparing these
with the frequencies of the same events in real life, thus
obtaining a picture of how life is distorted, exaggerated,
or suppressed on the screen. Siegfried Kracauer (1942)
has used another approach in the analysis of German
newsreels and documentary films. He has examined a
considerable bulk of these films from a technical point of
view, using the contrapuntal relations between visuals,
speech, and sound to give a general picture of Nazi
propaganda methods and the special view of life which
these methods express.
The present analysis differs from both of these in that it
is concerned with the weaving of themes within a single
fictional film. The purpose, too, of the present analysis is
different, in that where Dorothy Jones asked, "How does
what is shown on the screen differ from real life?", and
Kracauer asked, "What are the Nazis trying to say on the
screen, and how do they say it?", the present research
asks, "What sort of people are the Nazis?"
The question has many sorts of importance. Wherever,
either in war or after the war, we are concerned with
Germany, our actions must be guided by an understanding of what sort of people the Nazis are and how Nazism
is related to the character and culture of pre-Nazi Germany. Our whole intelligence service depends upon an
abi Iity to guess at German motivation, and when, for
example, we analyze German radio propaganda, treating
it as an indication of the state of the German morale, our
analysis rests in the end upon certain assumptions about
what sort of people the propagandists are. Equally, if we
want to estimate the effect of Nazi propaganda in the
United States or in South America, or in some other nonGerman region, we need to know what sort of people the
Nazis are.
In this latter case the Nazi character is, of course, only
one element in a complex situation, and even to estimate
the direction of the effect of Nazi propaganda we shall
need a similar study of character and culture in the affected country. With such a double knowledge of the nature of Nazism and of the propagandized population we
will, however, be able to tell exactly what' sort of susceptibility the population may have to the Nazi creed and
which parts of the creed are likely to appeal to them.
At the present time the sciences of anthropology and
psychology are engaged in devising the techniques for
precisely this sort of description of the various sorts of
character appropriate to and implicit in the cultures of
different peoples (Bateson 1942; Erikson 1942; Gorer
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1942; Mead 1943). The present study is therefore intended to make two sorts of contribution: first, a contribution to the methods of analyzing human behavior and
human culture, and second, a more specific contribution
to our understanding of Nazism.
The film which is here analyzed has three principal
connections with Nazism: (1) Nazis are shown on the
screen, (2) the film was made by Nazis, and (3) the film
was used to make Nazis, that is, to induce a Nazi frame of
mind in the audience. Since we are interested to know the
psychology of this Nazi frame of mind, we are naturally
concerned chiefly with the second and third of these
connections. The picture of Nazis which the filmmakers
put on the screen cannot be taken as an objective or
ethnological record of Nazi behavior, being no doubt subject to all sorts of distortion, exaggeration of some aspects and suppression of others. The camera-and especially the motion picture camera-can lie freely about
whatever passes in front of the lens, but inasmuch as the
film was made by Nazis and used to make Nazis, we
believe that at a certain level of abstraction the film must
tell us the truth about Nazism.
A painting, a poem, or a dream may give an exceedingly false picture of the real world, but insofar as the
painter or the dreamer is an artist, insofar as he has complete control of his medium, the artistic product must of
necessity tell us about the man himself. In the same way
this film, insofar as it is an integrated work of art-and we
shall see that it is very highly integrated-must tell us
about the psychology of its makers, and tell us perhaps
more than they intended to tell .
We shall not in the course of this analysis ask whether
the filmmakers were conscious or unconscious of what
they put into the film, but since this question is commonly
raised by those who approach the analysis of propaganda for the first time, and since the notion of unconscious mental processes is difficult to grasp, it is necessary to make clear the assumptions about the unconscious upon which this analysis is based.
It is assumed that the filmmakers continually put together details which appeared to them to be artistically
appropriate, and further, that in many cases what was
implied by such montage or editorial arrangement was
consciously meant. In other cases, no doubt, the
filmmakers did not stop to ask what was implicit in the
way in which they put the details together, but were only
conscious of their appropriateness. In such cases we assume that they liked the symbolic implications of what
they had done, at least so long as t~ese implications did
not come to their conscious attention.
It is not possible, however, to tell in any given case
whether the filmmakers were ful~y conscious, partially
conscious, or unconscious of whaUhey were doing, and
therefore this question is not asked in the analysis. There
are several passages in the film where it appears that the
script writers had at least a parlor acquaintance with
Freudian psychology. In one case, for example, we are
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shown on the screen an incident in which a Communist
thrusts a banana into a girl's mouth, and this incident fails
to achieve spontaneity. It is as if the filmmakers departed
from their own methods of artistic creation to introduce a
piece of Freudian symbolism almost by recipe. If they
have done this once, they may have done it many times in
the course of the film, and there are no criteria which
would enable us to tell whether a given detail or combination of details was spontaneous or calculated. It is not
possible ever to determine whether the filmmakers were
conscious of the implications of the various themes in the
film, and we shall therefore refrain from asking this question. Those who feel that the analysis leans toward overinterpretation are recommended to look for the sort of "artistic appropriateness" which probably appealed to the
filmmakers and then to consider what the logical implications of such appropriateness are.
Another feature of this analysis which may be confusing to the nontechnical reader concerns the relationship
between psychological and anthropological techniques.
A film is not the idiosyncratic production of a single artist
working by himself and for himself; it is created by a
group of filmmakers working in close cooperation and
with an eye on a popular audience. Therefore it has been
assumed in the analysis that what seemed artistically
appropriate to the filmmakers was also psychologically
germane to Nazism-that the unconscious implications
of the film were also themes implicit in Nazism as a
whole, whether or not Nazis were or are generally conscious of them . In the analysis, the film has been treated
not merely as an individual's dream or work of art, but
also as a myth. We have applied to it the sort of analysis
that the anthropologist applies to the mythology of a
primitive or modern people.
The anthropologist has an essential touchstone by
which he tests his interpretations of any given myth or
record of behavior. His analysis is not confined to that
one item; he has in his notebooks many other myths,
many descriptions of the ritual behavior and the daily life
of the people whom he is studying, and he is able always
to take eqch detail of his interpretation of the myth and to
compare it with the wider background of other data upon
that culture. If the interpretation is correct, he will be able
to find numerous other instances in the culture which the
same interpretation would fit; and if the interpretation is
incorrect, he will be able to find instances in the culture to
disprove it. Still more important, he will be able to say
immediately of many possible interpretations: "No; this is
wrong. This interpretation does not fit the people whom
I knew."
We have tried, in the present analysis, to create a
touchstone of this kind. Before beginning the analysis of
this film, and during the course of this analysis, the
analyst has been cooperating in a more general study of
German and Nazi culture (Erikson 1942). This work has
been done under the auspices of the Council of Intercultural Relations, and has consisted in a series of detailed

22

studies in Visual Communication

anthropological interviews with a number of social scientists1 who have had intimate experience of German
culture.
These interviews have been of two sorts. The majority
were directed toward discovering the major themes of
German culture. The social scientists were asked in an
anthropological interview to discuss their own experiences in Germany-especially their experiences as children in a German family setting. Simultaneously they
were asked to comment as social scientists upon these
experiences, their significance, and the degree to which
they might be regarded as typical. These interviews were
recorded verbatim.
A further series of interviews was used to check the
specific interpretations arrived at in this analysis. The
social scientists were invited to a showing of the film and
were invited to comment on the interpretation. As a result
of these various comments, the analysis has been revised
in many ways, but since not all the comments made have
involved reinterpretation of the analysis, the writer
alone is responsible for the interpretations which are
here offered .
Last, it is necessary to stress that this analysis makes
rather unusual assumptions about the nature of propaganda. In most content analyses the various statements
in a piece of communication-for example, a film or a
statistical picture of the propagandic content of the
communication. 2 In such an analysis, in its extreme form,
Communist sentiment uttered by the Communists in this
film would have to be counted as items of Communistic
propaganda, which would be absurd. In the present
analysis, however, the emphasis will lie on the context of
each event shown on the screen, the film as a whole will
be regarded as a single psychological or artistic unit,
and each event on the screen will be seen as set in the
context of the film as a whole.
This means that we shall attribute propagandic effect
to the plot and its structure rather than to isolated details.
We shall assume that what the audience learns from the
film is not so much to ape the explicit sentiments of the
hero nor to adopt his opinions, but rather that they acquire the ways of thought of the propagandist. We are
interested in knowing what sort of people the Nazis are,
and in order to find this out we shall assume that the
audience learns from the film to accept as artistically
appropriate those things which the filmmaker has put
together-in fact, that the audience consciously or unconsciously will acquire Nazi habits of thought.

Reasons for the Selection of This Film
For this type of analysis it was essential that the film
selected should have certain characteristics.
1 It should show both the Nazis and their enemies on the
screen. There are many propagandic films intended to
promote a Nazi frame of mind which achieve this end by
indirect means. Faehrmann Maria (1935), for example,
contains an excellent symbolic expression of the Nazi
attitudes toward death, but the whole film is set back in
the realm of fantasy and the Nazis themselves do not
appear on the screen. Friesennot similarly contains a
great deal of material which expresses the Nazi attitudes
toward sex and the Nazi notions of conflict between the
generations, but this story is set in Russia and deals with
an old German colony invaded by Bolsheviks; Nazism
does not appear on the screen and, therefore, though the
equation is obvious, it is not possible to say definitively
that the younger generation of these colonial Germans
stands as a symbol of Nazism.
To make all these other films available for analysis it
was first necessary to establish the basic symbolic equations, and this could best be done by analyzing a film
which showed the Nazis and their enemies explicitly
labeled on the screen. Such a film makes it possible to
dissect out the relationship between these two fixed
points and the whole range of phenomena-parenthood,
adolescence, maturity, cleanliness, sex, aggression,
passivity, and death-which are embraced by the Nazi
view of life.
Few German films meet this requirement. On Horst
Wessel's birthday (October 9) in 1933, Dr. Goebbels addressed a gathering of German film producers and his
speech contained the following passage:
We National Socialists do not particularly care for the mere
fact that our S.A. marches over the stage or the screen. Its
realm is in the street. But when somebody approaches the
solution of National Socialist problems artistically, he must
realize (sich klar sein) that in this case, too, art does not come
from wishing (wollen) but knowing how (kennen). Even an
ostentatiously presented National Socialist conviction
(Gesinnung) cannot make up for the lack of true art, by a long
way. The National Socialist government never has demanded
~hat S.A. films be produced. On the contrary: it sees a danger
1n too many. ~ut when a company nevertheless approaches
the pre~entat1on (Darstellung) of the values arising from life
(Erlebmswerte) of our S.A. or the National Socialist idea then
this film must be of first-class artistic quality. Therefore it,is not
easy (bequem) but, on the contrary, extremely difficult because [the filmmakers are] responsible to the entire nation to
make an S.A. film. The task one undertakes there demand~
staking (Einsa.tz) of all the best (aile besten) talent, and only
truly great art1sts can accomplish it. National Socialism is
under.n~ cir?umstances a guarantee of approval (Freibrief)
for.art1st1c fa1lure. On the contrary: the greater the idea that is
bemg presented, the greater the artistic demands that must
be made of it. [Kalbus 1935].
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~hat the effects of this speech were we cannot judge,
but many case very few films of this sort have been
made ..There have been documentaries (e.g., Triumph
des Wtllens, 1934; Fuer Uns, 1937; Sieg im Westen) dealing with various sorts of Nazi ceremonial, newsreels, and
the films of conquest which were made officially, but the
only available fictional films containing the Nazi uniform
were those produced in the early years of Nazism. These
included S.A. Man Brandt (1933), Hans Westmar (1933),
Blutendes Deutschland (1933), and lch fuer Oich (1934).
2 For this type of analysis, the film should contain a large
mass of material on the German family. This criterion was
introduced for practical reasons. It so happens that in
anthropology and psychology the most effective techniques for the description of human character have been
based on analysis of family life, especially of the parentchild relationship. It would have been possible-indeed,
in anthropology, we are often compelled to do this-to
have performed similar analyses outside the family setting. But such analyses are less vivid and are less useful
in comparative studies of more than one culture. If it is
possible to refer the peculiarities of, say, religious behavior back to the family, then comparison between one culture and another becomes comparatively easy because,
although the elements present in one religious system
may be very different from those present in another, the
basic elements of the family are almost universal and
only differently arranged in different parts of the world.
Actually, the Nazis have used the family setting as a
springboard for their propaganda in several films and
even in Mein Kampf. 3
3 The film should be a good film in two senses: first, the
acting should be good enough to give an accurate impression of the emotions intended; and second, the film
should be a close-knit artistic unit so that the themes and
incidents of the plot can be readily seen in relation to the
film as a whole.
4 The film should carry the imprimatur of official Nazi approval and should have been successful with Nazi audiences. It is true that every film is a product of cooperative
work and therefore must show a cultural norm rather than
individual idiosyncracies, but this criterion is introduced
as a further guarantee of Nazi cultural normality. The festivities at the premiere of this film and the fact that the film
is said to have been kept on the commercial screens for
an unusually long time are a proof of official Nazi approval, but, unfortunately, we have no data on audience
reactions. The film Hitlerjunge Quex amply satisfies these
criteria.
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Basic Data on the Film
The .film Hitlerjunge Quex was shown to Hitler at the
Ufapalast in Munich on September 12, 1933, and had its
premiere in Berlin, at the Ufapalast am Zoo, a week later.
This premiere was made into a great occasion with a
symphony by Bruckner and a speech by the Youth
Leader, Baldur von Schirach. 4
The print of the film which was used for this analysis
was obtained from the Reichsfilmarchiv, in 1938, by the
M~seum of Modern Art Film Library, and in the analysis a
mimeographed transcript of the film, also obtained from
the Reichsfilmarchiv, has been used.
Length: The film is nine reels in length and lasts about 1
hour and 40 minutes.
Titles: The film carries credit titles in German, which are
here reproduced in translation:

a

UFA presents (zeigt)

b "Hitlerjunge Quex"
c A film of the spirit of sacrifice (Opfergeist) of German
youth.

d Produced under the auspices (Protektorat) of the Youth
Leader of the German Reich, Baldur von Schirach.

e After the novel by-K. A Schenzinger
Script-K. A Schenzinger
B. E. Luethge
Camera .... . . . ........ ...... Konstantin lrmen-Tschot
Setting ......................... ... Benno von Arent
Arthur Gunther
Sound ............. . ............. . ... Walter Tjaden

g Music ......................... Hans-Otto Bergmann
Words of Hitler Youth Song ........ Baldur von Schirach
h Cast:
Father Voelker ...................... Heinrich George
Mother Voelker ......................... Berta Drews
Heini .................................. a Hitler boy
Stoppel ...................... Hermann Speelmanns
Gerda .............................. Rotraut Richter
Wilde ................................. Karl Heixner
District Leader Kass .................. Claus Clausen
Fritz Doerries ........................... a Hitler boy
Ulla Doerries ........................... a Hitler girl
k Hospital sister ....................... Franziska Kinz
Grundler ........................... Hans Ramspott
Franz ................................ Hans Richter
Boys and Girls of the Berlin Hitler Youth
m Director: Hans Steinhoff
n Producer: Karl Ritter
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Summary of the Plot

Figure 1 Heini's father begging his wife for beer money.

o Prepared with Klangfilm apparatus
Afifa-Sound-Track

p Ufa
q End

The five analyses which follow will all be in part selective
summaries of the film, differing from each other in the
type of selection involved. To orient the reader in these
analyses, it is necessary to provide at this stage a somewhat less selective summary. All summaries are necessarily in some measure selective and therefore fall short
of objectivity. The present summary is, however, objective in the sense that each statement is objectively true,
but the summary as a whole was written after the study of
the film had been completed and is specifically designed to enable the reader to follow the steps of the
various analyses.
The hero of this film is Heini Voelker, a preadolescent
boy, the son of a violent father and a drudge mother. His
parents are of the lower middle class and have fallen in
the world as a result of the inflation and the father's war
wounds.
Two hungry Communist boys steal apples from a
vendor in the street, and Heini's father intervenes in their
favor when the vendor talks about putting them in prison.
In the crowd there is a sinister Communist agitator, Wilde,
who makes a speech and provokes a riot in which Heini's
father hurts himself, stumbling over the curbstone. He is
helped home by Stoppel, an organizer of Communist
youth. The Voelkers live in a poor Communist district of
Berlin. Stoppel helps the mother to dress the father's
wound.
The father asks the mother for money to get some beer.
She says that she has no money, and a violent scene
follows, the father ransacking all the containers in the
house in search of the mother's hiding place. At this moment Heini returns home from his work in a printing shop
(arriving so that we see the climax of the scene between
the parents through the eyes of the son). At the printing
shop Heini had received a tip of 1 mark. He secretly gives
this mark to his mother. She gives it to the father, who then
goes off to get his beer. Stoppel is impressed by Heini's
character and contacts him with a view to enlisting him in
the Communist Youth International. (Figures 1, 2.)
After Stoppel leaves, the mother opens the window and
lets in the mechanical music of a merry-go-round at the
neighboring fair. Heini is thus reminded of a wonderful
knife which he has seen in a lottery in one of the
sideshows. He asks his mother to enter this lottery, which
he is sure that he will win. She gets money from the hiding
place in the coffee grinder and gives it to him. Heini goes
to the lottery and loses. (Figure 3.)
Stoppel appears at Heini's elbow, comforts him, and
invites him to join a hike of the Communist Youth on the
following day. Heini accepts.
On the hike, Heini sees the Hitler Youth, a company of
whom are hiking on the same train to the same woods. He
is disgusted by the gross behavior of the "Communists"
and especially by a kiss which Gerda, one of the Communist girls, forces upon him. Finally he wanders in the
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Figure 2 Heini 's father demanding pennies for beer.
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Figure 3 Heini and his mother listening to the merry-goround music while Heini begs for money for the lottery.

dark, away from the Communist camp, ti ll he hears the
"Hitler Youth Song " coming from the Nazi camp. He
gazes through the buses at the Nazis who are celebrating
the summer solstice. The Nazis find him and accuse him
of spying ; Fritz, the boy leader of one of the Nazi troops,
sends him away. The vo ice of Ulla, Fritz's sister, is heard
saying that he might have become a convert, but by this
time Heini has sadly gone away. He sleeps by himself on
the bare ground , and next morning , after watch ing the
Nazis with longing eyes, he goes home to his mother.
(Figure 4.)
He tells her he was with the Nazis and they were not so
bad ; they were wonderful. His mother is worried but not
angry with him. She even lets him sing the "Hitler Youth
Song" (without warning him that his father is in the next
room) . The father hears the song and comes in, furious.
He compels Heini to sing the "lnternationale," boxing his
ears while he sings.
Next day at school Heini again meets Gerda and
avoids her advances. He approaches Fritz and is invited
by him to supper. Gerda meanwhile has been told by
Stoppel to vamp Grundler, a weak Nazi boy, and while
Fritz and Heini go off to supper, Gerda and Grundler go
off to seek "Turkish Delight" at the fair.
At supper in this middle-class home, Fritz and Ulla ask
Heini to come to the opening of their new Nazi clubroom
(Heim). Heini hesitates because he has no key with which
to return home after the meeting. Finally he accepts when
put on his mettle by Fritz.

The father, meanwhile, has been persuaded by Stoppel
to sign Heini into the Communist Youth. When Heini
comes home, his father at once informs him that he is to
go that night to the Communist Local. Heini says, "Do I
get a house key?", and the father says, "Of course-you
are now a grown man, and a grown man has a house key."
The father then makes a long, friendly speech to Heini
about the difficulties of life and how "you young ones
must help us older people." Heini is almost in tears and
says later to his mother, "Father is not so bad-1 cannot lie
to him-he gave me a house key." He is determined,
however, not to go to the Communist meeting.
He goes out that evening but meets Stoppel , who
draws him aside into a doorway and tells him that the
Communists are going to raid the Nazi clubroom and that
he is to help in the raid . Heini manages to slip away
without taking an active part, but when the police come
he is picked up and taken to the police station.
The police tell him to "go home to Mother." The Nazis
think he has set the Communists onto them, and as he
leaves the police station, they accusELhim of treachery.
(We are given no further information about the events of
that night, nor do we see Heini use the house key to return
to the bosom of his family.)
Next day Stoppel tells Heini that he was a hero because he did not tell anything to the police and that tonight they will get dynamite from the Communists' cache
in the Marschstrasse and blow up that nest of Nazis.
Heini protests and finally says he will warn the Nazi boys.
Stoppel is shocked and tells Heini that that is something
which one does "only once in a life," but in the end Stoppel shrugs his shoulders and dismisses the matter.
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Figure 4 The "disorderly" Communists march past the
Hitler Youth at the train station.

When Stoppel leaves, Heini rushes to the telephone. to
warn Fritz and Ulla. Ulla answers the telephone but Fntz
tells her not to listen to that traitor. Ulla is worried by
Heini's mention of dynamite, but she obediently hangs up
and Heini is left talking into a dead phone. In despair, he
tries to persuade the police to interfere, but they again
treat him as a child. He then tries to find Stoppel
but cannot.
Suddenly, while Heini is at the fair looking for Stoppel,
there is a violent explosion-the Nazis have blown up the
Communists' cache of dynamite-and Heini starts for
home whistling the Youth Song.
Stoppel knows that it is Heini who has betr~yed them,
and he goes to the Voelkers' home where he f1nds only
the mother. In the conversation which follows, the mother
gets at first an impression that Stoppel has killed Heini
and later a general fear that the Communists will kill him.
Heini arrives after Stoppel has left and finds his mother
in a state of despair. She tries to persuade him to make up
with Stoppel but fails in this because Heini is now sure.
that the Nazis will accept him. Heini goes to sleep on h1s
bed while his mother sits weeping beside him. Finally,
she turns on the gas to kill both herself and Heini, and the
screen is filled with billowing fumes.

Heini awakes in a hospital. A nurse says, "There is ..
somebody to see you." Heini s~ys, ".MY mot~er?", but 1t IS
the Nazi boys and Ulla. They g1ve h1m a un1form and a
mirror in which to admire himself. After they have gone
the nurse comes, and while she removes the Nazi cap
from his head, she tells him that his mother will never
come.
. .
While Heini is convalescent, his father and the d1stnct
leader of the Nazis happen to visit him simultaneously
and the question is discussed-"Where does the boy.
belong?". The Nazi wins this discussion by a ve:bal tnck,
and Heini goes to live in a Nazi clubhouse outs1de the
Communist district. Here he meets Grundler, the weak
Nazi and we are shown the contrast between the two
boys'. Grundler gives Heini the nickname "Quex" (an .abbreviation of Quexsilber, "quicksilver"). He resents th1s
and a small fight breaks out among the boys. The fight is
quelled by a barked command fr?n: the district leader.
The leader himself addresses Heinl as Ouex, and the
name sticks.
The Communists are waiting for vengeance, and, in
spite of the district leader'~ oppositi?n, .Heini wants to
return to the Communist d1stnct to d1stnbute leaflets for
the 1933 election. Grundler has been falling lower and
lower under Gerda's influence, and through Grundler's
treachery Stoppel finds out where Heini is stayi~~· We ~re
given to understand that Stoppel is fond o.f Heinl. a.nd IS
wavering in his Communism. He goes to find He1n1 an~
makes a last attempt to persuade him to leave the Naz1s.
Heini is adamant, even against the offer of the original
many-bladed knife which Stoppel produces from his
pocket. Stoppel goes back to the Communists and with a
gesture places the knife on the table. It is picked
up by Wilde.
.
The Nazis are working on leaflets for the 1933 elect1on,
and Grundler and Gerda treacherously destroy all the
available Nazi leaflets. Fritz has been wounded in an
election riot, and Heini and Ulla meet at the door of the
room in which Fritz is lying. They go off together to Heini's
printing shop, where they work to prepare new leaflets,
and when the work is completed Ulla gives Heini a single
kiss. Heini then goes out to distribute the leaflets in the
Communist district. He is hunted and encircled by the
Communists in the darkened streets and takes refuge in
one of the tents in the deserted fair.
Accidentally, he touches a mechanical figure of a
drummer and the figure starts to beat its drum, thus betraying him. The Communists enter the tent and Heini
screams (presumably stabbed by Wilde). The Nazis
come (it is now bright daylight) and find Heini dying. The
knife lies on the ground beside him. Heini's last words
are, "Our flag billows before . ..."The soundtrack takes
up the "Youth Song" and the flag appears on the screen,
giving place to marching columns of Hitler Youth.
(Figure 5.)

Analysis of the Nazi Film "Hitlerjunge Quex"

27

Analysis 1: Time Perspectives
In any analysis it is important to determine the sorts of
questions which we ask of the material and to set up our
analytical frames in such a way that the whole unit which
we are examining will not be lost in our attention to details
nor the details lost through too much attention to the
whole. This dilemma of the wood and the trees can best
be resolved by employing a series of different types of
analysis. We shall therefore look at this film from three
standpoints: first, from far off we shall examine its total
climax structure; then, in a somewhat closer inspection,
we shall study the characterization of the two political
groups and the backgrounds in which they are set; and
last, examining the film in detail, we shall study the in- ·
teractions between the various members of Heini 's family.
The climax structure of any work of art is related to
those characteristics of the artist which the psychologists
call "time perspectives." All peoples must impose sense
and coherence on the very complex stream of their experience. They must punctuate this stream so that the relations between events may be meaningful. But the type of
sense which different types of peoples impose is known '
to vary greatly. Some people see themselves as living in
a fatalist universe; others see their own behavior as determining the future; and still others believe in a Golden
Age, and of these some will put the Golden Age in the
past while others imagine it in the near or distant future.
Philosophers may try to choose between these various
views of experience, attributing greater or less truth to
one or the other, but with this question we are not concerned. We are only asking what sort of view of the past
and future, what type of time perspective, a certain political cult had developed in 1933. Probably it is not given to
man to determine which of these time perspectives is
"true" because the stream of events to which the perspective is applied includes not only outside events but also
his own behavior. His own behavior will be guided by his
own time perspective, and thus whatever that time perspective may be, the total stream as he sees it will acquire the appropriate structure.
But because his behavior is shaped in terms of his time
perspective, it becomes important to study this. A statement of a man's time perspective is a way of describing
his character. 5
The time pe(spective of this film is summarized for us
in the "Hitler Youth Song," whose words were composed
by Baldur von Schirach:

Figure 5 Heini dying in the arms of his Nazi comrades.

"Through death to a millennium"
Our flag billows [flattert] before us!
We advance [ziehn] into the future man for man!
We march for Hitler through night and pain [Not]
With the flag of youth for freedom and bread!
Our flag billows before us!
Our flag is the new epoch [Zeit]!
And the flag loads us into eternity [Ewigkeit]!
Yes, the flag is more than death!

Or, in one phrase, we may summarize the time perspective of the film as "through death to a millennium."
This time perspective is interesting in several ways. It is,
of course, the characteristic time perspective of the great
fanatical revivals and nativistic cults, from early Christianity through Mohammedanism and Marxism to the
Ghost Dance of the American Indians and the Vaihala
Madness of New Guinea. The same basic view of life,
"through the unpleasant to the pleasant," recurs again
and again, but the specific pictures which are drawn of
the unpleasantness and of the later reward vary from one
culture to another. The unpleasantness may be death or
political chaos or persecution or striving effort; and the
final reward may be either in this world or in the next. It
may be a sensuous reward, a military victory, or an ivory
tower. The prognosis for any cult will depend on how the
two successive phases of this time perspective are
conceived and on the likelihood of events fulfilling
expectations.
In this film there are two such cycles, in which Heini
goes through death: first, his incomplete death when his
mother turns on the gas and second, his final death at the
hands of the Communists. What sorts of death were these
and to what sort of millennium did they lead?
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The two deaths have a number of features in common:
Each follows some conspicuous achievement on Heini's
part. The gas death occurs after ~e has rescued the Nazi
boys and enabled them to blow uts>. the Communists'
dynamite; the final death follows his successful distribution of l-eaflets in the Communist district after the Communists thought they were all destroyed.
2 There is a woman involved in both deaths. The gas death
is the final episode in Heini's relation to his mother; and
the final death follows Ulla's kiss.
3 Each death is represented on the screen by a sort of
billowing or waving motion. In the case of the gas death,
we see the fumes fill the screen and move like heaving
waves. In the final death, it is the Nazi flag itself which fills
the frame and bi Ilows before us. 6
4 Each death is accompanied by a change in illumination.
The gas death occurs in a darkened room, and after it the
fumes fade away to disclose Heini in a brightly lighted
hospital ward. In the final death Heini distributed his leaflets and was encircled by the Communists in darkened
streets; he takes refuge in the dark tent of the deserted
fair; he is stabbed in the dark. We then see his legs
faltering as he comes out of the tent in a half light and
finally, when the Nazis find him dying, we see full daylight.
Each death accompanies a change in Heini's status. By
the gas death he shifts from his family home to a hospital,
a sort of neutral ground halfway toward Nazism. By his
final death he moves from the world of the living to the
world of reincarnated heroes.
In each death Heini's last words refer to the future. In the
gas death, his mother says, "Heini, settle your quarrel
with him [Stoppel] or else everything is lost [sonst ist
alles aus]." And Heini replies, "But Mother, now it is just
beginning [Jetzt faengt es doch erst an]." In the final
death, Heini's last words are:
Our flag billows before us
It leads ...
[See Figure 5.]

Each death is rather amply predicted. The gas death is
predicted by the mother at the beginning of the film when
the father comes home hurt. She says, "You'll bring us all
into misfortune [Unglueck] again." Later, while Heini is
coming home from the hike, we are shown a shot of the
mother lighting the gas, and finally, just before the event,
she says, "Everything is lost" (quoted above). The final
death is predicted by the district leader's anxiety, by
Stoppel's and Gerda's warnings, and by the heavily
weighted scene in which Wilde picks up the knife. Each
death is tragic in the classical sense of being the final
outcome of an inevitable sequence of events.

These features which are common to the two deaths
give us together a rounded picture of Nazi time perspective. To get this picture, it is important not to think of these
features separately as they are enumerated above but to
combine them into a hazy sense of the total Weltanschauung. The achievement, the woman, the billowing, the change of light, the change of status, and the
destiny idea together make up a state of mind which can
only very inadequately be expressed in words-an ongoing state through some sort of orgasmic upheaval to a
final millennium.
The final term in the Nazi time perspective is of special
interest. The beginning of the cycle, through suffering
and effort to individual death, is comparatively common
in fanatical cults, but the final goal toward which the Nazi
nominally strives is a rather unusual one. It appears to be
a sort of multiple reincarnation in this world. Heini's
corpse is replaced on the screen, first by the flag, then by
columns of marching Nazis, and in this final shot some
trick photography has been used so that while we see the
innumerable marching figures moving obliquely away
from us, we also see, faintly superimposed on them and
much larger, the waists and thighs of uniformed Nazi figures striding toward us. Even after the passage through
death, there is promise of future turmoil, sexual and
aggressive.
A similar promise of multiple reincarnation is still more
explicit in another Nazi film, Fuer Uns (1937). This is a
documentary account of a Nazi party ceremony in which
we see the dedication of sixteen concrete blocks to the
memory of the sixteen martyrs of early Nazism. Each
block has on it the name of a hero (Hans Schlageter,
Horst Wessel, etc.) and the words "On call" (Zum Appel).
Each block supports a great urn in which flames billow.
As a wreath is laid at the foot of each block, the name of
the hero is called, and a thousand men somewhere in the
stadium answer "HERE." The procession goes on to the
next hero, and again the answer comes back from
another section of the stadium.
Before leaving the subject of Heini's deaths, it is necessary to ask why there should be two of them. In this, the
film transgresses the ordinary canons of tragedy, but the
reasons for this transgression lie in the peculiar social
structure which Nazism seeks to set up. In place of the
more common type of social system based on the family,
Nazism substitutes a system based on what anthropologists call "age grades." 7 The youth of the nation is
to be divided into blocks from small boys (Pfimpfen), from
6 to 10 years old, up to the fighting units of S.A. The step
from each grade to the next is accompanied by an arduous initiation ceremony. 8
Initiation ceremonies, and other rites which symbolize
the passage from one social status to another, usually
include a symbolic statement of the candidate's death as
a member of his former group followed by a symbolic
statement of his aggregation into the new group. Thus, in
giving Heini two deaths, the propagandist has epit-
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omized a whole social system and a time perspective
which envisages repeated symbolic deaths. Heini's final
death implies that the long series of symbolic deaths
representing promotions from one age grade to another
will reach its climax in a real death and multiple reincarnation. His first death by gas tells us that the entry into the
age grade system is itself a passage rite, differing only
from other passage rites and initiations in that Heini's
mother, instead of mourning the loss of her boy when he
leaves the family, is herself killed.
In killing the mother in this way, the film does more
violence to the conventional folk philosophies than is
immediately apparent. It is not only that the film kills off a
member of the group which Heini is leaving but, specifically, the mother is the predictor of tragedy, the representative of fate. This theme is not very striking in this
particular film. We hear the mother at the beginning say
to the father, "You will bring misfortune on us again," and
later she dies, but this combination is not shocking to the
average spectator. That this combination may be significant, however, is demonstrated by another Nazi propaganda film, Faehrmann Maria (Ferryman Maria, 1936),
an allegory specifically concerned with death. In this
film, the old male ferryman (a figure who reminds one of
Charon) dies in the arms of an austere male figure representing Death. The place of the old ferryman is taken by a
beautiful ferrywoman, Maria. She cheats Death of a
young male victim and deceives Death into following her
across the swamps in search of this victim whom she
loves. Death's foot slips, he sinks into the swamp, and the
last we see of him is his hands pleading for rescue. Maria
then tells her lover, "The way is open to the homeland
[Heimat]," 9 and they go together hand in hand across the
river and over the hill.
This second film does very great violence to occidental
notions about Death and shows us that the death of the
mother in Hitlerjunge Quex-the killing of the personification of fate-is possibly significant. German thought, both
pre- and ~ost-~ litler, is very much preoccupied with ideas
of destiny, interwoven with ideas of duty, racial superiority, and providence, and it is natural to compare the destiny notions in Hitlerjunge Quex with those in Faehrmann
Maria. The second film leads us naturally to look in
Hitlerjunge Quex for a second Destiny or Providence
figure who should be a young female, replacing the
dead mother.
This role is filled by Ulla. Twice Ulla works like Fate or
Providence behind the scenes, to reverse the course of
the plot. First, when Heini is caught spying on the Nazi
hike, Fritz is angry and sends him away, but after he is
gone we hear Ulla's voice saying, "He might have been
one of us." The audience is left with the impression that
Nazism is inaccessible, and this impression is reinforced
by the distant views of the Nazi camp at which Heini
gazes the next morning. But on the following day Heini
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has no difficulty in approaching Fritz, who at once invites
him to dinner. Later in the film we see another reversal of
the same sort when Heini telephones to warn the Nazis
about the dynamite and Ulla hangs up the phone under
Fritz's orders. Heini is left unable to make contact with
anybody, but the explosion occurs. Nothing is said to
explain either of these reversals, and only one explanation is possible: Ulla, on both occasions, worked like
Providence behind the scenes. Thus into the whole notion
of death and the time perspectives there has been infused a sense that Death and Providence should be the
object of the sorts of attitudes which the Nazis would
direct toward the desirable female (see Analysis IV).
Such a reading of the film will account at once for the use
of orgasmic billowing symbols to represent death.
In concluding this discussion of the time perspectives
expressed in this film , it is appropriate to consider how
this film differs from others. Insofar as a time perspective
involves an expectation of change in the course of events,
the perspective itself and its imp Iications for character
may alter as time goes on. The expected climax may
occur, in which case the former time perspective is satisfied and a new one must be constructed. Alternatively,
the climax may not occur and some modification must
then be introduced into the time perspective to accentuate or rei ieve the frustration.
Almost simultaneously with the production of Hitlerjunge Quex, other films were produced with the same
basic time perspective, "through death or chaos to a millennium," but the chaotic phase is not always symbolized
by personal death. In Bluten des Deutschland, this phase
is directly equated with the political chaos of the twenties, while in Hans Westmar, ·a film based on the story of
Horst Wessel, individual death and the political chaos
are simultaneously invoked. Thus in these films it was
possible for the filmmaker to present the notion that the
worst of the chaos was already over. The possibility of
chaos still remains as a threat in case the nation should
not dutifully follow its Nazi destiny, but the time perspective is not, as in Hitlerjunge Quex, that of a man faced with
the whole uphill climb and only the distant promise of the
summit. It is rather that of a man already more than halfway up the hill and able to look back on what he has
accomplished.
When, however, we look at a much later film, Ohm
Krueger (released in April1941), we find an entirely different time perspective. This film deals with the story of
the Boer War, and the Boers, fighting England, are clearly
the model that is held up before the German audience.
The film starts after the Boer War is over. We see Krueger
as an old man suffering from psychological blindness in
a hospital in Switzerland. He is looked after by a young
nurse to whom he narrates the story of the war. The film
then cuts back to South Africa, and we see the Great Trek
followed by disreputable intrigues attributed to Rhodes,
Jameson, Chamberlain, Queen Victoria, and others. The
war begins with prodigious victories for the Boers and
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ends with utter defeat. We see the graves of the Boers,
and then the film returns to Krueger, in Switzerland, who
predicts that all this suffering will be avenged by some
greater nation.
The time perspective implicit in this film seems to be
the precise opposite of that of the films of the early thirties. Instead of "through death to a millennium" this later
film offers us "through pre! iminary victories to ultimate
defeat"-a time perspective which probably results from
the resemblance between World Wars I and II. We may
note, however, that Hitlerjunge Quex and Ohm Krueger
are alike in assuming an enormous pendulum swing in
the tide of human events. Ohm Krueger may bode better
than Quex for a United Nations victory, but the problem
which will confront us after the war is that of steadying the
pendulum-of inducing in Germany an expectation not of
climax but rather of steady progress.

Analysis II: Political Groups and Backgrounds
The first analysis of the film dealt with the climax structure
of the film as a whole and related this to the time perspectives of Nazism. In contrast to this, the present analysis is
static. The element of time is here deliberately overlooked, and instead this second analysis will consider
how Nazism and Communism are characterized in
the film.
The film actually deals with three types of social
grouping-Communism, Nazism, and the family-but of
these the family is a sort of no man's land over which the
battle for Heini's future is fought. In this battle Heini's
relationship to his parents evolves and changes, the emphasis shifting according to the propagandist's technical
needs. Analysis of the family, therefore, cannot be handled in static terms, and is reserved for a later section.
The present analysis is confined to Communism and
Nazism, which are consistently characterized throughout
the film.
The very first shot of the film lays the base for the
characterization of Communism. It is a close-up shot of a
single apple which fills the screen-a double symbol of
food and sexuality. From this the camera trucks back to
include the whole heap of apples in the vendor's store,
and we see two boys, whom we later discover to be
Communists, debating whether to steal the apples. They
are hungry and without money, and suddenly one of them
snatches an apple and runs. The vendor grabs the boy
and begins to box his ears.
A second characterization of Communism follows in
the same sequence. Wilde, the sinister Communist
agitator, makes a speech beginning, "Workers [Proleten],
hear me. It is not this boy alone who has been boxed on
the ears. I tell you that all you who are here have had your
ears boxed."

Thus in a single sequence Communists are characterized as unstoical in the face of temptations of the
mouth and as making political capital out of purely
human woes. 10 In doing this the propagandist has resorted to two sorts of biblical reference; he has invoked
the apple and has put Christlike paraphrasing into
Wilde's mouth.
Stoppel 's behavior when he accompanies Heini 's
father to his home and helps the mother to dress the
father's wound further illustrates this use of human woes.
He takes advantage of the situation to contact Heini for
the Communist Youth International, and later, at the fair,
when Heini has lost his money in the lottery, he again
exploits this woe, comforting Heini by inviting him on the
Communist hike.
On the hike, we see the contrast between the ragged ,
disorderly Communists and the neat, disciplined Nazis,
and we are told almost in so many words that this contrast
is a part of the emotional dynamics upon which Nazism
rests. A platoon of Nazi girls in uniform is standing on the
station when a disorderly mob of Communists comes by.
At the head of the Nazi girls is Ulla (though the audience
does not as yet know that this girl will play a special part
in the story). Just before the arrival of the Communists,
Ulla's head droops forward in a very unmilitary posture,
but when she sees the Communists, she suddenly raises
it and holds herself properly erect. Her gesture implies
that the emotional value of Nazism is not simple and
positive ; it is also negative: it is a pride in not being the
sort of people that they accuse their enemies of being
(see Figure 4).
Immediately after this incident, the film begins to develop the themes which were first suggested by the apple. We see the Commun ist boy who stole the apple take
chewed food from his mouth and fling it in the face of one
of the Nazi boys,11 and in later stages of the film we
repeatedly see the Communists indulging in grass eating, throwing their food, passing a half-eaten apple from
one to another, smoking cigarettes (the Nazis apparently
do not smoke), and drinking schnapps (the Nazis drink
only beer).
The response of the Nazis to the insult of the thrown
food is interesting. For a fraction of a second we see them
b~eak their ranks and prepare to indulge in a completely
disorderly brawl. The district leader barks a command,
and they return to attention. But in this fraction of a second the psychological base for the whole propaganda
system is exposed. The Nazi assumption is that, but for
the barked command and their veneer of discipline, they
themselves would be the same sort of disorderly rabble
they represent the Communists as being.1 2
T~is assumption reappears when Heini is living in the
Naz1 clubhouse. Heini is referred to as "Quex" at a meal
and when he shows resentment at this nickname, a disor~
derly brawl breaks out, involving all the Nazi boys. Some
of them fight in one cluster and some in another in a
completely disorganized manner, until a barked com-
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Figure 7 Heini is pulled down by Gerda and exclaims,
"You are a girl!"

mand from the district leader freezes them into guilty
immobility. (Figure 6.)
Here the disorderly characteristics which the film attributes to the Communists are another example of the
Nazis' habit of attributing their own real or potential vices
to their enemies, and we shall see that the whole characterization of Communism in this film is, in a sense, a
self-portrait of Nazism. It represents what the Nazis think
that they themselves would be like without their discipline or, psychologically speaking, what they are like
under the veneer of that discipline.
The sexual suggestion which was Implicit in the apple
is also developed on the hike. When Heini enters the
compartment on the train, Gerda, the Communist girl,
seizes him around the neck and pulls him down onto her
lap. His back is toward her, but she forces his face around
until she is able to plant a kiss on his lips. Gerda is
wearing a boy's cap, and as Heini stands horrified, she
pulls the cap off her head. Heini, still more horrified, says,
"You are a girl ," and she replies, "You notice everything."
(Figure 7.)
This kiss might appear sufficient to smear the Communists with the combined reproach of sexuality and
mouthiness, but the propagandist was apparently not
satisfied and he borrows a Freudian recipe to drive the
point home. We see Stoppel push a peeled banana into
Gerda's mouth with the palm of his hand, and this moment is chosen for the others to start to sing the "lnternationale." (Figure 8.)
Later, in the camp, we see another characterization of
the Communists, in which a Freudian recipe is once
, again borrowed. They play a buttocks-slapping game
(Schinkenkloppen). The boy who stole the apple is held

bent over so that he cannot see who slaps him. Gerda
supplies the slap and then self-consciously looks the
other way. The boy guesses correctly that she is the guilty
one, and she in turn is grabbed by the crowd and held
while the boy spits on his hands preparatory to taking his
revenge. Heini at this point turns away in disgust. 13
These characteristics are attributed to the Communists
whenever they appear on the screen. Almost always they
have food in their hands, and when the filmmaker wants
to show us that Grundler's character is degenerating
under Gerda's influence, he does so by having Grundler
smoke a cigarette in a lackadaisical manner. While he
smokes he sings a snatch of a cheap popular song, and
when he sees Heini's photograph of Ulla, he assumes that
she is a sexual object (Fiamme).
In contrast to the Communists, the Nazis are almost
colorless. We see their parade-ground smartness, we see
them dashing into the sea to bathe, but these behaviors
are the negative of the excesses which are attributed to
Communism, and throughout one is left with the feeling
that Nazi life is empty. On three occasions we see them
eat-on the hike, in the Nazi clubroom, and at the home
of Fritz and Ulla-but except on the hike, where the Nazi
eating is contrasted with the throwing of food by the
Communists, their eating habits are not specifically used
to characterize them. In the Nazi clubroom the meal is
merely the setting in which Heini's nickname is given
him, and at the home of Fritz and Ulla, it is the whole
upper-middle-class background which is significant,
rather than the eating.
On the sexual side, the film shows us something of the
courtship behavior and attitudes which Nazism held up
as an ideal in 1933. These, however, can be analyzed
only in connection with their whole handling of the family,
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Figure 8 Comrade Stoppel stuffs a banana in Gerda's
mouth while the others sing the "lnternationale."

and we shall therefore confine ourselves here to the question of the psychological nature of the sexual contrast. We
have noted that the contrast in terms of orderliness is
based on the Nazi habit of referring their own disapproved weaknesses to their enemies, and two types of
evidence are available to show that the same is true of
the sexual conquest.
The first evidence is of the same general type as that
which we used in the case of orderliness-disorderliness.
The Nazis used the premise that they themselves would
be disorderly but for their discipline as an argument in
favor of their whole system; and in the same way they
employ the argument that they would be sexually depraved. The story of Grundler's fall is propagandic in
this sense.
The story begins on the morning after the hike when he
and the other Nazis are distributing leaflets. Gerda, under
Stoppel's orders, contacts Grundler, asking him for a leaflet and then for another and another ti II he gives her all he
has. Then she throws all the leaflets into the river and
starts a flirtation with Grundler by asking him for a
cigarette. A few minutes later she says she wants "Turkish
Delight." He asks where they can get this, and she says,
"At the fair." We then see Grundler falling in step with
Gerda on the way to the fair. Later we see them dizzily
riding the merry-go-round, and the camera stoops to pay
special attention to the swinging legs of the boy and girl.
From this point on, Grundler's uniform becomes more and
more slovenly, and finally, under Gerda's influence, he
enters into a plot to destroy the entire supply of Nazi
leaflets. He brings the leaflets on a barrow to a rendezvous with Gerda, and together they throw all the bundles
of leaflets into the flowing river.

The inclusion of Grundler in the film can partly be explained as a bid for "truthfulness," an attempt to make the
audience say to themselves, "Yes, the film is not an
idealized picture of Nazism because, after all, they do
show a bad Nazi," and, of course, the propagandist can
safely show this bad Nazi because the showing is accompanied by disapproval of Grundler's weakness. Actually, however, they have shown a Nazi who is not only
bad but deteriorating, and thus, consciously or unconsciously, they have again preached that Nazism has a
double quality. On one side, Nazism may have the fine
overpurity of comradeship (Kamaradschaft), but this purity carries with it, on the other, the tendency to deteriorate
in a particular direction.
This is by no means the double nature attributed to
many by the more familiar Christian sects. Christianity
has classified the forces which work to mold man's behavior in many ways, and no doubt the Nazi tendency
toward dualism owes something to the dualistic thinking
in other religions, but the actual content of the dualism is
fundamentally different. Christianity sees man in various
dualistic frames; it sees him as divided between mind
and spirit, reason and emotion, soul and body, conscience and temptation, and so on. But even the most
pessimistic of Christian beliefs, those which assign
maximum strength to the taint of Original Sin, have never
omitted from man's nature some traces of spontaneous
goodness. The Christian dual isms have always assumed
good and bad elements within the individual man; they
may have insisted that the good side needed external
help from church or minister, but they have never seen
man as a mechanical creature who should be passive
vis-a-vis an external disciplinary authority. In the Nazi
view-and the same is true of the handling of temptation
and depravity in many pre-Nazi German films-man's nature will respond almost mechanically to bright lights, the
whirl of circuses, and city life. He will inevitably be
sucked down into a swamp. 1 4
The second type of evidence, which shows that, in
attributing a certain sort of sexuality to the Communists,
the Nazis are merely describing the worst side of their
own nature, is indirect. If the Communists were represented as merely different from Nazis, the filmmaker
could claim that he was simply giving an objective picture. But these "Communists" are not simply different
from Nazis; they are a systematic opposite of the Nazi
ideal. This relationship is, of course, what we should expect if the attributes of "Communism" are psychologically rooted in the Nazi character, and while it is conceivable that this relatedness might be due to coincidence
'
such a coincidence would be unlikely.
The clearest indication that "Communism" as here depicted is only the obverse of Nazism comes from the
makeup of the two girls, Gerda and Ulla. Gerda, the
Communist, is more heavily female in her head and torso.
Her hai~ strays loose; she continually expresses her sexual des1res and frustrations with gestures of the lips; and
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her breasts are evident through her sluttish blouse. But in
contrast to this femaleness in her head and torso, her legs
are usually clothed in slacks. Ulla, on the other hand , is
the precise reverse of this. She wears a skirt, but from the
waist up she is progressively more boyish. Instead of a
blouse she wears a Nazi shirt open at the collar and
loosely held with a tie. She has straight blond hair,
bobbed and severely parted. She wears a beret.
This contrast may be summarized by saying that if
Gerda's head and torso were set on Ulla's legs, a complete female figure would result; whereas Ulla's torso on
Gerda's legs would give us a complete boy. They are not
just two people, different one from the other; they are a
pair of people, each systematically related to the other.
Gerda is a postadolescent female with male legs, and
Ulla is an adolescent or preadolescent boy with female
legs. 15 The same type of systematic contrast occurs also
between Heini's father and the district leader, and again
between Heini and Grundler, and these two contrasts will
be examined at a later stage of the analysis. It is evident,
however, that the likelihood of these three systematic
contrasts all being due to coincidence is very small , and
we may take their systematic nature as evidence for the
fact that the depiction of the Communists is a function of
the Nazi character.
Last, we cannot leave the consideration of the contrast
between Nazism and Communism without examining the
backgrounds in which these two political groups are set.
The filmmakers went out of their way to blacken Communism by photographing the Communist scenes in poor
light. Even Heini's home is murky and sinister; the fair so
much frequented by Communists is poorly lit; and the
room in which the Communists meet is clouded with tobacco smoke. In contrast to this, the home of Fritz and
Ulla and the Nazi clubroom are brightly lit, and on the
hike we see Heini progress from the murky Communist
camp through darkness to the scene in which the Nazis
celebrate the solstice, where their beacon fire gives
bright contrasts of illumination. When he is dismissed as
a spy, Heini retires into the darkness, but next morning he
is shown a brilliant scene of the Nazis on the beach in
the morning sunlight.
In general, these shifts between light and dark are
satisfactorily woven into the plot, but at the very end of
the film, one shift from darkness to light seems arbitrary.
We see Heini encircled in the darkened street and he is
killed in the dark, but when the Nazis come to pose
beside his dying body, it is broad daylight.
In addition to darkness, the background of Communism is characterized by various kinds of spinning
objects, the merry-go-round, the lottery wheel, and spinning targets in the shooting booth. It appea~s that the
Nazis conception of the sort of sexuality which they attributed to Communists is closely linked with feelings
of dizziness. Man, the mechanical puppet, is endlessly
liable to be swept off his feet into some sort of whirlpoo l. 16
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The relationship between the dizzy background and
sex is especially clear in the scene in which Stoppel
invites Heini to the Communist hike. Behind them while
they talk is the whirling merry-go-round, and their conversation is interrupted not only by the mechanical music
but also by Gerda's voice. Gerda is riding one of the
horses, and whenever she passes Stoppel she calls out
to him. Finally, at the end of the conversation, Stoppel
jumps on the moving merry-go-round, like a frog
jumping into his pond.
In addition to the use of these dizziness symbols,
Communism is twice characterized by the river. This occurs at the beginning and end of the story of Grundler's
fall. First we see Gerda throw Grundler's leaflets over her
shoulders into the river, and finally we see Grundler and
Gerda together throwing the main supply of leaflets in
bundles into the water. Probably the appropriateness of
this symbol derives from some notion that Communism
sweeps all good things away.
German cameramen are exceedingly fond of photographing waves and ripples, and these symbols are usually used to denote some pleasant or desirable emotional
state. In the first scene, when Gerda throws the leaflets
over her shoulder, we see the river behind her, smooth
and shining in the sunlight. Here the river probably reinforces the idea of Gerda's attraction. In the final scene,
we see the river at night with the lights of the city reflected
in it so that the river becomes a symbol of the seductive,
bright lights. On neither occasion do we see waves,
which are reserved instead for association with Nazism.
We see the sea (or possibly a lake) when the Nazis run
into it to bathe, and the Nazi flag, whenever it appears on
the screen, bi Ilows with a wave motion, and the gas
fumes bi Ilow Iike a flag or Iike water. Thus Nazism is
associated with the movement of waves.
There is clearly a rather close relationship between the
hypnotic fascination that comes from staring at waves
and that which comes from looking at spinning objects,
and this relationship is probably another facet of the relationship which we have already noted between Nazism
and the Nazi characterization of Communism. There is,
however, an important difference between waves and
spinning objects. Waves contain an illusion of progress,
of forward movement, but spinning objects evidently get
nowhere. It is possible that the waves used to characterize Nazism are related to the endless marching which
has such great fascination for Nazis and which appears
in almost every Nazi film. Only in its endlessness does
this marching resemble the spinning of the symbols associated with Communism.
These two introductory analyses, the first of Nazi time
perspectives and the second of characterization of
Nazism and Communism, enable us now to go on to
examine how the filmmakers handled the mixed emotions
present in the German family and how they have marshalled these emotions to make them support Nazism.

34

studies in Visual Communication

Analysis Ill: The Family of Origin
From a propagandist's point of view, and also, perhaps,
from that of an artist, the contrast discussed above, between Nazism and Communism, is the weakest part of
this film. The contrast is stated openly and didactically so
that the audience is fully conscious that a contrast has
been presented and, being fully conscious, is therefore
free either to accept or to refuse it. Indeed, we may suppose that if the only propagandic message in this film
were its idealization of Nazism and its caricaturing of
Communism, its effect on a mixed audience would be
merely to reinforce Nazism in those who were already
converted, while those who preferred Communism would
be able to repudiate the caricature so that the film would
only anger them and make them more Communistic tha~
before. The contrast by itself would not make converts; 1t
would only increase antagonism.
The great strength of the film lies elsewhere, however.
Heini's preference for Nazism dates clearly from his seeing the contrast, but from then on his progress toward
Nazism is tied up with his relations with his father and
mother in a way that endows Nazism with a psychological force much greater than it would otherwise have. The
family scene as it is presented to us is one of extreme
intensity, from the first moment that Heini appears in the
doorway and sees his father in a temper tantrum, demanding money from his mother. And later, when we see
a pleasant, warm relationship between Heini and his
father-when the father gives him the house key-the
emotions, though of a different kind, are no less intense.
In general, the propagandist evokes all the intensity of
emotion that lies latent in the German boy's relationship
to his family, and as the film progresses, these emotions
are rearranged and harnessed to give dynamic force and
fanatical violence to Heini's Nazism.
The present analysis from the kinship angle is an attempt to show how this is done and to outline the implications for the Nazi character that follow if we suppose that
the ·fanatical intensity of this cult is largely derived from
certain themes of pre-Nazi German family life. 17
In a strict, narrow sense (excluding possible spouses
and parent substitutes), Heini's family consists of himself,
his father, and his mother, and of these the first to appear
on the screen is the father. We see him in the opening
sequence of the film as an unknown man in the crowd at a
food riot. He is a big, heavy man, poorly dressed, clumsy
and violent, but with unexpected warmth and gentleness.
The first characterization of him is as a kind person. We
see him speak against the crowd that wants to imprison
the two boys who stole apples when driven by hunger.
The father pushes his way forward through the crowd,
and he speaks simply, as a human being without party
alignment. He sees the incident not as a political allegory
but simply as a peccadillo. He points out that you don't
put a boy in prison for one apple-"especially when the
boy has not even bitten it." At this stage, the propagandist

is careful not to associate the father with Communism
and the father is sympathetically treated. A riot starts,
however, fomented by Wilde, the Communist agitator:
who treats the incident of the apple as politcal matenal:
"Workers, listen to me. Here not only this boy has had his
ears boxed, but also you who are here have been boxed
on the ears." In the riot the shopkeeper upsets his own
apples, and then there is a shout, "Police!" As the crowd
scatters, the father stumbles over the edge of the
sidewalk and strikes his head against the wall. He stands
leaning against the wall and groaning on the porch of his
own home. He is helped up the stairs by Stoppel, an
organizer of the Communist Youth.
The following sequence includes the father, the mother,
and Stoppel, and it is important to watch how Stoppel
becomes included in the set of relationships which constitute the family. The relationship between father and
mother is immediately and sharply defined. The mother is
dominated by the father, and yet he is as dependent on
her as a child. When he enters with his injury, she cries
out in horror. This is the only evidence of love for him that
she shows, and as the sequence develops we realize that
his injury is not serious. The father groans when the
wound is washed, but this is plainly due to his lack of
stoicism. Stoppel joins the mother in ministering to
the father.
The mother, after washing the cut, solicitously offers
the father a drink of water, but he with an oath demands
beer. The mother says, "But that costs money!" He then
asks where Heini is so that he can send him to get two
bottles, but the mother replies that Heini is still at work.
This sequence has set up the following definitions of
the personalities and their relations to each other: the
father is unstoical and dependent upon the mother; the
mother is a drudge, solicitous for the father, and Stoppel
is associated with the mother in caring for the father.
At this point the sequence is cut to let us see Heini at
work in a printing shop, where he receives a tip of one
mark from a customer. He and the printer regard this as a
great windfall, and the printer makes a tentative effort to
take the mark from him (lest the mark should appear to
the audience to have been too easily earned). Heini successfully resists this and goes home.
The camera now returns to the father, mother, and
Stoppel. The father asks for money so that he can buy
beer-" Mother, won't you give me a few pennies?"-thus
underlining his dependence on her; and when she professes to have no money, he becomes more and more
violent and domineering. He starts searching in all the
containers in the house, first looking in the coffee pot and
then throwing it down, pulling out drawers and scattering
the clothes, then scattering the photographs out of the
family album, and so on. Both Stoppel and the mother try
to quiet him. Stoppel says, "Man, don't make a circus
(Zirkus )18 here." But the father continues to advance,
angry and domineering, toward the mother, who slowly
retreats backward, facing him (see Figures 2, 3).
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At this point, Heini appears in the doorway. He arrives
home at the precise moment of the height of the father's
tantrum, and for a moment he hesitates in horror, so that,
when the camera returns to the father and mother, we see
their relationship through the eyes of their son. Almost
immediately Heini goes over to the mother and secretly
slips the mark into her hand. She raises her hand and
opens it, and the father seizes the mark. His temper tantrum suddenly subsides; he spits on the mark and says,
"There, you see, one has to show one's teeth in dealing
with women."
This very dramatic sequence burns into the audience
the whole stereotyped family picture from which Nazism
draws its emotional power. Heini is for a moment
paralyzed with horror at the conflict in which his parents
are engaged, but this hesitation is resolved when he goes
and gives his mother the mark. In contrast to the father,
he, Heini, is the mother's slave, and she, at least in this
instance, is dependent on him. He is the rescuing hero in
his own eyes and in the eyes of the audience.
The emotions and attitudes of the rescuing hero are
precisely those which the propagandist would like his
audience to apply to Nazism or to Germany. But this incident has a double significance. At a superficial level we
can see Heini as the hero, but while he is being heroic, he
is also at a slightly deeper level joining his mother in
passive appeasement of the father.19 And this passivity
also can be orchestrated into the emotions which Heini
will give to the Party. In the end, the propagandist wants
the audience to feel that utter passivity to the demands of
the Party is a form of rescuing heroism, and this incident
presents the ideal model for such a combination of emotions. Heini's passivity toward his father is glorified by
being at the same time a rescuing of the mother, and this
glorified passivity has now only to be shifted to the Party
and/or the nation.
The film does not go into the question of the relationship between Party and nation, and it seems thatto have
attempted this would have landed the propagandist in
difficulties. Starting from three symbolic units, the son,
the father, and the mother, he would have had to end up
with two, the party and the nation, and the basic instability between these two would eventually be disclosed. If
the nation were equated with the mother, then the Party
would have to combine the father's authority with Heini's
heroism, and would therefore become a recipient of ambivalent emotions. We should see all too clearly that Party
and nation could only exist side by side if perpetually fed
on scapegoats and enemies, which would provide an
object for the negative parts of this ambivalence.
Passivity can be glorified only by emergency, and there
must be imagined danger from which somebody can
rescue somebody else.
We have now seen son and mother united in mutual
love against the father, and Stoppel has received a sympathetic characterization through his association with the
mother in aiding and placating the father. Now Stoppel
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takes advantage of the occasion to contact Heini for the
Communist Youth International. He first praises Heini to
the father and then asks if Heini is "organized." The father
tells him to ask the boy himself. In a later scene the father
signs Heini into the Communist Youth willy-nilly and
brushes aside the mother's suggestion that Heini ought to
be asked, but at this stage of the film Communism is still
being given a favorable build-up. We are not allowed to
identify the father as an active Communist but only,
perhaps, as a mild Social Democrat.
Stoppel has a few words with Heini. He asks him if he is
"organized," but Heini apparently does not even know
what the word means. Stoppel says that of course Heini
belongs naturally in the Communist Youth lnternational"or do you want to be a Nazi?" The father scoffs at this
idea, saying, "What!-my boy a Nazi-l'd sooner kill him."
The father then goes off to get his beer, and after taking
leave of Heini and saying that they will talk it over later,
Stoppel, too, goes away.
This leaves Heini still the rescuing hero with his loving,
drudging, and weeping mother. She sighs, "That is no
life--1 cannot bear it (das halt ich nicht mehr aus)." Heini
continues in a comforting role for a moment, telling her
not to be always so sad . But she goes and opens the
window. This act lets in the mechanical music of the fair,
which, as we have seen, is associated throughout the film
with the orgies and degeneracy of Communism. It is the
mother who lets in this music, and Stoppel the Communist has so far been associated with her rather than
with the father. And now it is the music of the fair which
leads Heini to desert his heroic role. He gazes for a moment out of the open window, and then he remembers a
wonderful knife he saw at the fair in a lottery in one of the
sideshows. He turns back to his mother and starts to
describe the knife, listing its many blades- "and it has a
saw, too." She says, as she said before about the father's
beer, that it must cost money, but Heini tells her it is in a
lottery and can be had for a penny. He begs her for the
penny just as his father begged her for money (see
Figure 3).
In spite of the fact that Heini has now shifted from a
rescuing to a dependent role he is still a hero in her eyes,
and very slowly she smiles on him-a slow, almost
seductive, Mona Lisa smile. Thoughtfully she rises to her
feet and moves across the room. As she moves, the
music of the fair, which hitherto has been almost formless, becomes rhythmical, and she moves in step with it.
She goes and gets money from a hiding place inside the
coffee grinder.
Thus she confers on her son the favor she had refused
the angry father, but we are shown very clearly that Heini
is no longer really a hero. As she crosses the room, he
watches her appraisingly-judging the success of his
plea for money. He smiles secretly when she starts to
shake the coffee grinder and rapidly removes the smile
from his face the moment she turns to give him the
money. Then he dashes out to get the coveted knife.
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In thus going out to get the knife with his mother's
money, he is performing an act closely comparable with
the father's going out to get beer, and indeed both the
knife and the beer are natural symbols for a certain sort of
virility. Through this crack in the knight's armor Communism enters. The pennies are, of course, immediately
lost in the lottery, and the "of course" element in this loss
is underlined by the casual impersonal quality of the lottery scene. The lottery is a swindle, in which a large
number of prizes are exhibited but the competitors do not
know which prize is being put up at any given turn of the
wheel. When the wheel is spun and the winning number
announced, the prize is not the knife but a cheap vase 20
of artificial flowers, and it is won by a silly woman. Heini
shyly asks how much the knife would cost to buy, and
the man says, "8 marks"-the knife is inaccessible.
But Stoppel, the Communist, is there in the
background. For a moment Stoppel and Heini pause to
listen to a ballad singer (Moritaet). Each stanza of the
ballad ends with the words "Often the thing succeeds.
But for our George it failed." Stoppel tells "Heini to note this
text, then offers him a sort of substitute gratification instead of the knife. He invites him to a Communist hike in
the country. Heini says, "But won't that cost money?" but
Stoppel says, "I will take you , you are my guest." Then,
further underlining the fact that the hike is a substitute for
the knife, Stoppel goes on to list its charms just as Heini
in the previous sequence listed the charms of the knife.
They will have tents, they will play, they will bathe. Heini
agrees to meet the Communists at the railway station the
next day. 21
The preliminary build-up of the family structure is now
complete, and a Iink between the two parents and the
political background has been constructed. The position
which the film has so far achieved may be summed up in
Diagram 1. 22
The first fifteen minutes of the film have been devoted
to building up Communism into a straw man. The audience has been led to accept unconsciously the premise
that the symbolism of the family is applicable to the political scene by being shown how this symbolism could be
used to create a sympathetic basis for Communism.
Heini's world is shown as split into two great halves by
the scene of violence between the two parents. Heini
himself is repulsed by his father's violence and dependence. He has just been shown a side of his father's
character with which he cannot identify, but he is attracted by his mother, who smiles upon her hero. Communism has been quite definitely linked with the world of
the emotions in two ways, first through Stoppel, the
Communist, who is associated with the mother, vis-a-vis
the father, and second, through the knife and the fair. The
mother opened the window and let in the music of the fair,
which reminded Heini of the knife, and then she gave
Heini the money to get the knife in the fair. The link between the fair and Communism has already been discussed in the analysis of backgrounds, and it is accen-

tuated by the clear symbolism of the incident in which
Stoppel jumps onto the merry-go-round from which
Gerda, the seductive Communist girl , has called to him.
This diagram is, of course, fundamentally false. The
propagandist has deceived the audience into accepting
links which are psychologically unsound. In particular,
the knife as a symbol of virility cannot really be linked
with the mother, and the film will go on to destroy this
preliminary picture. The basic premise, however, will remain, and remain unconscious-that the symbolism of
the family is relevant to political ideology-but the symbols will be rearranqed .
At this point the story jumps to the railway station where
Heini joins the Communist hike. The scenes at the station
and in the woods, in which the contrast between Communism and Nazism is built up, have already been discussed. But there are a few points relevant to the family in
these sequences. The first of these concerns not Heini 's
family of origin, but his courtship and the sort of family in
which he might be a father. Gerda, the Communist girl ,
grabs Heini around the neck as he enters the compartment on the train , pulls him down onto the seat, and
kisses him on the mouth. While she does this Gerda is
wearing a boy's cap, which she takes off after the kiss.
Heini is shocked and disgusted by the kiss and apparently sti II more shocked to discover that she is female. He
says, "You-you are a girl?" She replies, "Yes, you seem
to notice everything ." (See Figure 7.)
Later, after Heini is disgusted by the Communists, he
wanders away from their camp and sees the Nazis celebrating the summer solstice. They find him and think he is
a spy. Fritz, the boy leader of the group, recognizes him
as one of the Communists who were on the railway station
and abuses him and sends him away. Ulla, Fritz's sister,
is heard expostulating with Fritz. She is not shown on the
screen but we hear her voice telling Fritz that he ought not
z

crnm:t:;~:;;:;ttr::m:ttttttt' :::::::=::::::::=::=:=:::r::::r:=::~t::f;wm=::::.m••••••

Diagram 1
Communism

{the Fair
{Knife
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Heini
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Figure 9 Heini 's father forces Heini to sing the " lnternationale."

to have been so hasty. Perhaps Heini might have become
a Nazi. These two incidents, Gerda's kiss and Ulla's expostulation, provide the beginning of Nazism's answer to
the adolescent's problem of sex.
Next morning there is a symbolic reference to Heini's
family of origin. While Heini is looking longingly at the
Nazis, who are now inaccessible, Stoppel comes through
the woods looking for him and calling his name. Heini
hides in a hole in the ground and then runs.down the
hillside to a road where he gets a lift from a truck and
goes home to his mother. The hole in the ground is probably a piece of conscious symbolism introduced by a
propagandist who had read a little folklore and who
wanted a maternal symbol for blood and earth (8/ut und
Boden). That Heini should hide in this way from Stoppel is
the first indication we are given of the complete reshuffling of the symbolic roles whi~h is now about_to ,oc?ur.
Formerly Stoppel was Iinked w1th the mother v1s-a-v1s the
father. Now we see Heini hiding in the hole vis-a-vis
Stoppel. Similarly, the return to the mother now that
Nazism has become inaccessible is another indication of
the same reshuffling.
When he arrives home his mother is surprised to see
him so early and asks him about the hike. Heini is enthusiastic, and she asks, "What then did Stoppel do (to
make the trip so successful)?" Heini says, "Mother-but I
was with the others-with the boys with the--the hooked
cross." His mother says, "But not with the Nazis!" And
when he says "Yes," she heaves an anxious sigh; she is
not angry but rather regretful. Heini says, "But mother,
they are not so bad. They cooked and they wheeled and
they swam and they sang a song"-and Heini then sings
the "Hitler Youth Song" to his mother.

The father, meanwhile, is reading a newspaper in the
next room. The mother must certainly have been aware of
this, but she does not warn Heini. At first the father smiles
when he hears his son's voice, but suddenly he hears
Hitler's name and rushes in, furious. The mother tells him
to leave the boy alone and even tries to pull Heini away
from his father. The father holds Heini fast and compels
him to sing the "lnternationale," slapping at his face with
each beat of the song. The mother, almost crying, stands
there helpless, and a special close-up shot is inserted
into the sequence to show us the mother rubbing her own
cheek with her hand-thus underlining her link with
Heini. This slapping of Heini's face clearly echoes the
earlier slapping which was administered to the boy who
stole the apple, and we may suppose that this second
slapping is likewise administered to "all you who are
here"-i.e., the audience. The final shot of the sequence
is a close-up of Heini's weeping face (Figure 9).
This violent scene completely destroys the alignment
shown in Diagram 1. At that stage of the film Communism
was in the mother's half of the diagram, but now with
every slap of Heini's cheek we are told that Communism
is the father and especially that it is all that is violent and
shocking in that parent. The mother is as yet only very .
slightly associated with Nazism, though already we are 1n
a position to feel that such pro-Communist sentiments as
she professes are due entirely to tht:: father's influence.
This indeed is the great difficulty with this German
mother. Heini cannot get her to himself unalloyed by her
allegiance to the father, and while she is not angry with
him because he goes with the Nazis, she is regretful and
does not trouble to save him from detection.
The new alignment can again be stated in diagrammatic form. The situation is, however, somewhat more complicated than it was in Diagram 1. An~ it is now ~ecess_ary
to draw two diagrams, one representing the po1nt of v1ew
of the mother (Diagram 2) and the other representing
Heini's point of view (Diagram 3):
Diagram 2

Nazism ·

[Communism\

" ' - Heini) ()Father

\Mother

~Stoppel
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Diagram 3

~

Nazism

~Mother\

~Helni

Father

~

c.

ommumsm ~

~Stoppel

Diagram 2 shows that the mother has no cle~r allegiance or attraction uncomplic_ated ~Y repulsion_. In
psychological terms, all her relat1onsh1ps are ambivalent.
Even her love for Heini is complicated by the fact that
Heini is linked with Nazism. She herself is not actively
anti-Nazi but, duty bound to her husband, must oppose it,
so that the arrow representing the repulsion she feels for
Nazism is really an echo of the attraction which binds h~r
to her husband. However, her relationship to the father 1s
also ambivalent, and the repulsion she feels for him,
while partly her response to his violence, is also partly an
echo of the attraction she feels for Heini.
From Heini's point of view (Diagram 3), the position
appears at first glance to he much simpler. He is attracted by Nazism and by his mother, an~ he feels re~ul
sion for his father, Stoppel, and Commun1sm. If only h1s
mother felt as he does, life would be simple for him, but
unfortunately the "Mother" (in Diagram 3) is a complex
being whose attitudes are shown here in more detail.
Heini cannot be fully united with his mother because of
political sentiments induced in her by the father. The
propagandist has built his le~son into t~e ~tructure of ~he
family where the audience w1ll absorb 1t w1thout knowmg
what they are absorbing. Earlier in the film, ~hen the
mother slowly smiled on her hero and gave h1m money
which she had refused to the father, we were given a taste
of how sweet the world might be if only mother love were
unmixed, and now, by contrast, the propagandist is able
to slip in his message that Communism is those flaws in
mother which result from her undivided (?) love.
The next scene is laid in the yard of the school which is
attended by both the Communist and Nazi youth of the
neighborhood. We see Gerda try to make a date with
Heini who turns her down because he wants to approach
Fritz 'the Nazi boy. Gerda goes off disappointed and
Stop,pel tells her that Grundler, the weak Nazi, is due
(faellig) to fall for her. She says with a pun that Grundler
does not attract her (gefaellt mir aber gar nicht). Stoppel
says that that is not important. She must go ahead and
vamp him (einzuseifen, "Soap him in"). This she proceeds to do and we are thus given to understand that the
sexual seductions of Communism are not only dangerous
but actively treacherous.

Heini meanwhile has been waiting for Fritz, and when
he tells Fritz that he wants to join the Nazi troop, Fritz
says, "Famous!" (fabelhaft), and takes him to his home.
We then see Gerda falling into step with Grundler on
their way to the fair, and Heini falling into step with Fritz
on the way to the latter's upper-middle-class h?m~. At the
door, Fritz invites Heini to eat with them, ment1onmg that
his father is away at a doctor's conference. (None of the
committed Nazis have visible parents, and we shall see
that the propagandist's use of the emoti~nal_ fo~ces of the
family to give intensity to Heini's conversion IS, 1n the end,
totally destructive of that family.)
.
At this meal Heini meets Ulla, who shakes hands w1th
him with a conspicuous show of frankness and t_hen .
cooks eggs for the two boys. While they are eatmg, Fntz
invites Heini to the opening that night of the troop's new
"home" (Heim), or clubhouse. Heini exclaims, "A real
home!" in a tone of longing which recalls the whole torture of Heini's real home and suggests the possibility,
which is to be worked out at a later stage of the film, of
completely substituting Nazism for family life. ~t this
stage, however, Heini sees a difficulty-how w1ll he b~
able to get back into his parents' house after the meetmg
when he has no house key? Fritz replies, in the slogan of
Nazism, "If you will, you can do much" (wenn Man will
kan Man vieles), and Heini replies, "Yes, I shaiJ come."
In the following sequence we see Stoppel getting the
father's signature to a paper entering Heini in the Communist Youth International. The mother suggests weakly
that they ask the boy whether he "will," but the fathe~
violently exclaims, "What do you mean, 'will'? There_1s no
more to be said. He can be glad that they accept h1m.
Call it rather luck" (Glueck). And he signs the paper. At
the beginning of the film, when Stoppel first approached
the father to get Heini for the Communist Youth, the_ father
rather pointedly told Stoppel to approach the boy h1mself.
Now, the propagandist deliberately draws the reverse
picture, either to correct an impression of the f~ther's
kindness, which he did not intend should remam, or else
to give us a total picture of the father's p~rsonali~y, in
which we see him as mild only when he 1s certain of
getting his own way, but violent and overbearing
when opposed.
Heini now comes home from his meal with Fritz and
Ulla. He sees Stoppel just leaving the house and anxiously asks his mother what Stoppel has been doing. The
mother weakly says, "Yes, he was with your fatherFather will tell you. Go on in." Heini, a little afraid, goes in
to his father, who tells him he is to go to the Party Local
that night at 9:00 o'clock. Heini says, "And do I get a
house key then?" And the father rep Iies, "Of course you
get a house key. You are entering the Party and now you
are grown up-a grown man. And a grown man has a
house key."
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Diagram 4
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key,...'4111-----

Father, violent
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Fumbling to free the key from his ring, the father then
makes a long speech, awkwardly groping for words but
fully expressing an extraordinary warmth of feeling for his
boy. "Sit down a minute--1 have wanted to have a word
with you-you see, there is much happening in these
days that you don't understand-but we, Workers
[Proleten], we must look after our own skins. That's it.
Look how we Iive here-your mother, you, and l-it was
not always so. We had better days formerly. But now we
are thrown out of our tracks [Geleise]. I'd have Iiked to do
more for you. Many a night I have racked my brains how I
could make things better for you. But now work for years
on end-no wages-that's what breaks one. And now
even you young people must help us-must stand by us
old ones. Else we'll never get on, do you see? Else we'll
be stamping [on a relief line] forever. You understand?"
"Yes, father." "Now-you have the house key. Your father is
your friend [meint es gut mit dir]. Now, go along and see
to it that you enter your Party."
This scene is in a sense a recapitulation of the whole
story. The film has carried its audience through all the
combinations of the family alignment and has built up by
implicit reasoning the notion that all the psychological
forces in the family are linked with Nazism, while the
unpleasant are due to Communism personified in the violent and childish elements of the father. Now the film goes
on from its depiction of the internal structure of the family
to invoke on the side of Nazism all the emotions which
can be aroused in the boy when he achieves adult independence of the family. We are told almost in so many
words that the house key represents responsible maturity,
and this symbol is sufficiently well known in Germany to
stand alone even without the father's words, "A grown
man has a house key."
In this new beginning, the film again gives Communism a favorable opening, and the trap is baited
exactly as it was in the first scenes, except that instead of
posing as a hero in saving his mother, Heini is now invited to save his father ("us old ones") and the symbol of
virility is changed. Instead of a knife, he is offered a key.
Heini comes away from this talk with his father almost
weeping. He sits down beside his mother and lays his
head on his hands. "Father is not so bad, mother-father
is r;uite different, quite different [ganz anders]. What am I
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to do now? He gave me a house key and now I cannot lie
to him any more. What am I to do, mother? Tell me."
In this speech, Heini echoes his earlier speech about
the Nazis-with exactly the same emphasis he told his
mother that he had been with the "others" (andern) and
that those others were "not so bad." Thus, the moment the
father begins to show a pleasanter side of his character,
the propagandism takes steps to link this pleasanter side
with Nazism.
The mother weakly replies, "It would be good if you
would obey [folgen] your father." Heini says, "But I cannot." The mother says, "One can do everything, even if it
is painful [Man kann alles. Muss dir eben Muehe geben].
One cannot always do as one would like [gem moechte]."
This last speech apparently recalls to Heini the full
strength of Fritz's challenge ("If you will, you can do
much") and he says definitely, "I will not go to the Communists. I will go to the others ."
The father's change of tone and Heini's decision to use
the key to go not to the Communists but to the Nazis have
introduced important changes into the alignment, and a
new diagram (Diagram 4) must now be substituted for
Diagrams 2 and 3.
Heini has placed himself in a false position, and instead of the cmparatively simple alignment shown in
Diagram 3, we now have one in which almost all of his
relationships have become somewhat ambivalent. His relationship with his father, which was one of simple repulsion, is now mixed, and we can represent it only by showing the father in two separate parts of the diagram-the
remembered violent event in one place and the gentle,
warm father in another. Even with this division of the
father into two personalities, Heini is still left in an ambivalent relationship to the friendly father. "I cannot lie to
him"-but Heini is going to lie to him and this lie must
necessarily introduce a negative element into his attitude
toward this new, kind father. And this negative element is
not the simple hate we feel toward those whom we dislike
and fear, but the subtler guilt we feel when we take a
course contrary to those who love us and whom we love.
His attitudes toward the mother are similarly complicated. Insofar as he now loves the kind but Communist
side of his father's personality, he must also love those
elements in his mother which weakly echo the father's
policies. But these elements he has decided to trample,
so that his decision to lie to his father must also, and for
the same reasons, introduce an ambivalence into his
attitudes toward the mother.
Similarly, his attitudes toward the house key are confused in that the key is very clearly linked with Communism, but he proposes to use it in cooperation with
Nazism. The key, therefore, also appears twice in the
diagram.
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Of all his relationships, only that toward Nazism remains almost uncomplicated. The attraction here is even
stronger than before, since Ulla has now been added to
the picture, but even here his attitude is simple only insofar as his "I will" is absolute.
We now have a long series of sequences dealing with
Heini's adventures outside the family home, but these
sequences must be followed in this family analysis since
their structure is evidently determined by the fact of
Heini's lie. Heini is stopped on his way to the Nazi "home"
by Stoppel. The Communists are about to raid the Nazis
and Stoppel says, "It is good that you have come-now'
you can join us." He draws Heini onto the porch of a
house and they stand there waiting for the raid. We see
Gerda try to seduce Grundler away from his post as sentry, and we see the Communists creeping up in the dark
from different directions. 23 Just as the raid begins, Heini
dodges away from Stoppel, but he runs straight into
the arms of the police who have come to quell the
disturbance.
The police have already been characterized in a beautiful shot near the beginning of the film. In the food riot the
apples are scattered, and we see a little girl eating one of
them in the middle of the street. Two policemen dash up
on horseback, as though about to ride over her. She
qui~tly continues to eat her apple, and the police halt
the1r horses harmlessly on each side of her: This shot has
told ~s that the police are supposedly infinitely reliable
and Impersonal , and since it is their relationship to a
~hild ~hich is used to. characterize them, we are justified
1n sa~~~~ that they are 1n some sense parental. (Figure 10.)
He1n1 1s taken to. the pol ice station and questioned by
these parental pol1ce. He refuses to give his name because he is afraid it will get into the newspapers, but he
says that he had nothing to do with the affair-that he was
o~ his way hom~ (nach Hause) when the pol ice picked
h1m up. The pol1ce agree that he does not look like a
gangster (Revolverheld) and tell him to "go home to the
mother." The first payoff of his lie is that the police label
him child.
As he leaves the police station, he encounters the
Nazis an~ especially Fritz. They accuse him of setting the
Communists on to them. Fritz's facial expression in this
scene is a study in what Nazism stands for. His lips are
drawn back to show both canines in complete and savage repudiation of all human contact with Heini. It is
however, interesting that the Nazis should have been 'willing to show us this expression on a Nazi face and di~ected against.the hero.24 The second payoff of Heini's lie
IS that the Naz1s label him traitor, putting him back to that
~arlier state.w~ich he fell into when he was caught watch~ng th~ ~az1 h1ke and accused of being a spy. Nazism
1s agam maccessible, as it was then .
We .see n.o ~or~ of.the. ~vents of that particular night,
but th1s om1ss1on 1.s s1gn1f1cant. Heini must have gone
home and someth1ng must have been said at home about

Figure 10

Mounted police arrive to quell the food riot.

the raid , but the filmmakers do not take Heini home. To
take him home would have involved them in working out
and recognizing the unacceptable impl ications of the
particular symbol chosen to represent maturity and the
achievement of independence of the family. That key, the
symbol .which stands for all this, is a tool for return ing to
the fami!Y· Its symbolic meaning is: "If you will accept
res~ons1ble sexual maturity, you need not break with your
fam1ly background." Thus in letting the father give Heini a
key, the filmmakers have unconsciously left open anal~ernative t~ Nazism. This alternative they avoid by passIng over Without a word the other events of that night.
What did Heini and his parents say to each other when he
got home? The film does not tell us and assumes that we
will not notice the omission.
The film now jumps to the following afternoon, and we
see Heini at work in the printing shop. Stoppel enters and
compliments him on the way he conducted himself last
ni~ht in refusing to give information to the police. The
th1rd payoff of Heini's lie is that Stoppel hails him as a
hero. ?t~~p~l 9oes on. to say that tonight Heini must join
them 1n f1n1sh1ng the JOb." They will get their "bonbons"
--dynamite and hand grenades-from the secret cache
in. the old factory in the Marschstrasse. Heini protests, "I
w111 not that you do this-You must not laugh-1 am fully
determined (es ist mein vollen Ernst)-1 shall warn them."
At this threat, Stoppel suddenly becomes serious and
tells Hei~i ~hat th~~ is .something which one does only
once. He1n1 says, Th1s then is that once ." Stoppel stares
at ~im for a moment and then relaxes suddenly with a
sm1le, saying , "Lad, you're on the level [Junge du bist
richtig]-1'11 see you at 6:30."2s
'

Analysis of the Nazi Film "Hitlerjunge Quex"

Heini has now, like Hitler, told his enemies what he will
do, and he has succeeded in not being believed. Stoppel
has dismissed the possibility that a mere boy would
commit a mortal sin. The assumption implicit in this
scene seems to be that the older generation (i.e., the
enemy) will always let you get away with murder if you tell
them that you are going to commit it and especially if you
underline the generation difference between yourself and
them. The same theme was implicit in Heini's interview
with the police, when the inspector ignored the evidence
in favor of Heini's guilt in favor of his impression of Heini's
childishness. (The same theme is also to some extent
implicit in Hitler's war against the "senile" democracies.)
Heini 's lie has now been expiated by telling Stoppel
that he will warn the Nazis, but the daydream that Nazism
is inaccessible persists. As soon as Stoppel leaves, Heini
rushes to the telephone and rings up the home of Fritz
and Ulla. Ulla answers and Heini passionately tells her
about the plot and the cache of dynamite. But Fritz is in
the room with her and asks who is telephoning. She tells
him it is Heini and Fritz says, "That spy! It is a trick. Hang
up!" Ulla hangs up the telephone thoughtfully, saying to
Fritz, "but he said 'dynamite.'" Heini is left talking to a
dead phone.
He dashes to the police, but the inspector says, "My
constables are not nurses for your Hitler boys." Next, he
runs to the house of Fritz and Ulla, but they are out, and
finally he goes to the fair to try to find Stoppel. At the fair,
the action of the film is delayed while we listen to fifteen
and a half lines of the ballad singer's performance, one of
the longest consecutive speeches in the whole film. At
the end of the second stanza, as the ballad singer is
saying, "Often the thing succeeds. But for our George it
... ,"the explosion occurs, in the Marschstrasse. All the
explosives have been destroyed. The Nazis have done it.
The Communists know that someone has betrayed
them-and Heini goes home smiling and whistling the
"Youth Song."
In fact the inaccessibility of Nazism was only a daydream: Heini's warning was effective and Ulla must have
prevailed on Fritz. Ulla's role as a personification of Providence has already been discussed in the analysis of
German time perspectives, but here we have to note specifically that this role is given to Heini's future mate.
After the explosion, there follows a curious scene between Stoppel and Heini's mother. In all the remainder of
the film the dialogue is perfectly straightforward, but in
this one scene we have a series of misunderstandings
and things half said. It is night, and Stoppel comes beating atthe door. The mother tries to keep him out, saying
"My husband is out! What do you want? I tell you my
husband is out." Stoppel forces his way in and tells her to
put out the light. She does this hesitatingly and asks
Stoppel, "Why are you looking [glotzen] at me like thatare you being followed?" Stoppel says, "Yes, by the
Homicide Squad." The mother then gets the idea that
Stoppel has commited a murder, and he goes on to say
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that he will always kill when he is betrayed-that he has
been betrayed by the Nazis-"And where is your Heini?"
The mother then jumps to the conclusion that Stoppel has
killed Heini. She grabs a knife from the table and attacks
Stoppel, who easily disarms her, saying, "You ought to be
glad that you are not Heini." The mother then asks who
betrayed them. Stoppel answers, ''Just a stupid boy," and
goes out. The mother is thus left afraid of Stoppel and
Communism but still uncertain of what has happened.
The effect, and perhaps the purpose, of this scene is to
shift the alignment shown in Diagram 2. We saw there
that the mother's allegiance to the father made it impossible for Heini to get her complete love. Now this difficulty
has in some sense been removed. The mother's allegiance to the father is now replaced by hatred and fear
of Stoppel and Communism. In terms of the diagram, the
triangle Father-Stoppei-Communism has been turned
around so that, instead of the corner representing the
father being directed toward the mother, Stoppel and
Communism have come into the foreground of her attention. (Diagram 5)
The scene, however, is an awkward one. Stoppel's acting, never very good, leaves more ambiguity in it than the
filmmakers perhaps intended, and it is possible to see in
the sequences a hint of potential sexual attraction between Stoppel and the mother. 26 What exactly the
filmmakers intended in this scene is not clear, but we
have to remember that Stoppel is later to appear capable
of conversion to Nazism. The filmmakers therefore had to
work within narrow limits. Stoppel could not be frankly
vilified; he could not come in seeking to kill Heini-and
yet a scene was necessary to make the mother afraid of
Communism. The scene consequently built up on misunderstandinqs and half-understood threats.
Immediately after Stoppel's exit, Heini comes in and
the mother says, "Did you do it, Heini?" Heini answers,
"Yes, I rescued the boys! ... Why are you crying,
Mother?" Earlier in the film, Heini rescued his mother
from his father and tried to prevent her from being so sad
Now he has rescued the Nazis from the Communists, and
she weeps.
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The mother pleads with Heini to go and be reconciled
with (versoehn dich mit) Stoppel, "else all is finished
[sonst ist alles aus]." He says, "But mother, it is just beginning." He is sure that the Nazis will not accept him,
and as he lies down on his bed he says in a tired but
happy voice, "Yes, everything will now be all right"-and
goes to sleep.
His mother is left weeping. She hesitantly looks at the
gas stove, turns on the gas for a moment, turns it off,
pauses, and finally gets up, turns off the light, and turns
the gas fully on. The music, based on the first bars of the
"Youth Song," modified and slowed down to express terror or threat, mounts slowly, and the gas fumes begin to
appear on the screen as wisps of haze. Finally, the screen
is completely blotted out with these billowing fumes, and
the music evolves from terror to a triumphant and almost
martial climax. Heini is finally united with his mother and
-with Nazism-and the propagandic use of the family has
now finally broken that little group.
In place of the sharply defined diagrams which we
have so far been able to draw of the attractions and repulsions within the family, we have now the billowing
haze in which the mother, Nazism, triumph, and death are
indistinguishably blended together.
Heini, however, does not die. The gas fumes clear from
the screen and reveal Heini awakening in a bed in a
hospital where he is being looked after by a middle-aged
nurse. When he realizes where he is, he asks about his
mother, but the nurse only tells him to drink his milk.
The sequence is then cut to show the father, who is now
being looked after by a neighbor who brings him food
and opens the window to let in some fresh air, as the
mother did at the beginning of the film after the violent
scene with the father over the money. The double role of
the mother has in fact been divided between two women
-one to look after Heini and make him drink the milk,
and the other to look after the father.
Returning to Heini, the nurse enters and says, "There is
someone to see you." Heini says, "My mother?" The door
opens and Fritz enters, accompanied by Ulla and four
Nazi boys. The Nazis are thus brought in as the word
"mother" leaves Heini's lips.
Fritz makes a speech to Heini asking forgiveness for
the way they behaved to him at the police station and
inviting him to join the troop. Ulla comes forward and
presents Heini with a parcel. He opens it and finds in it a
beautiful new Nazi uniform with, in one pocket, some
money which has been contributed by the group, and in
the other, a photograph of Ulla with her brother Fritz.
Heini puts on the cap of the uniform, and Fritz produces a
mirror from his pocket so that Heini can admire himself
-a knight in shining armor with the symbol of Aphrodite
in his hand. The nurse returns to tell the Nazis that visiting time is
over, and when they have gone, she removes the Nazi
cap from his head while telling him that his mother will
never come. Thus, in this scene Nazism is twice substi-

tuted for the mother-first when the Nazis enter in the
mother's place, and second, when the Nazi cap and the
mother are simultaneously removed.
In the next scene we see the father selling part of the
furniture in the home. He receives 30 marks for this, and
then agrees to sell the rest of the furniture for another 30.
The second sum is counted out into his hand, and then he
sees the men removing Heini 's bed-the last possibility
of Heini's returning to his home. The father tries to stop
them , but the bed is already sold. In helpless anger, he
flings the 30 marks on the floor-probably evoking in the
audience an almost unconscious echo of Judas and the
30 pieces of silver.27
Some days later, Heini is still in the hospital and we see
him walking forlornly in the garden. The doctor remarks
that his recovery is slow, and the nurse replies, "He cannot forget his mother"; and we see him refuse to play with
another boy in the hospital garden.
Meanwhile, Heini's father is in the waiting room of the
hospital, and while he sits there slumped heavily in his
chair reading a fashion magazine, the district leader of
the Hitler Youth comes in and sits down in the next chair.
The father eyes the swastika on the leader's sleeve and
moves away. The leader and the father meet, however,
when the nurse comes in and announces that Heini is in
the garden. Both of them rise. There is an awkwardness
as they both go toward the doorway, and the father says,
"Where are you going then?" and the leader replies, "To
Heini Voelker." "What? To my son?" "Oh, are you the
father?"
When they reach the garden, the leader waves to Heini
with enthusiasm while the father greets his son a little
gruffly. The father says that the doctor has given Heini
permission to leave the hospital whenever he wishes, but
Hein i says, "But where should I go?" The father says,
"What a question! To your father, of course-where you
belong [hingehoerst]." At this point, the leader cuts into
the conversation with "That is the question-where does
the boy belong today [heute ]?" 28
We have seen Nazism equated with the mother. Now
we have a triangular scene, whose structure is revealed
by Heini's sitting between the two older men so that they
are in analogous positions relative to Heini, though arguing in opposite directions. Thus Nazism comes to be
equated not only with the mother but also with the father,
as it was when Heini said of both the Nazis and his father,
"They are not so bad." Nazism is ready to be substituted
for those aspects of the father's personality which
are congenial.

Analysis of the Nazi Film "Hitlerjunge Quex"

The scene consists of a long ideological conversation,
the function of which, in the plot, is to formalize the shifting of Heini from the family setting into the Hitler Youth
organization. This conversation must be given in detail:
Leader:

That is just the question-where does the boy belong today? I had very good parents. But when I
was fifteen I got out of the rut (bin ich ausgerueckt).
I wanted to go to sea- to become a sailor-to
wherever there were islands, where there were
palms-to Africa. In there thousands of boys have
left the rut.

Father:

And there were bad boys (Lausejungens ).

Leader:

Boys are something that is wonderful! Boys are a
great mystery (Geheimnis)! In all times it has been
so. They have run away to the gypsies. Always a
day has come and they have joined the great caravan (Zug). They, they begin to wander. Where does
a boy belong? You-ask your own boy.

Father (to Heini): Well-you-you say a word now. (Heini
smiles to himself, imagining the palms, the islands,
and the wandering.)
Leader:

I don't know whether you were in the war (im Felde).

Father (resentfully): Yes-indeed.
Leader:

Two million boys then freely offered (gemeldt)
themselves for service. Every one of them was the
son of a father-and , more important, of a mother.
And where did they belong?

Father:

I am a simple man. I am a worker (Prolet).

Leader:

But you must have heard of the Movement (Bewegung). No?

Father:

Movement! Attention! March! March! That was my
"Movement" till I stopped a bullet. And then I was
laid in plaster of Paris, and then there was more
"Movement" stretching the bones. Bend! Stretch!
Bend! Stretch! And then I hobbled on the stamping
ground (Stempel; where men stamp in line, waiting
for relief). Week after week, year after year, that was
my "Movement." Nothing else "moved" me. I was
unstuck (Aus dem Leim bin ich gegangen). Do you
think it was eating (fressen) that made me so
·
heavy? And where I belong, that is where the boy
belongs. To his class comrades (Kiassengenessen).

Leader:

You mean-to the International?

Father:

Yes, indeed. To the International.

Leader:

And where were you born? '

Father:

In Berlin.

Leader:

And where is that?

Father:

On the Spree.

Leader:

On the Spree. Yes. But where? In what country?

Father:

In Germany-yes-in OUR Germany. Think that
over.
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This dialogue has a rather complicated propagandic
structure. The first two speeches are clearly addressed to
Heini and to those youthful members of the audience who
can be charmed with a daydream of wandering among
tropical islands, escaping from parents, and shelving the
difficult issues of maturity. Heini himself is clearly caught
in this daydream. He smiles to himself with a glowing
face and is so wrapped in his dream that he is hardly
aware of his father's question. We think of adventure as
inducing a greater awareness of other people and of the
outer world, but wandering, the escape of the German
Youth movements, was different. It was rather a withdrawal into a dream, an introversion of the personality.
It was hardly necessary, perhaps, to provide Heini with
this dream because we know that his heart is already set
upon becoming a Nazi. But this particular scene is crucial. It is the final scene between Heini and his father, the
scene of the final disruption of the family. The propagandist cannot say bluntly that Nazi ideology is logically the
bane of the family, that its propaganda is parasitic upon
the emotions which dwell within the family, and that, in
the end, the ideology is totally destructive of the family
unit. Therefore, this final scene must be sweetened, and
we are offered the theory that youth has "always" escaped "from the rut" and the lyrical illusion that they escape to palm trees and tropical islands.
The second half of the scene is addressed to the father
and to the men of the war generation. Heini and the problem of where Heini belongs fade away almost completely.
The leader brings up the question of the war, again and
again, "Where did they [the soldiers who fought] belong?" This is tantamount to asking the father not "where
does Haini belong" but "where do you belong." In reply to
this latent question, the father is then allowed to express
all his own bitterness about the war, his own wound, and
his own unemployment, and must at the end argue rather
lamely, "Where I belong, that is where the boy belongs."
The leader ignores this last reference to Heini and pushes
the father into equating class consciousness with internationalism (by means of a pun on the word "lnternationale"). Then he builds up the trap by dialogue until
he can spring it with the words "Our Germany."
In truth, the family drama is finished off with the
leader's speech about hunger and gypsies, and in the
second part of the sequence, the filmmaker has proceeded to an entirely new task-that of showing that all
the principal characters of the film, with the exception of
the sinister Wilde, can be converted to Nazism. It is difficult to ensure that every member of the audience will see
the story of any film through the eyes of the right character, and whenever, as in this film, two opposing sides are
presented on the screen, there is always a danger that
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some members of the audience may see the story
through the eyes of some character in the wrong camp. If,
however, all the characters make progress toward the
side favored by the propagandist, then there is hope that
all members of the audience will be encouraged in the
same direction.
The father is told to "think over" the fact that he was
born in our Germany, and later we see the result of his
cogitations . He is drinking with Stoppel and asks Stoppel
which he would prefer-English beer or the local Molle
Helles beer. Stoppel says, "Molle Helles," and then the
father asks, "Where was it brewed?" which leads successfully to "In our Germany-think that over."
Later we see Stoppel trying to save Heini from the
vengeance of the Communists; and we see Gerda scorning the traitor Grundler and expressing a preference for
Heini. She has taken a first step toward becoming a Nazi
in admiring Heini's loyalty to Nazism, and even Grundler
himself seems sobered by her scorn.
In sum, by closing off Heini's relationship to his family
of origin with this scene, the filmmakers have been able
to lay the foundations for the conversion of almost everybody in the film to Nazism. (The family of origin has
served its function as a source of emotional intensity, and
the propagandist has been able to collect from it all the
favorable attitudes directed toward the parents to redirect
them toward Nazism while the unfavorable attitudes have
been collected and redirected toward Communism.)

Analysis IV: The Future Family
The family of origin has been destroyed, the mother is
dead, and after the scene in the hospital garden, we
never again see Heini with his father-but this analysis of
the film's use of family symbols must follow Heini to the
end, because the beginnings of another family structure
are appearing. Every individual whose life is complete
has membership in two families, the family into which he
is born and that other family which he himself sets up
when he marries.
It is clear already that no future family could be set up
by Heini on the old pattern. The film has indicated great
disapproval of Gerda's lusty sexuality and has frustrated
all Heini's symbolic moves toward normal masculine
virility-his desire for the knife and his acceptance of the
house key presented to him by the father. The old virility
has been condemned, and if we want to know about
Nazism, we must ask what sort of pattern the film will
suggest as a model for the future Germany. In answer to
this question the film contains two types of materiaiHeini's courtship relations with Ulla and the district
leader's relationship to the boys. The leader, in the last
scene, has been set up as an alternative to the father, and
to this extent he can be regarded as a father substitute, so

that from his behavior we can get one segment of the
future German family pattern while from Heini's courtship
we get another.
The scene between the leader and the father is cut off
after the leader says, "Think that over," and the next shot
shows us the leader and Heini entering another Nazi
"home" in the district of Bannheim. Heini is to be protected from the vengeance of the Communists by being
removed from the Beusselkietz district. On entering the
home, the leader introduces Heini to his new roommate
-Grundler.2 9 The leader says, "So, Heini, you will live
here. And that is your roommate (Stubenkamarad),
Grundler. And this is Heini Voelker-he is alone in the
world like you." Thus the leader underlines the notion that
Nazism is a substitute for the real home and at the same
time marks the parallel between Heini and Grundler. This
parallel is at once used, as it was earlier in the film, to
point up the contrast between them. Grundler starts to
sing a snatch from some popular song :
That is the life of any sailorNever think my love will last,
Anchors cannot there hold fast . ...
(Das ist die Liebe der Matrosenauf die Dauer, Iieber Schatz,
ist mein Herz kein Ankerplatz ... .)

His association with Gerda is evidently causing his
character to degenerate, ·and while he sings he walks
around the room with a curiously footloose air, expressing
complete casual detachment. He pauses in his song to
offer a cigarette to Heini, who refuses disapprovingly.
Grundler shrugs his shoulders, lights one for himself, and
resumes his song. Heini meanwhile pins up over his bed
the photograph of Ulla and Fritz which they gave him in
the hospital. Grundler strolls over and looks at this, saying, "So, you have let yourself be photographed with your
wench [F/amme].'' The insulting implications of this remark are much stronger than we would guess. In most of
the German Youth movements-Communists, Social
Democratic, and Nazi alike-there was a·very strong
taboo on any suggestion that ordinary sexual attraction
might play a part in "comradeship." It is probable that not
only the Nazis but also other groups were on their way
toward evolving sexual patterns of the type indicated by
the relationship between Heini and Ulla.
Heini replies, "That is no 'wench,' that is the Group
Leader [Kamaradschaftsfuehrer] with his sister!" But
Gru.ndler says, "To me it only looks like a fine girl [strammes Maedchen]-a very fine girl." We have already had
hints that Ulla approves of Heini, and we have seen Gerda's desire for Heini and her seduction of Grundler. Now
the fourth possibility of sexual attraction is hinted atGrundler thinks that Ulla is a "fine wench." We are being
told that the sort of love which Grundler and Gerda and
the Communists affect is different in kind from anything
in Nazism.

Analysis of the Nazi Film "Hitlerjunge Quex"

The sequence is cut off at this point to show us the
scene in which the father tries the trick dialogue on Stoppel with the two pots of beer: "And where was it brewedin our Germany."
When we next see Heini, he is sitting with the other
Nazi boys at a meal in the clubroom. Grundler refers to
Heini as "our 'Quex."' Heini protests against this
nickname, but the other boys all say that he is a real
Quex-a real Quicksilver [Quexsilber]." 30 They all start to
point at Heini and call him "Quex! Quex!" A disorderly
fight breaks out between Heini and the others. Heini
throws water in Grundler's face, 31 and in a few seconds
one or two subsidiary fights start among the other boys,
as though they were all really fighting each other just for
the sake of fighting . At this moment the district leader
enters and restores order with a single barked command,
and the whole scene thus forms a further illustration of the
premise that disorderly depravity underlies Nazi discipline. This incident of the nickname requires, however,
further interpretation. The name itself- "Quex," or
"Quicksilver"-fits well enough with Heini's quick, responsive character, his "mercurial" temperament. But it is
interesting that the name should first be applied by
Grundler, that Heini should resent the name, and that the
name should be allowed to stick-it is later used by Ulla
at the highest point of her relationship with Heini, and of
course. it is used in the title of the film (see Fiqure 6).
We may guess that Grundler's use· of the word follows
naturally from the contrast which has been drawn between himself and Heini. Grundler is weak and wavering,
his heart is no place for an anchor [sic]; but Heini has
really changed-he has been converted to Nazism and
stands firm in that faith. It is natural, therefore, for Grundler to quiet his own conscience by accusing Heini of
changeability. Such a reading, however, will hardly account for the adoption of the nickname in the title of the
film. We have to recognize that, in addition to the meaning of mere changeability, the word "Quex" implies a
certain sexlessness, or, more strictly, a certain sexuality
distilled from the normal lustiness arising from the differences between the sexes-purified until either sex may
have the shining, untouchable charms of Mercury or
Hermaphroditus. 32 Such an epithet, bearing these implications, could certainly be applied to the preadolescent
Heini, and its overtones-verging on the homosexualwould certainly explain Heini's resentment.
The nickname comes close to being a reproach, and
its adoption into the title of the film is best understood as
an instance of the rather common -phenomenon by which
a term of reproach is picked up and worn as a badge of
pride-like the Garter and the motto Honi soit qui mal y
pense.
·
If we put together the intersexual implications of the
word "Quex" and the narcissistic implications of the incident in which the Nazis give Heini a mirror in which to
admire himself, we get a rather clear picture of one side
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of Nazi character. The badge of reproach is proudly worn,
and the uniform is self-admired. This type of narcissism
has led to the development in Germany of an entirely new
kind of film, which we may call the "pseudodocumentary."
These films, of which The Triumph of the Will is the outstanding example, depict historical spectacles such as
the Nurenberg Parteitag of 1934, but they differ from ordinary newsreel material in that the spectacle is expressly
created and staged for the motion picture camera. Reality
becomes a carefully dressed shop window in which
Nazism exhibits itself. 33
The ordinary technical terms of psychology and
psychoanalysis are not applicable to the particular type
of personality implied by this combination of intersexuality and self-admiration in Nazism. The word "narcissism"
suggests not only self-admiration but also effeminacywhich Nazism does not exhibit; and the word "homosexuality" implies dominance-submission relationships, usually with a strong emphasis on the erogenous zones.
Nazism has gone to the opposite, and equally pathological, extreme of repudiating all such emphasis. We are of
course talking only about the ideal Nazism as it is presented in this film and not about the reality. The film indicates to us that the ideal in 1933 was not merely without
emphasis on the erogenous zones, but emphatically
anti-zonal, and the psychiatric expectation would be that
a cult with such ideals would produce frequent cases of
underground homosexuality with pronounced zonal emphasis and dominance-submission patterns following the
lines of the overt authoritarian system.
It is, however, the ideal which we are here investigating, and in order to get a clearer picture of the sort of
human relationships which would be based on combining narcissism and intersexuality, it is necessary to look
carefully at the relationships between Ulla and Heini and
between the district leader and his boys. In the last two
reels of the film, there are two scenes between Heini and
Ulla, and it is interesting to note the ruse which the
filmmaker deemed artistically appropriate as a means of
bringing this boy and girl together. The script writer has
shown considerable resourcefulness throughout the film,
and he is here faced with a comparatively easy task, so
that we may legitimately assume that the device which
here seems to be artistically appropriate is also psychologically significant.
It is the time of the 1933 election, and after a series of
shots of election crowds and processions, one very quick
shot shows us a crowd scene in which Fritz's head is
slightly wounded. Fritz reports back to the Nazi headquarters where everyone is busy working on leaflets. The
leader seizes Fritz by the head and gazes into his eyes,
then gives orders that he is to lie down. Heini and Ulla
meet at the door of the room where Fritz lies in bed. Heini
tells Ulla that Grundler has treacherously destroyed all
their leaflets and that he is leaving immediately to print a
new supply. Heini and Ulla then go off together to print
more leaflets in Heini's workshop.
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Figure 11
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Ulla gives Heini a "Nazi" kiss of friendship.

Thus Heini and Ulla come together by temporary
elimination of Fritz, so that Heini is substituted for Ulla's
brother. The relationship between them, which is clearly
meant to have sexual overtones and to romanticize the
mating of pure types under the Nazi aegis, is structurally
equated with a relationship between brother and sister.
The second scene between Heini and Ulla is a very
short sequence in the printing shop. They have worked
all night on the leaflets and finally Heini says, "So-that's
done [sodas haetten wir geschafft]," and Ulla exclaims,
"Quex, you are colossal [du bist ein kolossaller Kerl],"
and bends forward, giving him a quick, sisterly kiss-a
kiss which contrasts sharply with that earlier kiss Gerda
had forced upon his lips. Heini is delighted, and says,
"UIIa!-and now for Beusselkeitz!" He then goes out to
his death. (Figure 11.)
The preliminary base for the future German family is
thus envisaged as a courtship between two mercurial
beings stripped of the outward manifestations of sex differences and symbolically equated as brother and sister.
Nazism offers us a recipe for life based on regression to
those themes against which most of the civilizations of
the world have striven since human communities first had
culture-psychological homosexuality, narcissism, and
incest. This probably is the logical outcome of building a
cult on the preadolescent daydream of perpetual youth.
Corresponding to the metamorphosis which courtship
has undergone at Nazi hands, we find corresponding
changes in the father and son relationship. The film unfortunately does not show us a Nazi father, but we have seen
that the district leader is cast as an alternative to the real

father, and therefore by comparing him with the father, we
may arrive at some indication of what the father-son relationship would look like in the ideal, future Nazi family.
When we compare the leader with Heini's father, we find .
the same sort of systematic contrast that we found earlier
in the comparison of Ulla and Gerda, As Ulla is constructed to be the physical opposite of Gerda, so the
leader is the physical opposite of Heini's father. He is a
curious but not unfamiliar type. The father is a very heavy,
broad-faced man, clumsy and fumbling in his movements, his voice a deep bass and his speech broken and
halting. He roars when he is angry but he is warm and
awkwardly charming when he wishes to be kind. In contrast to this, the district leader is tall and thin, hatchetfaced, fluent and even eloquent in his speech and in his
movements. When he is angry, instead of roaring he emits
a single, sharp bark. The two men are about the same
age, perhaps in their early forties with at most five years
difference between them, and yet the district leader is
boyish where the father is manly. The leader's youthfulness is enhanced by the uniform he wears which confers
upon him the air-slightly embarrassing to non-Nazi
eyes-of an overgrown Boy Scout, a Boy Scout who has
grown old insofar as the lines of his face are concerned
but whose physique has never filled out. He clings longer
than he should to a certain boyishness of manner, a certain romanticism of youth maintained almost by recipe
after youth should have given place to maturity. In fact,
the district leader bears just about the same relationship
to the old stereotype of the lower-middle-class father that
the ideal sexuality of Nazism bears to the caricatured
sexuality of Communism. He is an emasculated father but
not an effeminate one. When he talks of the mystery of
boys, we are reminded of those nineteenth-century
romantic notions about the "long, long thoughts" of
adolescence, and yet there is a difference. The
nineteenth-century labels were applied to underline a
contrast--even a barrier-between male and female, and
between the mature and the adolescent, but the district
leader's speech and tone indicate rather that he himself
is one of the boys whom he romanticizes: He recognizes
no suc1iJ barrier. He shares their dreams and romanticizes
himself by some twist of narcissism.
All of this is repellent to non-Nazi eyes, but this is the
enemy's idealized picture of himself, and if we are ever to
help that enemy pu"ll himself out of the swamp into which
he has sunk-and thereby endangered us all-we need
to understand him and the dreams on which he has fed.
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Analysis V: The Knife and Death

2

3

4

5

Two ingredients of the plot remain to be examined in
order to complete the analysis of the propagandist's handling of the symbols which derive their force from the
loves and hates of the German family. These are the knife
and Death.
The knife is referred to, either openly or implicitly, no
less than seven times, and while it only appears on the
screen at three of these points, the whole series must be
brought together to get a full impression of its significance:
The first reference to the knife is in the dialogue between
Heini and his mother, after the father has gone off to get
his beer. Heini is reminded of the knife by the music of the
fair, and turns to his mother. He Iists the charms of the
knife and begs for money to go and get it. We have already noted earlier that, in doing this, Heini is deviating
from the role of the self-sacrificing hero and is doing
something which more nearly parallels his father's irresponsible virility. (See Figure 3.)
We then see the knife in the fair, and we see Heini lose his
money in the lottery. He asks the price of the knife and is
told "eight marks." Stoppel appears at Heini's elbow and
says, "Now-don't let your head hang scr--1 promise
you'll have the knife sooner than you think-have you
thought about it? About the Communist Youth Organization?" and then Stoppel invites Heini to the hike, listing
the charms of the hike just as Heini had Iisted the charms
of the knife to his mother.
When the Nazis come to Heini's bedside in the hospital,
they give him a uniform and tell him to look in the pockets. In one pocket he finds the photograph of Fritz and
Ulla, and in the other some money. They tell him that they
have all contributed to make up this sum. (There is no
overt reference to the knife on this occasion.)
When Heini is hiding in the Nazi clubhouse in another
part of Berlin, the leader sends him to get some beer. He
goes and gets the beer from a bar, and on the way back,
carrying two full mugs of beer, he encounters Stoppel.
Stoppel makes a last effort to persuade Heini to come
back to the Communists and even produces a knife from
his pocket, offering it to Heini if he will come with him.
Heini's two mugs of beer are in imminent danger of being
upset by Stoppel's sudden movements (a little actually
spills), but he stands firm against temptation and Stoppel
finally leaves him, with the emphatic warning not to show
himself in Beusselkietz or he, Stoppel, will not be responsible for the consequences.
Stoppel then goes back to the Communists, who are plotting Heini's death. He says, "Whether you want it or notthere it is! [Wer nicht will, der hat schon ]," and lays the
knife on the table with a gesture dimly reminiscent of
Pilate or Judas. The camera then closes in and we see
the hands of all the other Communists crowd over the
knife. The sinister Wilde lifts the heaped-up but unresisting hands, takes the knife, and puts it in his pocket.
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6 When Heini and Ulla are working in the printing shop on
the new supply of leaflets, the following dialogue occurs:
Ulla:

What will your master say?

Heini:

Oh, I will pay him tomorrow for his current
[electricity] and paper.

Ulla:

Have you money then?

Heini:

You all brought money for me to the hospital.

Ulla:

Yes, but with that you wanted to buy the knife
for yourself.

Heini:

Never mind [Ach!]. Leaflets are more important
[wichtiger].

7 Hunted and surrounded by the Communists, Heini takes
refuge in a tent in the deserted fair grounds. He accidentally touches a grotesque mechanical figure of a drummer, and his touch sets the machine working. It gives a
few beats-thus betraying Heini to the Communists.
Heini's scream is heard, but no shot, and we are left to
presume that Heini was stabbed by Wilde. The knife is
seen a moment later on the ground beside the dying
Heini.
These seven incidents build up into a definite picture of
the psychological significance of the knife. Throughout it
is a symbol of the old sort of virility which is imputed to
"Communism." Heini's going to get the knife is analagous
to the father's going to get his beer. Before Heini appeared on the scene, the father had said, "My boy can
just go and get a couple of bottles of beer-Where is the
lad?" Thus the two glasses of beer which Heini goes to
get for the leader are an echo of the two bottles which he
never went to get for his father. The equating of leader
and father is again indicated by this echo, but the difference between them is underlined. The beer that Heini
fetched for the leader stands for his passivity, which is
happ.ily given expression within the framework of Nazism,
and this beer, the symbol of passivity, is pitted against
the knife-the old symbol of active virility and temptation.
We need hardly be surprised that the audience is made
to feel anxious lest the beer be spilled, nor need we be
surprised that the beer wins against the knife in this symbolic conflict.
Stoppel's handing over of the knife to the other Communists then becomes a statement that he, for his part, is
sick of them and has progressed at least from active
participation in Communism to neutrality.
The dialogue with Ulla about the money and the knife is
of great interest, since there are two obvious reasons
which should have prevented the inclusion of this
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dialogue: first, Heini is obviously being a little
hypocrite-he has seen the knife in Stoppel's hands and
knows very well that it is no longer on sale at the fair;
second , the dialogue has an unsatisfactory result-the
audience, who have not hitherto been told to associate
the money with the knife, now must do so and may well
ask. what has prevented Heini from acquiring the knife in
the interval. We are not told how long Heini spent in
Bannheim, but Grundler remarks to Gerda that Heini has
been with them there "ever so long [schon ewig lange]."
He could easily have asked one of his Nazi friends to go
to the fair and buy it for him.
Thus, by including this little piece of dialogue, the
propagandist has let Heini appear to be a hypocrite and
has created an unexplained blank in the plot, where previously no explanation was called for. We are entitled,
therefore, to conclude that this dialogue was psychologically important to the propagandist.
This importance seems to be of two kinds. First, there is
a marked parallel between this weakness in the handling
of the knife and the weakness which we have already
noted in the handling of that other symbol of maturity and
virility, the house key. The propagandist was compelled
to pass over the night of the raid on the Nazi clubroom in
order not to let it appear that by using the key Heini could
combine maturity with a return to his family. And now,
again, the propagandist has been constrained to pass
over a stretch of time. He seems psychologically impelled to leave open the way to a satisfactory mature
sexuality in spite of his ideological trend in the opposite
direction.
Second, the dialogue is important at a more superficial
level, since it is Heini's formal repudiation of normal sexuality in favor of Nazism and Kamaradschaft. He had, of
course, already repudiated the knife once before, in the
dialogue with Stoppel, but now he does it again. The
propagandist makes him protest perhaps once too often
than was quite necessary, but still this second repudiation is artistically appropriate here since it immediately
precedes Ulla's kiss.35 The abnegation of normal sexuality is rewarded by achievement of Nazi sexuality, and
from this reward Heini goes out to meet the knife for the
last time .
As to Heini 's death, the filmmaker goes to great pains
to show us that the Nazis are in no way to blame for it. The
district leader has done all he can to save Heini from the
vengeance of the Communists by keeping him away from
Beusselkietz, hidden in the Bannheim Nazi home, and
the filmmaker even goes to the quite unnecessary length
of setting up two trains of events, either of which could in
the end lead to Heini's death.

The first depends upon Grundler's treachery. Gerda
has made Grundler completely subservient to her, 36 and
she and Stoppel find out from him that Heini is in Bannheim. Stoppel does not pass this information on to the
other Communists, but himself goes to try to tempt Heini
back with the knife, just as we have seen Gerda similarly
not passing on the information (perhaps because she is
in love with Heini). The train of events, therefore, which
the filmmaker could have used to kill Heini if he had
wanted to, leads nowhere.
The second train of events springs from Heini's suicidal
ambition to return to Beusselkietz. Ever since he has
been in Bannheim, Heini has been wanting to get back to
his old comrades, and the screen shows two arguments
between Heini and his leader on this subject. The leader
insists on caution and backs up this insistence with appeals to discipline. He points out that those twelve in
Beusselkietz are not the only comrades that Heini hasthat he has "hundreds of thousands" of comrades all over
Germany who wear the same brown shirt-and this appeal to the bandwagon and to narcissism prevails in the
first argument. In the second argument Heini says, "You
said that a Hitler boy is a soldier-and you yourself were
an officer in the war ... and did you forbid your soldiers
to advance after the battle was on?" The leader is much
moved by this argument. He takes Hein i's head in his
hands and gazes into his eyes saying , "In God's name, go
then to your Beusselkietz."
Thus it is Heini 's fault-overzealousness-that leads to
his death, so that this, his real death, like the former
symbolic death which he shared with his mother, contains elements of suicide: the one was inflicted on him by
his mother, the other results from his own Nazi zeal.
Objectively speaking, the final death was inflicted on
him by Wilde with the knife, so that the suicidal elements
discussed above provide only a partial explanation of the
events and must be supplemented by a further explanation. Actually the death is the meeting point of two separate trains of circumstance, the development of Heini's
character, on the one hand , and the history of the knife on
the other. At the beginning of the film , Heini wanted to
possess the knife, the symbol of old-fashioned virility, but
on this occasion the knife was denied him, and later, in
the interests of ideological purity, he abjures the knife in
favor of two glasses of beer-his passivity. This passivity
mounts to suicidal ;z:eal and finally, in the end , again
meets the old virility symbol , the knife.
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Conclusions
The Nature of Nazism
The first purpose of this analysis has been to draw from
the filn: as muc~ insight as possible into the psychology
of Naz1sm, and 1n conclusion , those characteristics of
Nazism which have appeared at various stages of the
analysis are presented in the form of a list. Such a listing
~f psychological characteristics is necessarily a distortion: ~very charact~ristic of a human being is dependent
on, 1s mdeed a sect1on of, a whole character. Each item in
the list is only a special view of the central Nazi character
brought to light by some special form of analysis. For '
ex~mple , it ~~ probable that the Nazi tendency to project
the1r ~w.n fa1l1ngs upon the enemy is only another way of
descnb1ng the double nature of their attitudes toward
sex, and this again is probably only another way of describing their climactic time perspective-insisting,
however, that any separation of the characteristics one
from another necessarily does violence to our view of the
whole. Such a list may still be useful. The whole character
cannot be expressed in words, but the list may help the
~eader t? synthesize in his mind some vague feeling or
1mpress1on of what the whole is like.
The principal characteristics of Nazism are here listed
in the order in which they appeared in the analyses.
Characteristics which appeared in the study of
time perspectives:
·
In 1933, the Nazis had a climactic view of the future which
we summarize as "through death to a millennium." Evidence was produced also for believing that, in 1941, this
time perspective was already giving place to its obverse,
"though preliminary victories to a final defeat." From these
two conclusions, the central hypothesis emerges that
Nazi time perspective is reversible and subject to a
swing between two extreme positions. It is likely that
either of these extreme positions is more stable, more
psychologically attractive than the more common-sense
middle positions, and also it is possible that indulgence
in either of the extremes strengthens in the Nazi soul the
potentiality for the other; therefore, while a swing toward
the more pessimistic time perspective may bode well for
a United Nations victory, the psychiatric problem which
Nazism presents is of how the more realistic middle position may be made more stable and the extreme positions
less stable, so that the pendulum may come to rest.
2 Nazism is an age grade system. Important educative
functions of the family, especially the function of giving to
the growing boy some sense of self-sufficiency, are taken
over by another set of institutions, the youth organizations
and the army. These institutions are divided into a
number of age grades, and the psychology implicit in this
age grade system is basic to Nazism, so that such a film
as this, which does not specially deal with the grading of
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Nazi youth, is nevertheless patterned like an initiation
ceremony. Thus, at least in 1933, the Nazi attitude toward
death included the notion that death is a sort of
promotion.
Some sort of age grade system will inevitably persist in
Germany after the war, because the large number of broken homes and the general social dislocation will incr~a~e rath~r than decrease the importance of any institution wh1ch takes over the educative functions of the
f~mily. But it will be important for any such institution to
fmd some new phrasing of its philosophy of death and
promotion. T~e linkage between death and the passage
from ~ne soc1al status to another will probably persisteven 1n commencement exercises in American schools
the students often sing Tennyson's "Crossing the Bar"b_ut Germans will have to find some phrasing different
from the .notion of death itself as an achievement. Perhaps
death m1ght be seen more definitely as the sloughing off
of the old personality and less as a step toward the new.
3 In N~zi ritual it is assumed that death is followed by
multiple reincarnation. This notion has a number of undesi.ra~l~ implications. It necessarily diminishes any sort of
d1gn1f1ed and responsible individualism. The individual
sees himself as a mass-produced object, identical with a
thousand others. He may like this view of himself, and he
may reverse the tradition of dead Nazi heros, but his
chances of discovering his own worth and dignity, his
own power of responsibility, are necessarily reduced.
Characteristics which appeared in the study
of political groups:
Nazi propaganda continually resorts to projection. The
propagandist smears his enemy by attributing to him
characteristics which are latent in Nazism itself. Analysis
of the various sorts of projection recognizable in this film
indicates three fundamental splits in the Nazi character.
In each of these splits it is probable that each side of the
personality promotes the other, the more extreme positions of the personality being more stable than the intermediate positions. The stability, however, of the extreme
positions, especially of the overpurified extremes, is in
part dependent upon being able to recognize or imagine
~ome enemy on whom the other extreme may be proJected. All three splits are recognizable in the pre-Nazi
movies of the 1920s.
.a. B~tween dis.c!pline and disorder. Discipline as imagIned 1n the Naz1 1deal depends upon extreme passivity
-almost an impassivity-in the face of sudden, barked
commands, and these commands appear to be the
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stimulus which prevents lapse into disorder. In the Nazi
ideal at least, discipline is not so much a toadying to
authority as a controlled steadying in the face of sudden
shock, whether this shock be a sudden command or an
enemy attack. (There is here an interesting psychoanalytic possibility of identification between authority and the
enemy, and some identification of this sort would be expected since many of the unpleasant characteristics of
the old father stereotype are projected onto enemies. The
film, however, does not provide material for examining
this identification.)
Psychologically the passivity is wrapped in an aura
of romantic heroism, typified in this film by the incident of
the mark, in which Heini in one and the same act joins his
mother in passive submission to the father and does this
act of submission as a piece of rescuing heroism. And
the passivity is further romanticized by substituting it for
an identification with the father. The lusty and aggressive
behavior of the father-his going to get beer, etc.-is
replaced in the son by the two glasses of beer which
express the son's passivity toward his leader.
The disorderly underside of the coin is typified in the
film partly by the momentary outbreaks of disorder
among the Nazis, and more fully by their representation
of "Communist" behavior. It is a system of behavior
characterized by lusty virility and aggression. When the
Nazis themselves lapse into this state, they become disorganized, but when they are projecting this state upon·
the Communists, they attribute to them a considerable
degree of malevolent organization.
The split between disorder and discipline is an old
theme of German dreams and nightmares-recognizable
in, for example, The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1919)-and it
has its roots undoubtedly in the stereotype relationship
between father, mother, and son. 'vVe do not know what
the parental relationship looks like in families where the
parents grew up as Nazis, but it is here that we must look
to determine whether this particular nightmare is likely to
persist in Germany and to find the means by which the
Germans may remedy it.
b. Between sexual "comradeship" and sexual grossness. We have noted that the overpurified Nazi ideal of
sex leans toward the homosexual side even though, in the
ideal, the sexual object (UIIa) may be of the opposite sex.
On the other side of the picture, we have the sexually
gross and heterosexual relationship to a sexual object
(Gerda), whom Heini, in the curious incident of the kiss in
the railway carriage, mistakes for a boy. In the characterization of sexual grossness, there is an extreme emphasis
on the mouth and buttocks, and this emphasis on the
mouth spreads from the purely sexual to include gross
eating, the throwing of food, and even the use of chewed
food as a weapon. On the side of the Nazi ideal, the
eating and sexual functions of the mouth are minimized ,
but the mouth still appears as an organ of aggression in

the facial expression of the district leader when he gives
his barked commands and on the face of Fritz when he
repudiates Heini as a traitor.
The middle position between these two extremes is not
represented in any way in this film, but it does appear in
some other films (e.g., The Street), where we see a husband tempted away from domesticity by the bright lights
and whirl of the city. Significantly, in The Street,_the middle position, domesticity, is characterized as dull and
almost regressive, in the sense that the husband's relationship to his wife is almost that of a son to his mother.
Essentially this split between an ideal homosexuality
and a gross heterosexuality seems to be an expression of
preadolescent psychology. It is significant that Heini is a
preadolescent and that the audience is encouraged to
see life through preadolescent eyes. It is to eyes of this
age in German culture that Nazism appeals, and we may
suppose that where it appeals to adults, the attraction is a
nostalgic longing for a preadolescent purity. It would
seem, in fact, that German culture has in some way overvalued that preadolescent period of life and has inflated
the romance of this period until it has become a model for
the culture as a whole. To correct this, some change will
have to be introduced, either into the family pattern or into
the pattern of whatever institutions and youth organizations perform the function of giving a boy self-sufficiency
and introducing him into adult life.
c. Between light and darkness. This split is, of course,
common to most occidental cultures, which associate
fear, dishonesty, and vice with the dark, but it is interesting that in this film the split between light and darkness
takes two forms: light is used to characterize the Nazi
ideal while darkness characterizes the Communists; but
also within the Nazi ideal, light and darkness are used to
characterize different stages of the step from one status to
another. In this way, over and over again the projected
and repudiated themes find their expression within the
ideal system.
2 Nazism assumes that the individual is in a sense a mechanical object. He is not endowed with free will, or with
any internal tendencies toward good or evil, but rather is
seen as responding mechanically and inevitably to an
external dualism between authority and temptation. This
theme occurs in pre-Nazi Germany film material in two
forms: we see the mechanization of man in numerous
robot fantasies (e.g., Metropolis) and, inversely, we see
machines endowed with malevolent semihuman personality (e.g., in Metropolis and Berin). This notion is closely
linked with the Nazi idea of discipline, multiple reincarnation, and the whole psychology of the Nazi parade
grounds. It is interesting to note, however, that in the twenties these ideas of mechanization were especially spread
by filmmakers and writers, who were not themselves engineers. In its origin, the idea was probably in part a
reaction to the enormous industrialization of Germany by
people who were not actively concerned with mechanics.
It would be very important to know how much the en-
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gineers themselves have consciously or unconsciously
adopted this fantasy, and perhaps among them there
might be people who could correct it. It is also possible
that the fantasy has undergone changes in the course of
the war, and it will be important to know, for example,
what attitudes have developed in regard to the tanks and
airplanes against which the Germans are fighting. We
(especially the English) tend to think of our own tanks,
etc., as tools or vehicles or horses--creatures whom we
endow with free wi II. What attitudes the Germans, who
personify their own machinery, have built up in regard to
ours is not known.
Characteristics which appear in the study of the family:
One of the major appeals which Nazism had for German
youth was the solution it offered of the complex and intense emotions implanted in the boy by his pre-Nazi
German family background. The Nazis have used the old
family background as a springboard for their propaganda, not only in this film but also, for example, in
Hitler's account of his own boyhood in Mein Kampf (Erikson 1942). Specifically, in this film we have seen how both
father and mother are characterized as mixtures of good
and evil, so that the attitudes of the boy are ambivalent
toward each parent. The propagandist has rearranged
these attitudes so that by the end of the film all the positive attitudes toward both parents become directed toward Nazism while the negative attitudes are focused on
the enemy. Thus, the Nazi clubhouse becomes a substitute "home," the district leader is played off against the
father, and passivity becomes heroism when it is seen as
a means of rescuing the mother.
This complete reorientation of the attitudes and
stereotypes which were available in pre-Nazi Germany
leads logically and necessarily to the destruction of the
old family unit. Thus the obvious and necessary procedure for correcting the German tendency toward Nazism
and other such cults would seem to be the resuscitation
of the family. The mere resuscitation of the old German
family pattern, however, will not be sufficient, since this
pattern has been used again and again as a springboard
for cultist youth movements. If the pattern were merely
resuscitated, it would act only as a stimulus for such
movements. The old German family pattern with all its
ambivalences may have provided a stable base forGerman society in the nineteenth century, but it would not
provide such a base today. Habits die hard, and today the
habit of regarding this old-style family as something to be
rebelled against, as an inspiration for revolutionary
ideology, is too strong.
The family must be resuscitated, but the roles of father
and mother must be modified in some way. The youth
organizations, as we have noted above, are likely to persist in the postwar world simply because any organization will be valuable in that period of dislocation. It will be
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essential , however, that entry into these organizations
and membership in them not be conceived as a rebellion
against the parental background, and for this to be so the
parental background itself must alter.
As to the direction of this alteration, no prescription is
possible until we know what the new parental patterns in
Germany are, how Nazi-trained young men and women
behave toward their sons, what character is today being
implanted in small children by mothers whose husbands
are away from home, and how the people of Germany wi II
feel about Nazism after the war. It is out of these attitudes
and patterns that the solution must be developed, and
these patterns should be the subject of intensive inquiry
today.
2 In the analysis of the episode of the house key, we noted
that the propagandist in 1933 was psychologically unable
or consciously unwilling to exclude the possibility of a
persistent and satisfactory relationship to the family
background. The house key, the symbol which he chose
to represent Heini's independence of the family, is itself a
symbol for Heini's return to the family, and the film, therefore, must pass over Heini's use of the keys that night.
This would seem to indicate that there is available in
Germany, even among the Nazi propagandists, a psychological opening for the revival of family life. There is a
crack which could admit an entering wedge. If such an
opening exists among the propagandists-and the men
who devised the script of this film were undoubtedly enthusiastic Nazis-then it is likely that a very large portion
of the population of Germany is ready for a return to a
world in which the family would again be an important
educative institution.
3 The old German interest in ideas of destiny has been
picked up by Nazism and become one of the cornerstones of Nazi ideology, but in the process the concept of destiny has changed. In this film the mother, the
tragic predictor, dies, and her place is taken by Ulla, who
twice works like Providence behind the scenes; and we
noted that in another film, Faehrmann Maria, the old masculine personification of Death is killed, and his place is
taken by a sexually desirable young woman. We do not
know the psychological dynamics which lay down a base
in the child for this curious interest in destiny; we only
know that this interest is characteristic for German culture
and that it has changed. The destiny idea is certainly
related to the climactic time perspective we noted
above--destiny is the climax to which man must look
forward, and it is his duty to follow that destiny. We noted
above that the German time perspeotive shifts between
two extremes--one optimistic, the other pessimisticand that it would be important to substitute for both of
these some more stable middle position. Such a substitution would probably exclude the notion of destiny or
would, at any rate, rob this notion of much of its psychological attraction. This attraction is probably the result of
those unidentified parental patterns which lay the base
for the whole destiny idea, and therefore it becomes ex-
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ceedingly important that these patterns be identified and
that they be altered or eliminated in the future German
family.
4 In the course of the film, Heini graduates from coveting
symbols of virility-a knife and a house key-to wearing a
Nazi uniform and admiring himself in a mirror, and this
narcissistic theme has been exploited over and over
again by the Nazis so that it has become one of the
dominant themes in the cult. We may like or dislike narcissism according to our own cultural standards and
tastes, but at any international level , we are concerned
only to make sure that no nation shall induce in its population a character structure which is inevitably committed
to an internationally aggressive role. Some of the most
peaceful people in the world are the most narcissistic ;
the Balinese, for example, are among the most peaceful
and the most narcissistic. Warfare and personal aggression are virtually unknown among them , and internationally speaking, they would be ideal neighbors. Thus, narcissism itself is no blemish and may lead to all sorts of
cultural achievements. The important factor is what is
admired in the self. If the self is admired for beauty or for
virtuosity in the arts of peace, then narcissism will promote these characteristics ; if, however, the self is admired as a mechanism of aggression, then narcissism
must promote aggression. There is, therefore, no reason
why narcissism should not even be encouraged in Germany, provided the Germans shift its content and admire
themselves for qualities and virtues which will make
good neighbors of them .

Learning, Culture, and the Propagandic Process
Besides the psychology of Nazism, the detailed study of
this one film has bearing on a number of other types of
problems, which vary from the most general questions
about human nature, the ways in which we learn, and the
propagandic process to the forms of propaganda which
can be carried in fictional films. Our analysis has shown
that in this film there are a large number of themesespecially those connected with the family-which are
more or less easily overlooked by the casual audience
but which nevertheless may have very high emotional
force. That those themes are actually present in the film
and were put there by the filmmakers, consciously or
unconsciously, there can be no doubt. The film itself provides continual verification of this fact. We have seen, for
example, that Ulla not once, but twice , acts like Providence behind the scenes so that the significance of this
theme is verified by its repetition. Similarly, we have
noted that the contrast between Ulla and Gerda parallels
that between the father and the district leader, so that all
our descriptive analysis of the difference between the
Nazis' picture of themselves and their picture of Communism rests not upon one instance, nor yet upon one
contrast, but upon two contrasts which mutually verify
each other. The material which we have analyzed shows

an extraordinarily high degree of internal consistency,
which enables us to detect the same state of mind at work
in all the various contexts of the film , and so to obta in a
real picture of what sort of mind participated in and approved the total creation.
On the whole , this is what we should expect of any
daydream or artistic creation-that the way in which the
work of art is structured is psychologically characteristic
for the creators-and ranged beh ind this generalization
and supporting it, there is the whole mass of our anthropological and psychiatric knowledge of human nature. We know that human beings are generalizing creatures in the sense that they will bring to any new context
emotional and intellectual habits acquired in other contexts, and especially those habits that they acquired in
early childhood . The behavior of any individual in a new
context reechoes all his earlier experiences and forms of
behavior. The individual is a single organized entity, not a
collection of bits and pieces, and when we watch h'is
behavior and look at his creations, we find running
through all the same principles of organization.
The next step from this generalization is to say that a
similar character and similar principles of organization
will be typical for the various individuals in a given tribe,
a given community, or a given unit, and this is vouched
for by anthropolog ical findings among primit ive peoples
and more recently by the findings of anthropo logists in
the study of the higher oriental and occidental cultures. It
is true that, when we are dealing with cultures, the levels
of similarity between ind ividuals are necessarily somewhat more abstract, but still we are beginning to be able
to define (Bateson 1942) these levels and arrive at a systematic understanding of any given culture in terms of the
thematic handl ing of the various contexts of life.
But this is a propaganda film , and therefore there is a
further question we must ask. Granted that the film is
structured and built in terms of specifically Nazi themes ;
granted that the handling of the family, of courtship, and
of death are consistently Nazi-these themes are sti II not
articulately stated by the propagandist, and it may be
doubted whether the film would serve to propagate these
themes. The obvious methods of testing such a question
are barely available. Audience research techniques have
specialized in examining the reactions of an audience to
what was explicit in a film , but themes of the type with
which we are here concerned are usually not expl icitly
recognized-therefore, their effect upon an audience
cannot be obtained by direct questioning. There is, howe~er, very strong evidence, especially on the psychiatric
s1de, for supposing that, in many cases, themes which
can be accepted so long as they are not explicitly stated
may be violently repudiated the moment attention is consciously called to them-indeed , one of the purposes of
?ur whole analysis has been to bring the Nazi themes out
mto the open where the reader can recognize them and
so be fortified against them .

Analysis of the Nazi Film "Hitlerjunge Quex"

In place of audience research we must rely on our
general knowledge of man as an educable creature and
our knowledge of the circumstances under which learning occurs. Simple learning, we know, occurs principally
in those contexts which contain elements of either reward
or punishment, and it is probably safe to generalize from
this experimental finding to the very much more complex
type of learning with which we are here concerned-the
modification of the individual's character and view of the
universe in which he lives, and his reading of the events
in which he participates.
We should then have to ask whether the individual
member of the audience is rewarded in any way for accepting the themes which are implicit in the film, and
whether he is punished in some way for refusing to accept them. Here the answers must be affirmative. It is
exceedingly difficult to enjoy a good film without accepting the thematic premises upon which it is based. Either
we accept the premises and enjoy the film or we resist
the premises and suffer a psychological or physical
headache. It is in general exceedingly difficult to maintain any sort of intellectual detachment, to carry along as
a part of one's mental state some reservation , while enjoying any form of entertainment. The aud ience may say to
themselves: "This is a very good film "; and they may say
to themselves: "But I disagree with the contrast which the
film draws between Nazis and Communists." But combining these two statements is exceedingly difficult and
tends to result in : "If this contrast between Nazis and
Communists were true, this would be a good film." Thus
the premise which an audience tries to repudiate easily
ends up as a supposition which it temporarily accepts.
The propagandic effect of a film is perhaps stronger
when , like Hitlerjunge Quex , the film contains both explicit and implicit suggestions. The audience member
who repudiates the explicit contrast between Communists and Nazis may find it exceedingly difficult to
repudiate the less explicit propagandic themes which the
film contains. His critical sense is focused on one feature
of the film, and if he is to go on enjoying the film, he
cannot become critical of such assumptions as the way
in which Heini 's progress toward Nazism is made easy for
him by Ulla's intervention.
There is thus an a priori case to be made out for the
propagandic effectiveness of themes which are not explicit. The audience is rewarded by enjoyment of the film
for accepting these as implicit premises and is, in a
sense, punished for refusing to accept them. This case is
based, however, upon the structure of simple learning
experiments, and it is a very long step from these
experiments-from the rat which learns that the sound of
a buzzer is the precursor of an electric shock that can
only be avoided by lifting the right foreleg-to the more
complex learning phenomena with which we are here
concerned . The Nazi convert learns to remodel his Weltanschauung, his interpretation of the universe in which
he iives, and his interpretation of his own behavior. To
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compare him with the experimental rat, we should have to
suppose that the rat learned not merely to lift his leg
whenever he hears the buzzer, but also to expect future
sequences of experience to be patterned like the experimental setting; that pain would always be preceded by
some warning; and that, for him, the problem of life consisted in trying to guess what magical behavior would
avert these pains. Such a rat might be said to have
learned not only the connection between a buzzer, lifting
the leg, and pain, but also to have learned a Weltanschauung or ideology. Unfortunately, we have almost
no data on this order of learning. 37 That much learning
occurs, there can be no reasonable doubt, and it is probable that the generalizations about reward and punishment take less tangible forms, such as the enjoyment of
the film or the psychological headache to which we referred above.
The verification of the central hypothesis-that themes
implicit in an artistic structure may be propagandically
effective-must depend upon the development either of
methods of audience testing which will tap unconscious
or semiconscious levels, or of learning experiments
which will demonstrate this more complex type of learning at an animal or human level.
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Notes
1 This study was completed in the spring of 1943 while I was film analyst
attached to the Film Library of the Museum of Modern Art. As it is now
presented primarily for its methodological. implications, no attempt has
been made to bring the comments about Nazi Germany up to date.
These should be read within the research context of the state of the war
in 1945.
2 Lasswell and others have publ ished formal methodolog ical statements
and even experimental data on contrasting methods of content
analysis. They show the differences in the final findings which result
from differences in the size of the unit chosen for diagnosis. In terms of
Lasswell 's system , the present analysis might be described as an
extreme case in which the unit of analysis is the whole film , and in
which , therefore, only qualitative, nonstatistical conclusions can be
reached.
3 The present study supports a number of the conclusions which Erikson
(1942) arrived at by analysis of other types of German material.
4 These data are taken from "Vom Werden Deutscher Filmkunst" by
Oskar Kalbus (1935) , where a part of von Schirach's speech is quoted.
5 For more detailed and systematic discussion of time perspectives, see
Frank (1939) and Lewin (1942) .
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6 In translating the "Nazi Youth Song," the word flattern has b'een rendered as "bi llow." The dictionary meaning of this word is "flutter," and
the German word is certainly sometimes used in this sense (e.g. , in
referring to birds). A small experiment shows, however, that Americans, when asked to visualize a flag fluttering, usually see a small flag
moving rapidly or a large flag rather far away, whereas the image
called up in Germans by the words Fahne and flattern is of a large flag
close up. In Nazi films , the flags are usually photographed to fill the
frame , so that the emphasis falls not on the changing outline of the
flag, but rather on the wave motion in the middle of the fabric. Th is
billowing motion is clearly intended to have a fascination sim il ar to that
of waves in water.
7 For the Nazi Age Grade system, see Gregor Ziemer, "Education for
Death."
8 Unfortunately, we have no data on the symbolism of these ceremonies,
but it is almost safe to predict that they contain a mortuary elementcertainly referent to the heroic deed and probably actual symbolic
representations of the death of the candidates.
9 The Heimat is an important symbol in Nazi ideology. It differs from the
Vaterland in several respects. In particular, the Heimat seems to be a
pleasant place to which one returns or dreams of returning , so that the
emotion evoked by this word is a nostalgic, rather than a disciplined,
patriotism . The word Heimat is feminine.
10 The whole film is, of course, an attempt to make political capital for
Nazism out of human woes, and the suggestion that Communists do
this is a typical example of the technique and mental state of Nazi
propagandists, who project their own characteristics onto their enemy.
11 The boy who receives this insult is Grundler, the weak Nazi . I do not
know of any psychological reason why he should have been selected
for this, unless it be because he is the only named professional actor
among the Nazi boys. Heini , Fritz, and Ulla are all anonymous "Hitler
Youth ," but Grundler is a named actor, Hans Ramspott.
12 The general opinion of informants who were in Germany at this time
and in touch with the Youth Movements is that the Leftist group.s were
slightly more disciplined than the Hitler Youth.
13 An official propaganda photograph of the "Strength through Joy"
movement shows that this identical game of Schinkenkloppen is
commonly played at Nazi picnics.
14 Actual death in swamps occurs rather frequently in German films. The
case of Faehrmann Maria has already been mentioned. And in
Friesenet, a girl is punished for sexual relations with a Communist by
being led to the edge of a swamp where she must commit suicide. The
film suggests that this punishment is traditional among the peasants of
this old German colony in Russia.
15 In Nazi youth films, the camera rather frequently provides shots of the
backs of the legs of boys, showing the bare inside of the knees.
16 This type of symbolic treatment of temptation is also common in preNazi German films, e.g., Variety, The Street, Sunrise .
17 For several of the suggestions here put forward, I am indebted to
conversations with E. Erikson (1942). On the whole, the findings in the
analysis of this film coincide very closely with those of Dr. Erikson in
his analysis of Mein Kaempf and other Nazi literature.
18 This metaphor is probably put in Stoppel's mouth to prepare us for the
association between the fair and Communism.
19 I have to thank Dr. Marian Kris for pointing out the underlying passivity
in this episode.
20 The fact that a vase is contrasted with the knife provides additional
verification for regarding the knife as a virility symbol, and it also
verifies our assumption that the filmmakers had at least a prior acquaintance with theory.

21 Stoppel does not at this stage offer the knife as a reward if Heini will
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become a Communist, but the possibility is clearly in the air; later in
the film this bribe is actually offered.
The diagrams used in this analysis are necessarily on a rather crude
associational level and fail to indicate the finer points of the various
attitudes and relationships. Psychoanalysis is still a verbal rather than
a diagrammatic science.
It is interesting to note the frequency of encirclement themes in German films. Even in much earlier films (e.g., M, Emil und die Detektive)
this theme is recognizable and seems almost to replace the chase
·
themes so popular among American filmmakers .
The same expression appears on the face of the district leader when
he gives his barked commands to the Nazi troop.
This scene is somewhat awkward. Stoppel's acting is not convincing ,
and we are left without any clear idea of why he did not worry about
Heini's threat.
In the novel on which the film is based, this scene takes place in two
parts. First, there is a conversation between Stoppel and the mother, in
which the mother is described as hypnotized with fear in Stoppel's
presence ; later there is a conversation between Stoppel and the father
which is overhead by the mother. In this conversation , Stoppel tells the
father that he will give Heini one more chance to come back to the
Communists, but if he does not take it, he will be killed .
Echoes of Christian mythology occur rather frequently in German films ,
usually in a much disoriented form . In the present film, it is perhaps
significant that, at the beginning of the film , Wilde, the Communist
villain, is allowed to echo Christ, whereas at the end of the film the
Communists echo Judas and Pilate.
Heute may mean either "today" or "in this period of history."
The film gives us no rationalization for Grundler's removal from Beusselkietz to the new district. He was certainly a member of the Beusselkietz troop, under Fritz, in the earlier scenes.
So spelled in the Reichfilmarchiv transcript. The usual spelling of the
metal is Quecksilber.
This is probably an echo of the earlier episode in which chewed food
was thrown in Grundler's face at the beginning of the hike. The psychological reasons for this repeat are not clear.
This interpretation would not necessarily imply that either the filmmakers or the audience were familiar with the classical myth of Hermes
and Aphrodite . It would be equally possible for the name "Quex" to get
these overtones from the properties of the metal : its curious "quickness" and its "touch-me-not" behavior, the way in which it shatters into
shining pieces when shaken, combined with its power of recovery into
a single mass when the disturbance is over.
See Kracauer (1942) for a careful discussion of this fake realism in
Triumph of the Will and in German newsreels.
In an earlier footnote it was pointed out that the relationship between
the Nazi party and the nation would not be handled in the symbolic
terms set up by this film . It is possible, however, that this in-turned
narcissism-whereby the leader is romantic about himself as though
he were one of the boys, in spite of the fact that he is also in part a
father figure-may provide a partial solution of the problem of reducing three symbolic entities (father, mother, and son) to two (party
and nation).
One shot of the Communists, in which they gleefully boast that no Nazi
literature is reaching Beusselkietz, intervenes between the two scenes
and covers the night during which Heini and Ulla went to the printing
shop and completed the printing of the leaflets.
In Nazi ideology, it seems that, while Nazism itself stands for a disciplined obedience and the repudiation of full heterosexuality, normal
sexuality Is prescribed as an equally passive form of moral enslavement.
There is a great deal of experimental evidence to show that animals
can be taught to learn more rapidly. A new experimental animal will
learn only slowly to associate buzzer, lifting the leg, and pain, but the
animal with much past experience in experimental settings of this
general type will learn to adjust to any particular setting quickly. For a
more general discussion of these problems, see Bateson (1942).

Analysis of the Nazi Film "Hitlerjunge Quex"
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The Perceived and the Named*
Christian Metz
The viewer of an image feels the need to "recognize"
(identify) the objects which are represented therein.
When the image is figurative, as is the case in photography, paintiog, and film, it meets this need itself by
offering objects to recognize. However, it can happen,
even with strongly representative images, that the demand of the consumer remains more or less unsatisfied.
For instance, the westerner who watches an ethnographic
film often remains perplexed by the objects that he sees
in it but cannot name or classify (e.g., cooking utensils,
hunting or fishing equipment). To name, to classify: our
problem starts here, with the problem of cultural
taxonomies, encompassing both the taxonomy of cultural
objects and the cultural taxonomy of natural objects,
such as zoological or biological classification, which varies from one society to another. Phenomenology has
clearly shown us that we live in a world of objects, that our
immediate perception is a perception of objects, and that
this arrangement is neither superficial nor transitory (so
much so, I will add, that it is deeply reassuring, and that
is doubtless one of the roots of its existence). So why not
link this striking character of our lived world consciousness with the even more deeply embedded force of cultural classification and sociolinguistics?
The case of nonfigurative images (modern painting,
avant-garde films), only confirms the initial impressions
that emerge from this study. Notably, the spectator very
often has the tendency to forceably reintroduce to the
image, by the way he looks at it, objects which the au.thor
wanted to leave out. The vague forms, curves, blurs, or
shadings become clouds or dancing waters; the rectilinear drawings become railroad tracks. There are many
fewer nonfigurative images received than are sent. And
even at the sending end, the tendency toward representation is sometimes stronger than is believed by those who
consciously would like to escape it. The free contours
that we have in mind are often involuntary variations on
objects of recognizable form. There are fewer nonfigurative images than there are images that would like
to be so.

Christian Metz is author of Film Language, Language and
Cinema, and many other wo~ks in film theory and general
s,emiology. He teaches at L'Ecole Pratique des Hautes
Etudes in Paris.
Steven Feld teaches visual and sound communication at
The Annenberg School of Communications, University of
Pennsylvania. Shari Robertson is an independent
filmmaker.

Translated by
Steven Feld and Shari Robertson

Codes of Iconic Nomination
Work in philosophy, and the psychology of perception
and observation, taught us long ago that the identification of tangible objects was closely mixed with their linguistic nomination. The semantic organization of natural
languages, within certain sectors of the lexicon, overlaps
with the variable margins of shifting configurations and
demarcations of perception. The visible world and language are thus not without multiple and deep structural
interactions, and these have not yet been studied in the
detailed technical terms of intercodal relations. It is
exactly to such a study that I would Iike to address myself.
But one thing already seems certain to me: even if the
connection between language and the viewed can hardly
be conceived of as a complete "copy"-either one
served by the other-certainly one function of language
is to name the units that vision demarcates, and to help
demarcate them. And one function of vision is to inspire
the semantic configurations of language, and also to be
inspired by them.
Recently, from the semiological perspective, these
problems, which are exceedingly old in themselves, have
been approached from two sides-on the linguistic front
by A. J. Greimas (1968) and on the iconic front by Umberto Eco (1968, 1970). I have myself devoted some brief
analytical sketches to them, where the main interest was
the articulation of the two sides (Metz 1971, 1973). That is
really the heart of the matter. I have proposed the term
"codes of iconic nomination" for the systems of correspondence which explain that within figurative imagery,
even schematics, one can instantly recognize and name
objects. These codes are thus the constituent mechanisms of "analogy" and "iconicity," or the impression of
resemblance and reality that give us representative images. They contribute to the creation of fiction, diegesis,t
and the pseudo-real. It is now time-and the general
state of previous research does not deprive the undertaking of all risk-to try one's skill at a more detailed and
systematic description of these bridging devices. Between image and language, they facilitate the objective
production of a whole network so interiorized by the culture that, on the one hand, the phenomenologists were
able to describe them as spontaneous (which they are in
effect) and, on the other, as deeply tied in the West to the
Aristotelian tradition (quantitatively dominant even today)
of diegetic or mimetic art, in short, representative art.

The Perceived and the Named

Which Part Image, Which Part Language?
It is first necessary to delim it the object of this research
and establ ish boundaries on both its sides. The codes of
iconic nomination do not relate the whole of language to
the whole of imagery. The ir study should not aspire to
exhaust the vast question of the links between the perceptual and the linguistic but on the contrary should
concentrate on one of its levels in order to attempt to
better il luminate it.

Lexicon
On the side of language we will limit ourselves to the
lexicon. It hardly seems possible, for the moment, to serious ly establish even sli ghtly precise correlations between the perception of objects in a soc iety and the
phonological and grammatical structures of the correspond ing language. This difficulty, which perhaps will not
be eternal , is connected to another one which is more
general and well known to linguists: in. spite of some
interesting attempts1 no one has succeeded thus far in
linking, in a convincing fashion, phonological or syntactic
systems with social structures. It is across these two systems that language preserves for the moment its great
relative autonomy in comparison with other institutions
where the very existence of linguistics is founded , inasmuch as the discipline is distinct from sociology (but
belongs to the social sciences since language is an institution). Of all the internal sectors of language it is, on
the contrary, the lexicon which brings the most important
and most immediately exploitable materials to those who
wish to found a sociolinguistics. 2 It is clear that words are
linked to culture (and , among other things, to the faculty
of sight), following a shorter and more direct circuit than
do phonemes or rules of grammar. Moreover, the lexicon
is the only part of language wh ich immediately exercises
the function of nomination, that is to say, which enumerates the objects of the world and gives them a name. The
referential dimension, which characterizes all of language, appears in a direct fashion only within the lexicon.
The dissymmetry of the situation is certainly reflected
in the concepts of a semanticist like A. J. Greimas (1966).
Semes, as such, constitute the "semiological level," that
is, that level at which language articulates about the
"natural world ." These are distinguished from classemes,
whose entirety forms the "semantic level ," that is, the level
of autonomy of the linguistic orgaoization. Thus we see
the differences between semanticisms like "in an oblong
shape ," "made of leather," or "belonging to the feline
species," which are semes or "nuclear" to the degree
they are as diverse and specific .as the perceive~ objects of a culture which they desrgnate and constrtute at
the same time. Units of meaning like human/nonhuman,
material object/abstract notion, or animate/inanimate
are classemes, or "contextual semes ," which have a
more general significance within the lexicon and which
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intervene in the naming of numerous tangible objects.
Furthermore, at a different level, they submit also to a
second classification (whose links are in fact larger than
the first operated by the nominations themselves), which
extends beyond the lexicon to grammar, where they
often correspond to some formal markers. Thus we have
the case of human/nonhuman, the difference between
qui/quai in French , and who/which in English. Just as
the classemes within a language are common to the
grammar and the lexicon, the nuclear semes (which I
will henceforth simply call semes, since this study is
limited to them) are suited only to the lexicon . I will not
discuss all the lexical semes but only those which intervene in the lexicon of visual objects.

To Recognize the Object
In the domain of the image, the codes of iconic nomination no longer involve the whole ensemble of semiological material. We no longer need to review every sense
and all senses of the representative image. To recognize
the object is not to understand the image, even if that is
the beginning of it. It is only a question of a level of
meaning, that which is called the literal ( = denotation or
representation) , and not the entirety. The apprehension of
relationsh ips between objects, or at least of their more
factual relations, still participates in the literal sense, but
is taken over by other codes. Notably this involves montage in the most general sense of the word, encompassing the internal composition of the still unique image. To
understand that one object, in a narrative, appeared only
a few minutes after another, or that they are constantly
copresent, or that one is to the left of the other, or farther
back, is already something more than visually identifying
each of these objects. The "recognition" should therefore
be understood as an operation which articulates certain
sectors of linguistic activity and not directly the whole of
language over the whole of perception.

From the Word to the Sememe
If one poses the problem in this way, it becomes essential
to know to what sort of linguistic unit the optically identifiable object exactly corresponds, since language includes units that are very diverse in figure and status.
Common-sense response leaves no doubt-it is the
word. The act of nomination, considered in its concrete
and directly observable form, corresponds most often to
a word, that which comes to mind when our eye recognizes an object: "It's a dog," "it's a lamp."
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Yet the pertinence of a word does not resist analysis.
The word is a two-sided unit, with its signified and its
phonic signifier. Accordingly, that which can "correspond" to an iconic element will necessarily be a unit of
the linguistic signified and therefore only a one-sided
unit. The naming of visible objects is a case, among
others, of transcoding. In all transcoding (translation, for
example) the only direct transit is that which passes between the two respective signifieds. (I will return to this
point, which is in fact more complex). Nomination is more
than transcoding, though it is that also. It is clear that no
direct correspondence between the signifier of an image
representing a house and the signifier of the word house
(or maison or casa) is conceivable. This is a consequence of the "arbitrariness" of linguistic signs. The two
materials are absolutely heterogeneous; one is outlines,
colors, shades, and so on, the other an emission of the
human voice . The optical aspects of a house bear no
relation to the fact that the French word maison has four
phonemes rather than three or five, and exactly those
four. These are the signifieds which articulate one
another, the recognized object and the meaning of
the word.
The lexeme (lexical morpheme) is another sort of linguistic unit, smaller than a word, that for the same reasons no longer suits our purposes. It is still a two-sided
unit which includes phonetic elements. So, how shall we
distinguish the signified of the word from the signified of
the lexeme? At the level of the word or even the lexeme
the signified can include several units which are quite
distinct on the optical plane. For example, the French
word chevre means both the animal called "goat" and the
tool called "sawhorse." That is the problem of multiple
meanings.
In sum, the visual correspondence should have become established with a linguistic unit that is a pure
signified, which is smaller than the signified of the
lexeme--or the signified of one sense of a lexeme, or of
the unique sense of a lexeme with one meaning. But the
linguistic unit we are studying can in certain cases coincide with a longer segment than a lexeme or even a word
on the condition that one always pictures a single mean~
ing for the signified of .the segment. The object which one
names betterave ("beetroot" in English) is recognizable
in an image, and corresponds in French to two lexemes
(bette and rave) grouped here in a single word. The object which one names pomme de terre ("potato" in English) corresponds to three French lexemes, which also
happen to be three words. Nevertheless, as perceptual
elements they are obviously at the same level as the
French carotte (English "carrot"), where the nomination
uses a single lexeme that coincides with a word. This is
not an accident since within the linguistic order itself it is
a question in this case of a sequence of several lexemes
(eventually of several words) being lexically congealed
and turned into a single lexeme. In the terms of Andre
Martinet (1967) these are not syntagmes (free syntactic

combinations) but synthemes, combinations which have
been formed by the language once and forever and
which enter the lexicon with the same status as undecomposable segments. If a potato (pomme de terre) is
red in color (rouge) , one speaks of a pomme de terre
rouge and not of a pomme rouge de terre. As Martinet
proposes the term "theme" for jointly designating synthemes and proper lexemes, we can ask that the visually
identifiable object correspond at the level of nomination
to one meaning of theme, which is to say exactly what
Greimas3 calls a sememe.

Cultural Taxonomy of Objects
Each sememe (a specific unit at the level of the signified)
denotes a class of occurrences, not a single occurrence.
There exist thousands of "trains" even within the single
sense of "railroad cars," and these differ greatly from each
other in color, height, number of cars, and so on. But the
cultural taxonomy which is contained in the language has
determined to hold these variations to be irrelevant and to
consider them the same object (of a single class of objects). It has also determined that other variations are
pertinent and sufficient "to change" the object, as, for
example, those which separate train and micheline.+ It is
the same apportionment, so variable among different
societies, of pertinent and irrelevant traits-in sum the
same "arbitrary" principle of the enumeration of
objects-which presides over spontaneous classifications that operate the perception of corresponding objects within the same culture. The sight itself is slightly
obscured to the extent that the image does not determine
whether it is a train or a micheline. Once it is demarcated
the viewer of the image has the feeling of "recognizing '
the object." It is notable, then, that one false perception of
the color of this micheline (if it is one) or of its exact
length or of the metal of which it is made does not constitute a comparable obstacle.
~he traits that do not partic ipate in this decoupage of
obJe?!s are culturally experienced as types of secondary
qual1t1es, determinations superimposed as something
extra and not indispensable to the immediate intellection
-adjectival qualities rather than substantive ones. It is
most often true that linguistic expression of these visual
p~rticu.larities is conveyed by adjectives (a long
m_tcheltne) or by certain determinants which are larger in
s1ze but syntactically interchangeable with adjectives,
a~, for ~xample , the subordinate relative phrase "a
mtche~tne that goes very quickly." To the contrary, perti~ent v1su~l qualiti.es, those which, by their grouping in
packets, determme the list of objects to recognize, express themselves in language through nouns. As we have
known for a long time, the nomination of objectsbecause there are also those of actions, to which I will
return-proceeds by nouns. Traditional grammar says
that nouns correspond to objects, adjectives to qualities
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and verbs to actions. Simply, "objects" are only sets of
qualities considered as definers, and what we call qualities covers only those qualities whose proper meaning
does not enter into the definition of the objects.
Optically identifiable objects are, then, classes of occurrences, like the sememes which they name. That is
why Greimas proposes naming them "visual fig ures" (the
pertinent units) and then further distinguishes "visual
signs," which will be singular occurrences, such as one
drawing of a house or one photograph of a tree.4 But
within linguistic tradition the term "sign" is too strongly
evocative of the pertinent unit for it to have any chance of
being made to designate the contrary. It seems preferable to me not to adopt a special term and to speak simply
of "recognizable visual objects" as opposed to "visual
occurrences."

About "Nomination"
One sees that the fundamental phenomenon of nomination is itself quite poorly named . In the word "nomination"
the sememe nom corresponds to the English "name" and
not to the English "noun." But it nevertheless designates a
linguistic unit which is on the order of a word. Now it is
only at the surface level that nomination proceeds by
words. The real correspondences between the visible
world and language are established at the level of pertinent traits, which are deeper and more invisible units.
The word (nom) which designates the optical object only
constitutes the emergent part of the system, a consequence that is manifest by the play of the pertinent traits
and their internal organization. When an iconic item carries all the definitive traits required for us to recognize, for
example, a bulb (electric light bulb), and when one has
access to the corresponding sememe (ampoule =electrical accessory), this last access is carried to the lexeme
where it contributes to an articulation of the signified
(here "electric light bulb" in all its sen~es, but ~lsewhere
"bulb" forms a word by itself). And th1s word, 1n turn ,
functions as a two-sided entity, which also has its own
signifier and can therefore express itself. The viewer of
the image explains to himself, "That's a light bulb." In the
complete process of nomination, then , the word does
play a role, but only at the endpoint.
The term "nomination" is not peculiar to linguistics or to
modern semiology. It has come a long way, historically in
languages (nominative case) .. an? ~lso fr~m a whole
philosophical tradition. It cames 1n .Itself . m. a condensed
state, a certain concept of the relat1onsh1p oetwe~~ language and the world, a c~ncept that has b~en_ cnt1qued
since Saussure as what G1lbert Ryle terms na1ve
realism." For him there was a sort of list of objects,
preexisting their 'naming, and the words came to "name"
(nominate) these objects after the fact, one by one. As
long as we limit ourselves to the surface level (that of the
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word or even the lexeme) we are inevitably drawn toward
faith in this view. The word, the lexeme (and on the other
side of the problem, the visual object, once recognized)
is not the end product, because the decoupage of the
world into objects (and of language into sememes) is a
complex process of cultural production. At the heart of
this process the central role has been broken down into
pertinent traits: traits of visual identification on one side
(Eco) and linguistic semes on the other (Greimas).

Determination by Social Practice
This double decoupage did not exist before social activity and the features of each culture. It is determined by
them, and at the same time it implements them. We know
that the Eskimo employ some ten different lexemes (and
thus different sememes) for designating snow, according
to whether it is crumbly, hardened, slippery, piled up and
so forth (Schaff 1965). Each of these units consists of an
undecomposable lexeme, while the languages of Western Europe are obligated, in order to designate the corresponding "objects," to form a nominal syntagme, which
each time combines the appropriate adjective (e.g.,
powdery), with a noun that is invariably "snow" (neige,
Schnee, nieve ). Thus our culture sees a single object with
variable types, where the Eskimo see ten different objects. A perceptible trait like "crumbly" or "hardened"
(with its corresponding seme), while pertinent to the Eskimo, is considered irrelevant in our languages, at least
when the question is the "nomination" of snow.
This variation in lexical organization is obvious in relation to a difference in the perception of snow, which is
more subtle and more finely distinguished among the
Eskimo. Each society lexicalizes the distinctions which it
perceives the most clearly, and in return, perceives with
particular clarity the distinctions which it lexicalizes. It
would be a fruitless quarrel that would initially seek to
know whether it is language that informs perception or
perception which informs language. In fact, the one and
the other have been shaped by society. 5 In our cultures,
the modes of work and production are such that snow
plays a minor role, and careful attention to its different
states would be without immediate utility. The Eskimo,
who hunt and fish in largely snow-covered landscapes,
and whose very survival depends on that, are obliged to
know the diversities of the snow well: those which permit
the hunt, those which represent a danger of sinking, those
which announce a blizzard, and so on. A society
lexicalizes and perceives the distinctions for which it has
the greatest need.
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The Pertinent Traits of Perceptual Identification
Vision does not identify an object as a result of the totality
of its perceptible appearance, or as a result of the surface
of the paper, in the case of the same object being in the
state of " representation" in a drawing or photograph,
which is to say, the object relayed by codes of analogy.
Thus it can be explained that schematic representations
of objects in which the majority of the perceptible features have been deliberately suppressed are also recognizable (and sometimes more so) than many more faithful
representations which are far more complete at the level
of material expression (more exhaustive in respect to details of form, color, etc.): representations in which the
degree of schematization is smaller and the degree of
iconicity greater (Moles 1968). It is noteworthy that highly
schematized images are very identifiable (the whole of
the art of caricature lies therein). Visual recognition is
based on certain perceptible traits of the object and its
image (to the exclusion of others), only those which
keep-and for the moment, materially isolate-the
schema and the caricature . If they are sometimes more
implied than detailed figurations, it is because they avoid
the risk of drowning these traits in the midst of others,
thus slowing the marking of guidelines. On the contrary,
the image which shows great detail sometimes becomes
the image-jumble (!'image fouillee devient parfois !'image fouillis).

The Schematic Diagram
The traits which retain the schema-Drat least the figurative schema, because there are also some others (e.g.,
diagrams)-correspond exactly to pertinent traits of the
code of recognition so well described by Umberto Eco,
who has cited diverse examples of them .6 Others could
be borrowed from caricature: arms raised above the
head, a tall figure , and it is enough for us to recognize de
Gaulle; bushy eyebrows, a round face, and it's President
Pompidou. In certain comic drawings two protuberances
on one side and two on the other are sufficient to represent the breasts and buttocks, so that we interpret it as
"woman." (Needless to say, such a choice of pertinent
traits owes itself to an ideology at the same time misogynous and maternalistic, so characteristic of the world
in which we live.) The codes are the formal machines, but
it is precisely as such that they have historical and social
content; in this example, as in others, the opposition of
form and content leads to an impasse.
So, schematisme largely overlaps schematisation . The
latter is a socially specific activity which consists of producing materialized diagrams (schemas, in the precise
sense). The former, on the contrary, is a mental , perceptual , and sociolinguistic principle of wide general bearing, which makes possible the comprehension of
schemas as well as of detailed images with a high degree of iconicity and of spectacles from real life. Even

outside all schematization, this is because only certain
sensible traits matter in identification ; visual occurrences
which differ in other traits can be perceived as multiple
examples of the same object, and not as distinct objects.
If several drawings have in common definite traits of the
visual object "key" (e.g. , a head and a shank, a certain
type of serration), they can otherwise, and without disadvantage to the sociotaxonomic permanence of the item
"key," differ very widely in size, color, diameter of the
head, depth of indentations, and so on.
In ordinary perception, or in that of strongly figurative
images, it is the social subject, the spectator, who fabricates the schema by mental subtraction of nonpertinent
traits. In the case of schematisation, it is a specialist (designer or draftsman), a "transmitter," who performs the
same subtraction in advance and materializes it. The difference is that the process of abstraction and
classification-the "subtraction "-intervenes, in one
case at the level of reception and in the other at the level
of construction. In the former it is absent in the stimulus
but reintroduced in the perceptual act; in the latter it is
integrated into the artificially constructed stimulus. 7

Perceptual Exclusions and Inclusions
It is again the schematisme, and in a more general way
the very existence of pertinent traits and occurrences,
wh ich is responsible for a rather striking structural particularity, common to both perceptual decoupage and
lexical decoupage. Two "objects" can be contained in
one another while otherwise continuing to stand for an
autonomous and distinct item , so much so that one no
longer knows whether or not they are of the same rank. In
terms of set theory one could say that it is a matter of two
classes which simultaneously maintain relations of exclusion and inclusion. Thus , for example, the sememes
and the visual objects automobile and wheel: the wheel
is a part of the automobile and can be mentioned in the
entry "automobile" in a dictionary of iconic nomination,
but the wheel is also an entirely separate unit of the same
"rank" as the automobile: our dictionary would contajn
both entries, apart from each other and on an equal level.
This apparent peculiarity, which establishes itself in a
general and permanent fashion , is the result of the fundamentally classificatory and "arbitrary" nature of nomination. When the object to which one makes reference is
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the automobile (the automobile seen or spoken of), the
wheel intervenes only as a trait for recognition, on the
level of the steering wheel, for example. But the object to
which one refers in other circumstances can be the wheel
itself (for instance, in the case of a flat tire and its repair):
it then is the thing which functions as a recognized object, or that to be recognized, and requires in its turn
those traits of recognition (e.g., circular exterior form,
marked by a "center" and radial structure).
In sum, a single material element can operate at two
distinct levels of coding: as seme and as sememe, as
"identificans" and as "identificatum" (or "i dentificandum") . Objects which must be recognized constantly
serve in the recognition of other objects. According to the
multiple and diverse exigencies of practice, perception
and the lexicon reserve the right to regroup their basic
traits in other ways, into "packets" which vary in content
and size. Each packet, whi ch barely seems to be stable,
is frequently an object. Objects are always equal as objects , even if one is susceptible to being "lost" among the
traits of another on occasion-and only on occasionwhen the second remains an object and the first, ceasing
for a moment to be, contents itself to participate in the
decoupage of the second . There never exist any objects,
properly speaking, which might be included within
others: what one finds are elements (semantic and perceptual) which the code brings into play at one time as
objects and at others as parts of objects. In any case ,
this same code sovereignly arranges the list of objects,
not only those items on it which are occasionally
eclipsed .

Within the code of visual recognition , the signifier is
never the marked or suspected object, but the set of material responsible for its being marked or suspected:
forms, contours, outlines, shadings. This is the visual
substance itself, the material of expression in the sense of
Hjelmslev.
If one considers the correspondences between language and vision a result of a social process of intellectual production which exists in an active fashion
precisely to establish them, the transit by the signifieds
represents the final, directly observable level, the final
product of this set process. Thanks to pertinent traits of
the iconic signifier, the subject identifies the object; it
establishes the visual signified. From there, it passes to
the corresponding sememe in its native language, the
linguistic signified. This is the precise moment of nomination, of clearing the intercodal bridge. By the disposition
of the sememe, the word or the lexeme which is attached
to this sememe can be pronounced, producing the
(phonic) signifier of the linguistic code. The loop is
thus looped .
The intercodal bridge can also be crossed in another
sense, from the phonic signifier to the perceptual marking of the corresponding object and then to optical traits;
or, in the absence of all real or iconic· "stimuli," to the
mental evocation of the object; that is, again, of its pertinent optical traits. These two operations are so very
common in daily life that one does not consciously think
of them. Nevertheless, without them one would not be
able to understand the following situations: if I say to a
friend, "Pass me the pencil sharpener which is somewhere on the table," he finds it and gives it to me. Or, if
someone tells me, "My sister is wearing sunglasses," I am
capable of imagining a glasses-like object, even if my
conversational partner's sister is absent and I know nothing whatever about the exact model of the glasses she is
wearing .
When the perceptual signifier (trait~ of recognition)
journies to the linguistic signifier (phonic emission, itself
either real or mental), this is nomination. When it goes
from the linguistic signifier to the visual signifier, as in the
examples given above, one is dealing with visualization,
which is the inverse and inseparable correlate of nomination (that is why this last term, in a slightly larger sense,
can conveniently designate the entire phenomenon independently of its orientation in each case). The point
common to the two orientations is that the passage from
the linguistic to the perceptual, or vice versa, lies at the
level of the two respective signifieds, the sememe and
the object.

Language Perception: Their Double Relation,
lntercodal and Metacodal
The preceding reflections show that the correspondence
between vision and language establishes itself at two
different levels: one among the sememes and optically
identifiable objects, the other among the semes and pertinent traits of visual recognition. The full significance of
this duality merits a slightly more thorough examination.

Transit by Signifieds
Insofar as the sememes correspond to optical objects (or
vice versa), the intercodal transit-the reciprocal articulation of the linguistic code and the perceptual codeproceeds through the two signifieds. In language, the
sememe is a specific unit at the level of a signified. In
perceptual activity, the "object" is equally a signified: an
already found signified once the object has been recognized, and a sought-after signified when the object is felt
to be identifiable as such but has not yet been identified.
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Representation as Metalanguage
In many cases, and notably in those which occupy us
here, this level of relationships is neither the only nor
necessarily the most important one. Certain intercodal
relations are really more than transcodage. The relationship between language and perception is very different
than that between two languages (=translation), because
in this case the two codes no longer have an identical
semiological status and no longer occupy the same
place within the general process of socialization.

phonic emission
of themes

linguistic
code

I

observable intercodal transit

I
As long as one considers it from this vantage point,
which is not the deepest but which has its own reality, the
connection between the visual lexicon and visual perception remains on the level of ordinary transcodage. As a
defining trait of the latter, I propose retaining the
achievement of the transit by the signifieds. Transcoding
is a highly ordinary sociosemiological operation, whose
most typical form is translation; that is, a subcase of
transcod)ng where the two codes are two l~nguages.
The transit by the signifieds is neither an empirical
peculiarity nor an exceptional act. On the contrary, it rests
on a permanent and fundamental given: if the varying
codes in use distinguish among themelves-if there are
several, obviously-it is through the material and the
internal organization of their signifier (visual codes, auditory codes, etc.), or even by its organization alone when
the material is identical (e.g., the plurality of languages),
or, in any case, by the organization of their signifieds
(Hjelmslev's "form of the contents") since it is the direct or
indirects correlate of the organization of the signifier. But
it is not through the material of the signified ("material
content"), which is common to all codes and which is
always the "sense," the semantic fabric. The sense, also,
constitutes the universal intercodal footbridge. One can
switch from one code to another when two units of form of
the signified, belonging respectively to each of the two
codes (which are never, in fact, superimposable),
nevertheless occupy an adjacent position in the material
of the signified (or, as one says these days, "have very
nearly the same sense"). This happens when the translator takes a word from the source language and looks for
an equivalent word in the target language. In sum, there
definitely exists a level of relationships between codes
which always justifies saying that the passage is accomplished across the signifieds.

linguistic signifier

1

linguistic signified
~

sememe

designating
the object

Compared with all nonlinguistic codes, and with itself
when necessary, language is in the position of a
metalanguage: a universal, nonscientific metalanguage,
a "major equivalent" exchangeable with all other codes,
as is money against all other goods. There are also scientific metalanguages (formalized languages, mathematical notation, chemical notation), but it is still language
which is used to introduce them, to preliminarily explicate
them, and to define their field of validity. And within other
domains, language itself, subject to a specific task which
tranforms it in terminology-that is to say, in theorydirectly supplies the scientific metalanguage outside all
specialized notation, or in simply taking one of them as
an intermittent auxiliary title. This metalanguage consists
then of a body of linguistic statements of fact; it can pass
for the language of science itself. Thus the metal inguistic
inclination of language, universal at the nonscientific
level, is strongly reaffirmed at the scientific level. The two
things go together, and the current social classifications
are those of science. This is the problem of pensee sauvage, "the savage mind," so well posed by Levi-Strauss
(1962): all societies are societies of "savages," all people
are indigenes of some culture .
If language is the principal metalanguage, this is obviously so because no other code is situated so tightly in
daily social communications as a certain (abstract, explicit) form of thought. This is not the only operation but is
by nature the most apparent among the operations of
metalanguage. Every semiologist has noted that language, through its relationship with other codes, occupies a nonsymmetrical and privileged position 9 in that
it affects the quantitative extension of the material of the
signified (the total field of "things that one can say").
Language can say, even if sometimes only with approximation, what all the other codes can say, while the inverse is not true. (There exists, for example, no degree of
approximation, if it were imaginable, from which one
could allow that a reed pipe tune or a set of colors is
capable of "saying" even so simple a phrase as "The
train arrived at Lyon three quarters of an hour late.") Each
code "occupies" one part, and only one part, of the total
semantic material, which is to say, of the ensemble of
socially possible assertions, while language occupies
them all . Between language and the nonlinguistic codes,
the proportion of "translatability" equalizes itself rather
badly, leaning largely to one side. The advantage of this
semantic extension has a great deal to do with the social
status of language as universal commentator.
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signified of metacode

One of the most notable consequences of this situation
in everyday life (the flow of perception, deciphering the
numerous images which offer themselves to view in
modern cities, spontaneous conversations about them
etc.) is that language does much more than transcode'
vision. Translation is another signifier of the same rank
(the "verbalizer," as it is sometimes called by aud iovisual
specialists). Language accompanies vision in permanence; it is the continuous gloss of it, it explains it,
clarifies it, to the extent to which it accomplishes it,
whether spoken aloud or by simple mnemonic evocation
of the phonic signifier. To speak of the image is in reality
to speak the image; not essentially a transcodage but a
comprehension, a resocialization where the transcodage
is only the occasion, the necessary occasion. Nomination
completes the perception as much as it translates it; an
insufficiently verbalizable perception is not fully a perception in the social sense of the word.
If I mentally dis pose of a sememe (he Iicopter, for
example) and then I am unable to draw the corresponding object on a piece of paper, it is not a matter of accidental clumsiness; I am someone who "does not know
how to draw," and no one suspects that I do not know what
a helicopter is. But if the helicopter is drawn on another
piece of paper and I am not able to name it-or, in any
case, to find the sememe, lacking the phonic signifier, as
when one has the word "on the tip of the tongue"-the
situation, turned around 180 degrees, becomes much
more serious. I have not understood the drawing, I actually do not know what it is, I am incapable of making it
exist (at least at the level of representation I am discussing in this study). Language is not only another code; it is
the metacode.

To Transcode/Metacode: Relations between the Two
Operations
It is necessary then to distinguish the metacodal relationship (relationship of the metacode to its object-code)
from the intercodal relationship, which unites two codes
on the same level, when each can function on occasion
as "interpreter" of the other, but the situation can always
be reversed. In the metacodal relationship the transit by
the signified (where the equality of the status of the two
codes becomes explicit) is not the main point. We know,
following Hjelmslev (1953:Chapter 22), that the signified
of the metacode articulates itself across the total
signifier/signified of the object-code. There it is another
sort of transit, a dissymmetrical type, which engages, in
the case of more than two signifieds, one signifier and
one only (that of the object-code). As for ·the signifier of
the metacode, it constitutes, in this "unhooked" structure
that is so well known today, the part which "exceeds," that
which speaks the object-code in its entirety. Thus, in an
oral statement, the phonic emissions of the English languagd help me to describe the signifiers and the
signifieds of the iconic code.

signifier of metacode

I

The simple intercodal relationship can be represented in
the following manner:

I

code X signifier

code X signified
code Y signified

code Y signifier

I

Only the signifieds ensure the contact between the two
codes. The signifiers "exceed" both of them-each one
can "translate" the other. The dissymetry cancels itself.
These theoretical reflections find a striking illustration
in the problem which occupies us. Evoking the cultural
taxonomy of visible objects, Greimas (1968) considers
that the pertinent traits of the iconic signifier ("traits of
recognition" in Umberto Eco's terms) coincide with those
of the linguistic signified-that is, with the semes of the
sememe. This proposition seems to me of great importance. From a perspective of visual semiology I return to
the linguistic analysis which Greimas made (1966:43--50)
of the French word tete in one of its senses ("material
object"). Permit me to simplify a little, in order to abbreviate the exposition. Greimas proposed four semes for
this sememe: extremity (of a more immense object); discontinuous extremity (culturally felt to be distinct from the
rest of what one would voluntarily call "the body"); superlative extremity (superior and/or anterior); and spherical
extremity (or "swelling").
These are four pertinent traits of the linguistic signified.
But there are alscr-and at this point the two things become confused-four pertinent traits of the iconic
signifier. If in an ethnographic film we perceive an object
which is unknown to us (a hunting weapon, for example,
or a musical instrument), and if this object presents at its
anterior extremity a distinct part with a rounded form, we
would not hesitate to perceive it as being the "head," or
tete, of this utensil which was previously impossible to
identify. All that our gaze would comprehend would be
that one of the parts of the object consists of a known
object, a "head." The four semes would then correspond
to four physical (optical) characteristics of the visual
signifier, that is, the visible "spot" which on the screen
forms the photograph of this "head." In the same way, we
recognize a "house," which could be seen in an image or
next to a walkway in the countryside, thanks to certain
perceptual traits which are separable from the entirety.
The silhouette which we have before our eyes evokes an
object constructed by man. It contains several walls, has
a roof, a door, and so forth. These different features are
also the semes of the word "house" in one of its senses
(edifice).
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From Objects to Actions

The Return of the Signifier
It is thus confirmed that the articulation between the
taxonomies of vision and the visual part of the lexicon, in
the bosom of a single culture, establishes itself at two
levels simultaneously. The first is between the respective
signifieds (object and sememe ), insofar as one considers
this the ordinary intercodal relationship, simple "translation," the terminal list of surface correspondences. The
second is between the pertinent traits of the signifier (on
the side of the object-code) and those of the signified (on
the side of the metacode) when one envisages the cultural classification of objects as an active operation of the
metacodal type in which the main point plays itself
against units "smaller" than the whole object and
"smaller" than the whole sememe, at the outcome of concrete nomination. One conceives of this articulation as
the historical production of nomination, a production in
which language, the universal commentator, comes to
state the law and its partitions, even though in the final
analysis it would itself be, like the visible world , entirely
informed by social forces. In the following table, I represent the double relationship of language and vision. One
ascertains that the two sides of the object-code (signifier
and signified) articulate themselves toward the signified
of the metacode, and toward it only. The signifier of the
metacode, formed from phonetic sequences which designate the perceptual units, bears no direct relation to the
object-code. It can only "speak" globally, and from the
exterior, through the intermediary of its own signified , the
metacodal signified.

visual signifier

linguistic signifier

(forms, contours, etc.)
with its pertinent traits

phonic sequences

~

deep correspondences
between pertinent traits

~
visual signified
recognizable object

linguistic signified

:...~.....__---•• (sememe)
with its pertinent traits
(semes)

Until now I have spoken only of "objects." But visually
recognizable "actions" exist as well. The problem of
nomination thus moves from the noun toward the verb, at
least for Western societies and languages, where the
noun and the verb, the object and the action, are clearly
distinct. Except for that point, the principle of analysis
remains the same. Thus, in a film in which the images are
blurred and difficult to read, it is sufficient for our purposes that certain optical traits are clearly marked in
order to perceive that someone has thrown something . In
this example, it seems to me that the pertinent traits of the
perceptible action, and of the lexeme "to throw" in the
corresponding sense, are two in number (a minimal deduction but set in a potentially larger paradigm).
1 Material object which distances itself from the body of the
person (the opposite of "to catch ," "to reach," etc. , in
which the object approaches the person).
2 Muscular action on the part of the person (the opposite of
"to let fall," "to let escape," "to let loose," etc., where the
object distances itself but the person is passive).
Clearly the analysis should be pushed further, moving
closer and closer to the larger group of verbs of movement, and to the larger organization of the visual world (or
at least the principal gestural units). For example, the two
traits which I have noted as the most immediately striking
presuppose two others by an implied relationship: the
"material object," or at least an inert one, here the projectile, and its opposition to an "animate be ing," a person
or animal , or even another material object conceived and
perceived as "active" (a catapult can also throw something).

Noises . .. Sound Objects
The perspective which is proposed here is equally applicable to the world of recognizable noises and the corresponding sector of the lexicon. This aspect of the problem is particularly important in the case of sound film
(which in our age is all cinema), television , radio broadcasting, and so on. Even so, it has been studied much
less until now, because our culture grants a strong preference to the visual and does not pay attention to the
audio sphere, except when the subject is the sound of
language; of the two, the "noise" is often left behind .10
How is it explainable that in the soundtrack of a film set
in the countryside, or in the noisy confusion of a forest
where we are walking, we would be capable of recognizing and isolating a lapping sound (clapotis) , even if we
did not know its origin, and even if we identify as "lapping," from one occasion to another, noises which are
very different? One must admit that the "lapping" exists
as an autonomous sound object, with pertinent traits of its
acoustic signifier corresponding to those of the linguistic
signifier, from the semes to the sememe "lapping ." Four
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appear rather quickly, resulting from the "nearest" commutations:
1 The noise is relatively weak (as opposed to an uproar,
howl, din, crash, etc.).
2 It is discontinuous, which a distant hum, a whistling, or a
background noise is not.
3 It is acoustically "double," or, in any case, not simple, as
each of its emissions can be decomposed into two successive sounds/--!····!--····!--/. (In this respect, the
first two phonemes of the French linguistic signifier c-1apotis can be considered onomatopoeic). The commutation shows that the other identifiable noises do not have
this character and that each of their emissions is "simple,"
as in "detonation," or even "blow" or "shock" in their auditory sense. It is the opposition between floc and tac, or,
to give some English examples, "plop" and "plip."11
4 This noise is experienced as being liquid, or as being
provoked by a liquid; the opposite of "rubbing" or "scraping" in their auditory sememe, which presents the trait
"solid," or even "sizzling" and "hissing," with the trait
"gaseous."
These four traits, and all those of the same genre which
I have forgotten, are common to both auditory perception
and language. There would be no point whatever in asking whether they define the "lapping" (clapotis) as
characteristic sound or as the French word clapotis,
since the noise and the word exist only by virtue of each
other. Our four traits constitute a level of articulation
where the two things coincide, under the metacodal stat·
ute of language.

Ideological Reduction of the Sound Dimension
There is a difference, however, between the visual and
the auditory in our cultural definition. When I recognize a
"lamp" and can name it, the identification is terminated.
All that could be added would be on the order of adjectives or determiners. On the contrary, if I distinctly hear a
"lapping" or a "whistling," and if I can say that, I only have
the feeling of making a first identification, a marking as
yet incomplete. This impression disappears when I recognize that it is the lapping of a river or the whistling of
the wind in the trees. The recognition of a sound leads
directly to the question "What makes the noise?" There is
something of a paradox there, since the sememes of the
initial identification ("whistling," "sizzling," "rubbing," etc.)
correspond to actual sound profiles, while those of the
final identification (the wind, the river), which are not at all
auditory, articulate the source of the noise and not the
noise itself..
Within language as the metacode of noises, the most
perfect identification is obviously that which simultaneously designates the sound and its source ("rumbling
of thunder"). But if one of these two indicators must be
suppressed, it is curious to note that it can be the soundobject which suffers the least damage in overall recogni-
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tion. If I perceive a rumble, without further precision, there
exists some mystery and a sense of suspense (horror
films do not miss playing on this); the identification is
only roughly sketched. If I perceive "thunder" without paying the least attention to its acoustical characteristics, the
identification is sufficient.
One might perhaps reply that the example is tendentious because thunder is an object which is nothing other
than sound (one cannot see it; lightning is what one
sees). But the situation stays the same with objects which
do not exhibit themselves through their noise. If I allude to
the "throbbing of a machine," my conversational partner
may consider that he does not know exactly what I am
talking about and may ask, "What machine?" I have
nevertheless been precise in the clarification of the
noise, but remained vague on that of its source. It will
suffice that I reverse my axes of precision by saying,"lt's a
jet airplane noise," in order for everyone to then be of the
opinion that I have explained myself clearly, and to feel
satisfied. From the moment when the sound source is
recognized (jet airplane), the taxonomies of noise themselves (throbbing, whistling, etc.) can only be supplied,
at least for our age and in our latitudes, as supplementary
precisions, not felt to be indispensable, basically in the
nature of adjectives, even when they express themselves
linguistically as nouns. At the level of discourse, one is no
longer entirely within nomination, but already is moving a
little way into description.
Ideologically, the sound source is an object, the sound
itself a character. Like all characters, it is attached to the
object. Simply because the identification of the latter suffices to evoke the noise, the inverse is not necessarily
true. "To comprehend" a perceptual given is not to grasp
it exhaustively in all its aspects, but to be capable of
classifying it, of putting it in a pigeonhole, 12 to designate
the object of which it is one occurrence. Noises are also
classified much more according to the objects which
produce them than according to their own properties.
But this situation is not at all natural: from a logical
point of view, the "throbbing" is an object, an acoustical
object, on the same level that the tulip is an optical object. Language takes this into account elsewhere--or at
least the lexicon does, failing discourse-since a great
number of recognizable noises, reduced nevertheless to
the level of characters, still correspond to nouns. It is a
sort of compromise, which does not prevent auditory
traits from participating more feebly than others in the
dominant principle of recognition of objects. Furthermore, when one wishes to name the same concept as the
sound-object, it is necessary, as I have just done and as
the supporters of musique concrete often do, to add to
the word "object" the attributive adjective "sound," when
no precision at all is required for what should logically be
called "visual object." We consider it evident that a flag is
an object, but we hesitate about the ullulation of owls: this
is an infraobject, only a sound-object.
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"Sur un substantialisme sauvage"

The "Off-Screen Sound" in Cinema

Thus there is deeply implanted in our culture (and doubtless in others, although not necessarily all of them) a sort
of wild "substantial ism," which distinguishes fairly strictly
the first qualities that determine the list of objects (substances) and the second qualities that correspond to as
many of the attributes as are susceptible to being linked
to these objects. It is a conception reflected throughout
the entire tradition of Western philosophy, starting with
the notions of Descartes and Spinoza, which recaptures
the preceding phrase. It is equally clear that this "worldview" has something to do with subject-predicate structure, particularly strong in Indo-European languages.
One can think that for us the first qualities are on the
order of the visual and the tactile-tactile because touch
is traditionally the very criterion of materiality; 13 visual
because the guide marks necessary to daily life and to
techniques of production emphasize naming by eye more
than by any other sense (it is only in language that the
auditory order, as if to compensate, finds "rehabilitation").
The subject is too immense to be approached usefully
here. It is even now possible, however, to begin to encircle certain qualities which seem to be "second": thus ·for
noises, evoked a moment ago, or the olfactory qualities (a
perfume is hardly an object), or even such subdimensions on the visual order as color. 14
In a clothing store, if two articles are of an identicar cut
but distinguished by color, one considers that it is "the
same pullover (or the .same pair of pants) in two shades."
Culture feels the permanence of the object, language
affirms it; only the attributes vary. But if two articles are of
the same color and a different cut, no one would say or
think that the boutique offers "the same color in two garments" (incorrect formula, and not by accident, in which
the color will be in the position of grammatical subject).
Rather, one will announce that these "two garments," this
scarf and this skirt, for example, ".are of the same color."
The articulation restores the color to its place, that of the
predicate; these are two distinct objects which have one
attribute in common .

The division of first and second qualities plays a large
role in one of the classic problems of film theory, that of
"off-screen sound." In a film , a sound is considered offscreen (literally, outside the screen) when it is actually the
sound source which is off-screen. So, one defines the
"off-screen voice" as that of a person who does not appear visually on the screen. One forgets that the sound
itself is never "off"; either it is audible or it really does not
exist. When it exists, it cannot be situated inside the rectangle or outside it, since the property of sound is to
diffuse more or less throughout the total environmental
space. The sound is simultaneously "on" the screen, in
front of it, behind it, around it, and in the whole theater.15
On the contrary, when one says that a visual element of
a film is off-screen, it really is. One can reestablish it by
inference from what is visible within the limits of the rectangle, but one does not see it. A well-known examp le
would be that of "the bait"; one predicts the presence of a
person where one only perceives, on one side of the
screen, the hand or the-shoulder; all the rest is really out
of the field of view.
The matter is clear: the language of technic ians and
studios, without their realizing it, applies a conceptualization to sound which only makes sense for the image.
One pretends to speak of sound , but one in fact thinks of
the visual image of the sound source.
This confus ion finds itself obviously favored by a
characteristic of noise which is phys ical and not social.
The spatial anchorage of sound "givens" is much more
vague and blurred than that of visual "givens." The two
sensory orders do not have the same re lationship to
space. Sound is much more constrained , even when it
indicates a general direction (but rarely an entirely precise placement, as it is the contrary of the rule for the
visible). One understands that film techn ic ians have
based their class ification on the less elusive of the two
elements. (It must nevertheless be remembered that the
phylogenetic choice of an acoustical material , the sound
of a voice, for the signifiers of human language, probably
derives from the same reasons: phonic communicat ion is
not interrupted by obscurity, by the night; one can speak
to someone who is behind oneself, or is hidden by an
obstacle, or is in an unknown place, etc. The relative
weakness of the relation to space procures here multiple
advantages of which the human race would lose the benefits should it choose a visual language.)
But to come back to off-screen sound in film , the physical "givens" do not suffice to explain the persistent confusion between the sound-object itself and the visual
image of its source; from the most literal definition, the
concept of off-screen sound lies in this confusion. There
is something else behind it which is cultural and which
we have already encountered : namely, the concept of
sound as an attribute, as nonobject, and the tendency to
neglect its proper characteristics for the benefit of those
of the corresponding "substance," the vis ible object emitting the sound .
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Conclusion
In this study I have wanted to show that the perceptual
object is a constructed unit, socially constructed, and in
one sense a linguistic unit. Here we are already far from
the '; adverse spectacle" of the subject and the object, of
this there is, cosmological as much as existential (at any
rate transcendental) within which phenomenology
wished to establish our presence to objects, and the
presence of objects to us. I am not so sure that this "distancing" is so great only on certain axes and does not
carry along a complete rupture of the horizon. Obviously I
spoke of semes, of pertinent optical traits, and so on; that
is, of elements which have the property of not having one
single existence and which are, on the contrary-on the
contrary or prec isely?-the conditions for the possibility
of real life, the structures of production which shape it
and which lose themselves in it, which find in it the place
of their manifestation and their negation simultaneously:
the objective determinations of subjective sentiment. To
concentrate interest on this inconspicuous stratum is to
stray from the path of phenomenology. But the obvious
stratum-apart from the fact that it has its own reality,
authorizing possible studies or already having led to
benefit-is equally the only one which arranges from the
outset those studies which its movement will then distance itself from.
I have tried my best to comprehend why perception
proceeds through objects. But I felt from the first, and still
feel keenly, that it proceeds (and the phenomenologists
do not say anything different) in effect as follows: in order
that I try to analyze the "objects" which are so striking to
the native (and from the start, in order that I be able to feel
them) , it was necessary that I myself be the native and
that I be struck by the same things as he was. One knows
that every psychoanalytic enterprise begins through a
"phenomenology," following the term of the analysts
themselves. That is not true in this domain. Each time that
one wants to explain something, it is most advisable to
begin by experiencing it.

Translation Notes
* This essay was originally published as Le per9u et le nomme, in Pour
une esthetique sans entrave ; Melanges Mikel Dufrenne (Hommage
collectif) , Paris: Editions 10/18, 1975, pp. 345-377. It was then reprinted
in Metz's collected papers, Essais Semiotiques, Paris: Klincksieck,
1977, pp. 129-163. The present version modifies the original footnotes
to separate references cited from actual footnotes relating to the text.
t Diegesis (French , diegese) is a term coined by the French writer
Etienne Souriau to indicate the denotative material of film . The concept
is discussed in Metz 1968 (Eng . transl.1974:97-98).
:t: ·Micheline is an autorail with tires invented by the Michelin Tire Company and used for the Paris Metro.
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Notes
1 I'm thinking of course of the famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and also of
isolated attempts such as Sommerfelt's (1938) on the language and
culture of the Aranta tribe of Australia.
2 President day sociolinguistics, situated after generative tranformational linguistics, rightly tries to exceed the purely lexical stage. It also
would like to exceed the Chomskyan distinction between "competence " and "performance," which rejects as pure performance important social variations in the usage of a single national language. On the
intersection of these two perspectives and the idea of constructing
proper grammars (syntactic and/or phonological) as for example Black
English (English as spoken by Black Americans) or that of other
sociolinguistic groups, cf. the work of Labov and the variationist
school.
3 Is a sememe each "sense" of a lexeme (Greimas 1966: 43-45) or of a
paralexeme (1966:38)? The paralexeme of Greimas corresponds
closely to the syntheme of Martinet (1968) . Greimas does not propose
a special term to commonly designate the lexeme and the paralexeme;
Martinet calls this the "theme." I follow Martinet here, because his term
is particularly useful to me. The perceptual object can correspond
equally to either a lexeme or a paralexeme (syntheme) , but only on the
side of the signified and only in a single sense. Here, the Greimasian
term sememe is the only one available.
4 Greimas (1968) speaks of figures and "natural signs." The context
shows that what he means by "natural" is "perceptual." (It is a bit like
when linguists speak of "natural languages" as opposed to formalized
languages or metalanguages, without a thought that these languages
are also really natural.) In my text I prefer to avoid the word "natural."
5 The same idea is found in Schaff (1965). It is that language is an
"instrument" because it contributes to the decoupage of perceptual
units, but it is also (like perception itself) a product, a product of social
life.
6 In Eco (1970:16)--a French translation of part of Eco 1968--"We select
the fundamental aspects of the perceived following the codes of recognition: when we are at the zoo and we see a zebra far away, the
elements that we recognize immediately (and that our memory retains)
are the stripes and not the silhouette which vaguely resembles that of a
donkey or mule. (... ) But suppose there exists an African community
where the only known quadrupeds are the zebra and the hyena, and
where horses, mules, and donkeys are unknown. In order to recognize
the zebra it will not be necessary to perceive the stripes( ... ) and in
order to draw a zebra it will be more important to emphasize the form of
the snout and the length of the legs, in order to distinguish the quadruped represented from the hyena (who also has stripes; the stripes
thus do not constitute a factor of differentiation.)"
7 In Metz (1971 :207-209) I distinguished two exactly similar cases by
taking up and more precisely specifying the traditional comparison
between the cinematographic image and the ideogram. I noted that in
the former case it is the spectator himself who "makes" the schema; in
the latter it is already made, or at least, in certain of its forms, notably
the pictogram and morphogram.
8 It is direct when each formal unit of the signified corresponds to a
formal unit of the signifier; without either one or the other having followed proper internal articulations (codes of the "symbolic " type following Hjelmslev). It is indirect in the contrary case (" linguistic" codes
in the larger sense, formed by "signs" and not by symbols) when the
level of the signifier and the level of the signified each have their
"figures" (units smaller than the sign) which are not isomorphic; thus
the internal organization of the signified is not transferred from that of
the signifier. They are nevertheless dependent (from wh ich I derive my
expression "indirect correlate") because the form of the signifier and
that of the signified continue to coincide on the level of the sign , even if
this entails diverging later on the level of the figures. In this conception, the symbol is a sign without figures (or the sign a symbol without
figures). Proper languages are the best example of a system of the
linguistic type, with figures: there is no bi-univocal correspondence
between the phonemes or the phonic traits (figures of the signifier of a
sign) and the semes, figures of the signified of the same sign
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(Hjelmslev 1953). The Hjelmslevian distinction between symbolic systems and linguistic systems is better known by the name "symbolic
systems/semiotic systems" or "symbolic systems/languages" (which
fiqures elsewhere in my work) .
See Benveniste (1969:130-131). Language is the only semiotic system
that can be universally "interpreted ." The same idea figures in the total
work of Hjelmslev; see his paper "Structural Analysis of Language,"
appended in Hjelmslev 1953. Different codes other than languages are
"restrained languages"; languages are "non-restrained languages."
A widely held view insists that the privileged position of phonic languages leads in our culture to an underdevelopment of visual richness.
And this is not mistaken. But this is even more true of the sonic richness of "noises," which are very directly in competition with language
by virtue of the fact that they also have an auditory signifier.
Onomatopoeia, which takes exception to the "arbitrariness" of linguistic signification , represents the case where a direct link exists between
the signifier of the metacode (language) and the set of the object-code
(perceptual code) . On cases of this sort where there appears a "motiva'Lion " for the linguistic signifier, see the important work of Pierre
Guiraud (1961 , 1962, 1967).
In the field of semiology this idea has been developed in a particularly
clear and demonstrative fashion by Luis Prieto (1966, especially chapter 2, "Le mecanisme de I' ind ication," pp . 15-27). Every indication is an
indication of a class. A class only has meaning in relationship to a
complementary class (or classes) in the presupposed universe of discourse.
I have already led up to this remark by an entirely different route in my
"On the impression of reality in the cinema" in Metz 1968 (translated
1974).
It is not without reason that noncolor film , i.e. , black and white film, was
possible (culturally as a result of demand) for many years and that in
large measure it still is. Smell film does not correspond to any strong
and generalized expectation. Sound and talking film, ordinary film
today, is almost always more filled with speech than sound , so much
so that the noises found therein are poor and stereotyped. In fact, the
only cinematographic elements which interest everyone, and not only
a few specialists, are image and speech.
This is related to another characteristic fact of cinema today. The visual
givens are only reproduced there by condition of certain perceptual
distortions (the absence of binocular factors of relief, the presence of a
screened rectangle which marks, on the contrary, the absence of real
vision , and so forth). The auditory givens are reproduced on the conditions that the sound recording has been properly done, and does not
suffer a single phenomenal deficit in relation to the corresponding
noise in the real world . Nothing, in principle, distinguishes a gunshot
heard in a film from a gunshot heard in the streets. "Sounds do not
contain the image" as film theoretician Bela Balazs said. Even so, the
sounds of cinema diffuse within the space as do the sounds of life, or
very nearly so. This difference in perceptual status between that which
one calls "reproduction" when dealing with the visual , and that which
one qives the same name, when dealing with the audible, is discussed
in my "Problemes actuels de theorie du cinema," pp. 57-58 in Metz
1973; also see Metz 1971 :209-210.
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Applied Optimism

3

1
Mobil's series of TV commercials on the theme "The Spirit
of America Is the Spirit of Achievement" (excellent both in
concept and realization) is an examp le of the Applied
Optimism in the best trad iti on of Steichen's Family of
Man.

2
I am suspicious toward the subjects of Optimism, Health,
and Patriotism.
Happy bi rthday.

The story about the elephant in the china shop. Who
cares about china anymore? It's pure Buster Keaton , a
merry chaos.
Ask children: do they want small porcelain figurines
forever or a five-minute ride on the elephant's back?
The elephant who wanted to stamp out a mosquito eventually came out as that mouse who wanted to fuck a cow.

4
The Principle of Socialist Realism: speak about Positive
Hero, Reflect Reality (but recognizing the elements of
Future in it).

But this hag is two hundred years old, and still so lively.
Eternal youth .
It's good you squeezed out those boils. The clean face is
important. Scars are less ugly than those red-greenish
carbuncles.
Here's mud in your eye.
The Chinese are said to count years backward : you always have the number of years remaining to you , not the
number of years you have spent. At birth, you are
seventy-five; afterward your years diminish. After
seventy-five you show clear profit.
But, anyhow, they have no intention of asking for anyone's
permission.

Comparing most popular Russian and American films we
shall easily ascertain that Hollywood is much better at
understanding and realizing the Principles of Socialist
Realism.

5
Popeye the Sailor influenced me positively, and, already
in my fourth decade, I still inordinately love spinach.
Among the animals I like mice best. In every mouse hides
the Spirit of Mickey Mouse.

Ambivalent Memories
1

Ousan Makavejev is a Yugoslavian filmmaker. Among the
films he has directed are WR-Mysteries of the Organism
(1971) and Sweet Movie (1975).

I was five years old. My uncle Steva took me to the
movies. Mickey, Goofy, Horatio, and Clarabelle and
Company formed an orchestra. They started playing and
then a terrible wind , a storm, came. They flew in all directions, still playing. That was irresistible.

Th is paper was original ly read at the 1976 International Conference
"The United States in the World ," Septembe r 27 to October 1, in
Wash ington, D.C., at the Smithsonian Institution.

The audience giggled and I was choking with laughter.
Then horror began. Something was leaking down my leg,
wet and warm, a puddle was spreading. Luckily, it was
noisy in the cinema and people around me didn't notice
anything.
Out of enthusiasm I have wet myself. Oh, shame!
Uncle Steva took me out in a hurry.

2
My mother is seventy-two and she still likes telling how I
was as curly as Shirley Temple-forty years ago.
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3
Around my eighth year, after seeing Robin Hood, I believed I was in love with Olivia de Havilland.
In fact, I wanted to be like Errol Flynn. That is to say, I
wanted to be like Robin Hood.
Then Young Tom Edison came, and I wanted to publish
my own newspaper, i.e., I wanted to be like Mickey
Rooney, i.e., like Tom Edison, i.e., like Andy Hardy.

4
A novel entitled Chicago was coming out in the form of
Tuesday and Friday booklets. In it, a mad scientist had
invented a matter called crystalopyr, which reflected sunrays in such a way that, on one side, everything turned
into ice, while everything burned on the other. A crystalopyr plane was in production; the destruction of the
world was in preparation.

8
The liberation came, Tito's part isans, and the Red Army.
Roosevelt died. New peoples' power proclaimed threeday national mourning, cinemas were closed, there was
no music in restaurants, for three days flags fluttered at
half-mast. I wondered: have they buried him in his wheelchair?

9
People were overjoyed with American food packages (we
had not seen chocolate for four years). However, one item
caused consternation and general mockery-pork in the
apple sauce. If you are really interested in "the absence
of the U.S. influence," here it is: my people will never taste
such muck as pork in the apple sauce.

10
What is the magic of chewing gum?

5

11

A year later, at 6 a.m. on April 6, 1941, German incendiary
bombs made the prophecy of Chicago come true and
burned 30 percent of Belgrade. Twenty thousand inhabitants of Belgrade died on that day, before breakfast, as
Fodor's guide puts it. The town was turned into congeries
of dolls' houses-houses without fronts disclosed intact
apartments, dining rooms with chandeliers, dentists' offices.

For months on end we ate powdered eggs (there were
barrels and barrels of them). Everybody called this food
"Truman's balls" (in our language we have the same word
for "balls" and "eggs").

6
German occupation began. My school was taken to see
Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs . Snow White and the
dwarfs spoke German. According to German custom , the
film was dubbed in their language. We were offended.

7
Easter of '44 was a beautiful, sunny day. Humming came
from the sky, the squadrons of Liberators sparkled.
People waved at them, happy with the near-end of the
war. Bombs started to thunder and raise dust. A maternity
clinic in our neighborhood was hit. Babies were found in
the tree-tops. There were thousands of dead civilians, but
~verybody was still glad to see the Allied planes.

12
Twenty years later, Belgrade youth weekly Mladost conducted polls trying to find out who were the heroes of the
contemporary young. At the top of the list: Che Guevara
and John F Kennedy.

13
Late sixties. The policy of open frontiers. With a Yugoslav
passport you can travel to over fifty countries-without a
visa.
The foreign influences become more complex every day.
Young playboy and criminal Milan Milosevic (one of the
legion of adventurers who went into the world after running around American crews making films in Belgrade)
was found dead in the bathroom of Mickey Rooney's Hollywood house.
In a nice casket his body reaches Belgrade airport, expenses paid by Alain Delon. It is met by dozens of hysterical teen-age girls.
Milosevic's mother tells all about her son, in a weekly
magazine series.
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Among other things, she produces a morbid detail: a few
months later ("around Christmas," says Mom), Delon sent
to his friend's mother a plastic bag with Milan's intestines,
taken out during the embalming.

14
I live in Belgrade, at the corner of Lenin Boulevard and
John F. Kennedy Street.
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3
"To catch up and overtake America" is a fatal slogan. We
already know from the ancient Greeks that even a rabbit
cannot overtake a turtle. I know that many of my American
friends do not enjoy having to run so much. I guess they
were told as children: "Run so that nobody can overtake
us."

4
My mother-in-law lives in Charlie Chaplin Street.
I like Instant Coffee and Instant Soup.

15
Late sixties. Godard uses the following metaphors: "Walt
Disney and blood," "the children of Marx and Coca-Cola."

16
In my last film, Sweet Movie , lovers make love in sugar; it
ends in murder. Blood mixes with sugar (during the shoot- .
ing we called this scene "the jam session"). I had in mind
a scene from Resnais' Hiroshima, Man Amour with lovers
plastered with sand; the effect was very sensual-and
unpleasant. I strived to make it pleasant.
Has this scene also been fathered by a need to "surpass"
(or interpret) the ambivalence of the image-concept
"Disney-blood"?

When Instant Death was introduced, in 1945, as applied
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I caught myself, a thirteenyear-old boy, in a dilemma: I liked it very much, although I
knew it wasn't nice that I liked it. Then everybody got
Instant Excuse: Instant Death has brought Instant End of
War.
Instant Beginning and Instant End.

5
The production of Absolute Happiness comes next. It is
curious that this concept (the guided creation of generations of completely happy human beings) did not appear
in Pavlov-oriented Soviet psychology, but at Harvard, with
B. F. Skinner.

6

"Orang Nach Westen" and Dangers of linear
Thinking

Where does it come from, this striving of America to make
other nations happy-against their will?

1

7

"To catch up and overtake America"-Stalin. In early and
innocent days of my school activism, we read in Stalin
what a communist should be.

The last three big wars were conducted by the USA in
Asia: Japan, Korea, Vietnam. Did the first really bring the
absolute victory? Did the second really secure status
quo? Why does America-with so much pain and
confusion-refuse to recognize traces of the American
Revolution and the Declaration of Independence in the
establishment of the national identities of Vietnam and
Cuba?

He should display, says Uncle Joe, the combination of
Bolshevik persistence and American practicality.

2
America served as a model to both Russian futurists and
Lenin.

8
For years humiliated and offended, heretics and dreamers, the hungry and those who "think differently" thronged
to the West, to America. From the East Coast to the Rockies and beyond, there was always-more West. After
World War II, this Orang Nach Westen has brought the
Americans to the Far East.
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5

We are scared by the discovery that the Far Westerners
are identical with the Far Easterners and that they reject,
"against their best interests," our concepts of time, history,
nature, and civilization as well as our sado-masochisticChristian concept of life, the best (and only) in the world.

In fact, the everyday life of America in its paradisaical
aspects of Freedom and Affluence, in its infernal aspects
of Freedom of Sin, Greed, and Lust, with its bursting of all
dams preventing Orgy of Desires-represents the wide
open playground of the Universal Dream. All practical
operations (economic, social, cultural, and private) are
performed in the oil of the Universal Dream, providing
everything with damping and acceleration.

10
Czech humorist Jaroslav Hasek has somewhere a group
of people meeting every day in a beerhouse.
There, in the beerhouse, they found "The Party of the
Moderate Progress within the Law."
The Americans could be considered members of the
Party of Immoderate Progress outside Any Law.

6
A fascinating situation: a TV commentator blows out his
brains on camera. After this, I cannot watch TV news in
America without hoping, in some dark corner of my soul,
that maybe now this commentator I am seeing and hearing . ..

7

The Factory of Universal Dreams
1
Hollywood .
The national pride of Yugoslavs: Slavko Vorkapich , Karl
Malden, Peter Bogdanovich.

In America there is no shame of desires. Since a half
century ago, Europe has scientifically ascertained the
immorality of desires, but it still retains the repression of
desires. Legitimacy of desires in America makes it possible to use them as fuel.

Energy

2

1

Another contribution of our national genius to Hollywood:

Does America know certain secrets of mobilizing human
energies which are unfathomable to the "rest of the
world?"

Vampir, the only Serbian word that has entered all the

languages of the world.
Vampire (F, fr, G vampir, of Slav origin; akin to Serb vampir
vampire, Russ upyr) 1: a bloodsucking ghost or reanimated
body of a dead person believed to come from a grave and
wander about by night sucking the blood of persons asleep
and causing their death.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary

Discontinuity?

2
A self-mocking Serbian story from World War I. At the
time of the Saloniki front, a child is drowning in the harbor
of Saloniki.

3
A real vampire: the biggest living WW II war criminal
Andrija Artukovic, the creator of the well-known extermination camp Jasenovac (Croatia, Yugoslavia), personally
responsible for the execution of 500,000 Serbians, Jews,
and Gypsies, lives, scot-free, in Los Angeles.

4
On the occasion of America's 200th birthday, David
Robinson writes about the American Cinema as the Universal Dream.

A crowd watches from the shore.
Suddenly, a heroic Serbian soldier is in the water; he
saves the child and reaps the applause of the spectators.
Afterward , on the shore, someone overhears him swearing: "If I get my hands on the motherfucker who pushed
me in!"
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3
Has not the whole of America come into being by a sort
of voluntary "Who-Pushed-Me-In " technique?
Millions swam across the ocean and , once on fhe other
shore, went on living as best as they could.
They were applauded from the ancient shore.
To bring oneself to the point of no return .

Tesla's ultimate dreams were of the wireless transmission
of electric energy, a system of interplanetary communication, and radio contact with the cosmos. In 1899, in Colorado Springs, he lighted two hundred bulbs, without use
of wires, from a distance of 25 miles. He also produced
manmade lightning flashes.
It was a poor eighty-year-old man who, in the early forties,
fed pigeons every day in front of New York's Plaza Hotel
and led a lonely Iife with a female pigeon at the Waldorf
Astoria.

4
Starting from zero.
The national income of Bangladesh is 70 dollars a year
per inhabitant; of Yugoslavia, 1,060; of the USA 7,020.
But still everybody behaves as if starting from zero. Although the American "zero" is-7,020.

5
The childhood dream of Nikola Tesla, in a deep province
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (today: Lika, Croatia,
Yugoslavia) was to go to America and install a gigantic
wheel at Niagara Falls which would produce unheard
quantities of energy.
In 1884, Nikola Tesla (twenty-eight) comes out from the
Immigration Office in Castle Garden, Manhattan, with
four cents in his pocket. He works as an electrician, digs
holes for two dollars a day, founds Tesla Electric Company, and creates the polyphase system of alternating
current.
At the same time Edison and John Pierpont Morgan work
steadfastly on the development of the direct current system . Edison's direct current has a maximum reach of one
mile from the power station .
According to some stories, Edison and Morgan go
around New York killing chickens with the alternating current in order to prove how dangerous it is. In 1888, with a
million dollar check, George Westinghouse buys forty
patents from Tesla-the complete system. Using the alternating current system, Tesla illuminates, on Westinghouse's behalf, the whole 1893 World Columbian Exposition in Chicago. Westinghouse obtains the contract to
build the Niagara power station. In 1896, Buffalo is illuminated by the alternating current coming from Niagara,
22 miles away.
Soon the whole of America is covered with pylons-the
cheap energy can be obtained, like water, out of the wall,
in evory house.

Seventy years earlier, he was a young man who had visions and nightmares, who had attacks of nausea at the
sight of a peach, went berserk at the sight of pearls, and
became ecstatic when faced with even, smooth surfaces
or spark! ing crystals, who could not work with numbers
not divisible by three.
He claimed that in the moments of heightened creativity
he was radiating a blue light.

6
In 1968 Life magazine published a cover photo of an
astronaut on the Moon. Gary Burnstein (Ph.D. in Psychology, a passionate researcher of Nikola Tesla and Wilhelm
Reich) draws my attention to the blue halo around the
astronaut in the atmosphereless moonscape.
The experts convinced themselves that this blue halo
was caused by some fault in the negative.

7
As far back as 1934, Reich explained to Erik Erikson that
all living creatures radiate a blue light. Erikson did not
believe him. Reich invited Erikson-it was in Denmark,
during the summer vacation-to observe with him
couples making love on the beach, in darkness. He asserted that the blue radiation, which becomes more intense during the sexual act, can be observed by the
naked eye. From then on, Erikson considered Reich mad.
Many others considered Reich mad at the time of his
death in Lewisburg prison, Pennsylvania, in 1956.

8
In the early fifties Reich was trying to draw public attention to poisonous masses of static air, hovering over cities
like black clouds. A few years after his death, people
started talking about the struggle against the pollution of
the atmosphere and about black masses of static air.
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It is quite superfluous to speak about freedom in America
in old European terms of freedom as democracy.

Perhaps we are dealing with machinery that has a built-in
acceleration mechanism, while someone forgot to install
a brake?

In regard to the freedom of information, "free circulation of
men and ideas," legal security of the individual, America
is a few shades freer than the most progressive European
democracies. This freedom, however, represents just a
tiny part of American freedom, if we speak of Freedom
understood as the radiation and chain reaction of Human
Energy.
The old Europe expends enormous energies defending
itself from the "abuses of freedom": public disorder,
"chaos," "bad taste," "immorality," "nonsense," "stupidity."
The public and private life of the people in the European
democracies is cut by series of meshes of invisible censorships.
In order to comprehend the energy of American creativity
one cannot just stand and stare dumbfounded at the
Brooklyn Bridge, as did Mayakovsky, who wrote an ode to
the Brooklyn Bridge as a marvel of modern technology.
America is the Brooklyn Bridge plus the London Bridge
transferred and installed in the Arizona desert.

10
The freedom of physical and spiritual risk should be
measured on the frontiers where that risk turns into failure,
self-destruction, madness, nonsense, game. These are
the Open Frontiers of America.

11

That remains to be seen.

13
During the past two hundred years greedy pioneer
America brought over from black Africa a multimillion
Gulag of unpaid slaves. Now, at the center of the beginning of America's new identity, there is a living reservoir
of beautiful and dangerous black energy which will bring
new beginnings. Or new ends.
Like so many other centers, radiating sti ll invisible blue
rays.

Discovery of Man on the Moon
1
It was the night between August 20 and 21 , 1969, on the
open Atlantic.
Bojana and I were on our way back from America to
Europe, on the Italian ocean liner Rafaele.
Two days earlier, apart from the sea, there was nothing
around us. I was waiting for the Azores to appear, on
account of Mayakovsky.

If the elegance and functionality of the Hoover Dam are
America's response to the perfection of Mona Lisa's
smile, let us talk then about the end of Western
Civilization.

The Azores duly appeared and state ly sailed past us, on
their way to America.

The monstrous beauty and uselessness of San Simeon
represent the moment in which the stupidity of shameless
richness explodes into a new formula, according to which
it is allowed to turn everything upside down in order to
start from scratch.

It seemed as if we were sailing through the lines of the
Great Vladimir. He did not sail out of this life like a tame
lazy island ; he blew out his brain with a revolver bullet. '
But that's another story.

The secret of the fascinating and "inhuman" qualities of
Manhattan, which are stubbornly conserved and regenerated, consists in the chaos which stubbornly refuses to
be ordered and thereby keeps open all roads toward the
permanent creation of new beginnings.
The freedom of risk is paid in blood and enjoyment of life,
which is nothing but a healthy nonsense.

"And life will pass by, like the Azores did."

That evening in the ship's cinema we saw Toshiro Mifune
and Lee Marvin in Boorman's Hell in the Pacific . It was
strange, it was a good prelude to what was going to
happen to us that night.
~n the n:iddle of the ocean-a ship, a cinema in the sh ip,
m the cmema-an ocean, but not this ocean, the other
ocean, at the Antipodes.

Nobody slept that night.
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All the ship's drawing rooms were full of people, in
semidarkness and silence. Everybody was watching
Armstrong and Aldrin, the first steps of the men on the
Moon.
It all came in poetically smudged video-images, like
Norman Maclaren's Pas de deux. Our compatriots, the
earthlings, did not walk, it was more like hopping and
floating in the no-atmosphere of the Moon, it was more
like that time when we were fish than when we ventured
on our first steps, being one year old.
It was very solemn, that TV watching, and it went on for
hours. This was not watching but being present, accompanied by the awareness that at the same moment hundreds of millions of other men, maybe even a billion of
them, were doing the same thing.
In that act of mass baptism, we were becoming, all together, compatriots-earthlings, soaked in highly primitive
emotion, the feeling that we, the men of Earth, have set
out on a new journey. Sitting by a TV set on that night
meant the approval of that risk, acceptance of all new
worries and perils, readiness to be surprised: we are off,
come what may.
State and national frontiers were ajar, slackened. All together, we were following the Earth Team, not the American Team. (The term "Race with Russians" retains a
sense only in the dumb linear logic of people still believing that the earth is flat, still seeing the world from "here"
to "there." What "race" is possible, once you start in all
directions?)
Later, the coming out of the astronauts from the spacecraft and walking-floating in Space showed even more
obviously-with that so prominent umbilical cord-that
we were faced with a dramatization of the act of birth, that
the whole fantastic-science-fiction theater performance
was, in fact, a celebration of human birth.
In that way the discovery of man was performed on the
Moon.

2
The ship was sailing silently over the ocean, there were
people in the drawing rooms in the ship, TV sets in the
drawing rooms, and the Moon on TV screens. I was coming into these drawing rooms full of silent people, and I
was going out to watch the Moon from the deck.
Jules Verne."
We have descended twenty thousand leagues under the
sea and we have stepped on the moon. We went to the
center of the Earth and we have entered the human brain.
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3
Far, far away, Jules Verne floated in the dark sky, disguised as the Moon, and very lonely.

Presidentes Municipales
Richard Tichich
There have been many portrait series which display a
consistent expression of the photographer, for example,
the work of Julia Margaret Cameron, Richard Avedon,
Karsh, and Judy Dater. In this type of series the subjects
play a secondary role to the creative style and presentation of the photographer.
The history of photography also reveals an endless
rendering of the human subject. Once techniques were
sufficiently sophisticated, nine out of ten daguerreotypes
featured a person. Sometime these photographs were
only faint shadows with no special "artistic" treatment,
but their surfaces captured the spirit of the subject. For
the most part, our ancestors have become nameless
faces photographed by anonymous photographers. But
when we consider the portrait in a series, the hand of the
artist is eventually revealed. As individual images, E. J.
Bellocq's photographs of the ladies of New Orleans allow
us to enter gently into the elegant houses and from a safe
distance become detached voyeurs. We are free to look
as long as we wish, we can freely take whatever we want,
but we can never ask any questions. The photographs are
silent and all the information must come out of our own
experience, our own prejudices. As with a Rorschach
test, we eventually see only ourselves reflected in the
surface of the photograph. With an extended series such
as Bellocq's we can begin to know as much about the
artist as we do about his subjects.
It was my intention to conceptually construct the most
neutral position possible when photographing the Presidentes. The idea of doing a portrait series of the mayors
of Mexican cities came to me suddenly. There was no
reflection on historical precedent or the feasibility of the
project. Through the concerned efforts of Tita Valencia,
Cultural Coordinator of the University of Mexico in San
Antonio, Texas, I was awarded a grant to travel and to
photograph in Mexico. I made no official application or
proposal. Up until the last minute it was uncertain
whether the money would actually be made available.
Ms. Valencia's motivation was very idealistic: the artist,
through his or her art, can function as a cultural ambassador if given the freedom to interact with another culture.
I was free to photograph anything I wished. Her original
concept was to have a photographer work with children
because it was the closing of the International Year of the
Child. I didn't like that idea. I'm not sure why, but I was
certain that to work comfortably in a strange country and
to produce a substantial series of photographs in a short
time, my concept would have to be as narrow as possible. It would have to be a project that defined its own
boundaries. I was totally unfamiliar with the political
structure of the country and curious about the people
who ran the cities of Mexico. In the face of limited knowledge of the history of Mexico a certain myth seemed to
Richard Tichich is Director of The Galveston Arts Center
on the Strand, Galveston, Texas, and an independent
documentary photographer.

surround the political leaders. When I first began telling
people about the scope of the project, they all seemed
interested in seeing the final outcome. Tita Valencia was
both apprehensive and pessimistic about the idea. Given
that I didn't speak Spanish and had no experience with
the culture. she felt that it was an impossible project.
In retrospect I had two previous experiences that seem
to have led me to this idea. The first is that, living in
Galveston, Texas, with a population of 70,000, I had
known the last three mayors of the city. Not one was a
professional politician. The office is part-time and nonpaying. Most cities seem to try to elect someone from the
community who has exhibited a willingness to work unselfishly for the good of the community and who will approach problems more with common sense than with exceptional learning. I am not afraid to work with anyone
who approaches problem solving with these credentials.
I suspected that the elected officials of the Mexican cities
would have the same qualities as any other leaders.
The second experience is my knowledge of the career
of Paul Gittings, the Houston, Texas, photographer. Years
ago I happened to read his autobiography, and in it he
detailed his business and artistic philosophy. In particular, to establish his portrait business Gittings would arrange to photograph the political leaders of a city such as
Houston, then exhibit the work in the most traveled of
galleries, the local airport. The politicians loved the idea,
and there was usually ample time for the traveler to view
the work. Gittings's aesthetic approach gives the portraits a uniform look and says much more about the talents of the photographer than about the individuals being
photographed. With this merchandising concept, other
members of the community were willing to pay to join the
elite club and be photographed according to the same
aesthetic.
When I worked with the Mexican politicians, my approach was to neutralize as much as possible my own
aesthetic input. In my case there was no need to sell the
portraits or rely on merchandising the aesthetic treatment. My goal was merely to present the individual in his
or her own surroundings. I did not want to idealize the
major politicians with dramatic lighting and artificial settings, then use a totally different aesthetic when dealing
with a small farming community. I wanted to standardize
each sitting to allow for all the photographs to be compared with one another on an equal basis. When possible, I wanted to photograph the individual in his or her
normal place of power-usually sitting at a desk. Unless
the spirit of Benito Juarez objected, I utilized the same
approach for each photograph. I felt free to violate the two
primary rules of executive portraiture: first, never to shoot
a businessman at his desk, and second , never to center
the individual in the frame. With this obvious method of
standardization I felt that the surrounding environment
would provide as much information as would the individuals. I went to Mexico to fill in the blanks. On entering
an office, I could readily see that the Presidente at his
desk and what immediately surrounded it did all the
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work. My role was that of a technician working to complete the one concept rather than make each photograph
a single creative experience.
If anything, the major pictorial thrust of the series came
through the selection of the cities to be photographed.
Logistically, my approach was to select the largest cities
in Mexico and to address a cover letter to the Presidente
asking permission to take his portrait. Half of the Presidentes responded, and the typical reply was that they
would be more than willing to participate and merely to
contact them to arrange the sitting when I arrived. With
the series in mind I felt it was extremely important to
photograph the Presidente of Mexico City. The series
would be incomplete if I obtained a small farming community without a photograph of the mayor of the largest
city in the country to provide the necessary contrast.
When crossing the border I still had not heard from
Mexico City. I had 10 weeks to complete the shooting.
Knowing that I wanted to photograph the largest cities in
the country, I designed an itinerary by filling in the lines
between these cities.
The first town I visited was Sabines Hildago, and any
apprehensions I had about the feasibility of the project
were immediately dispelled. The Presidente owned an
auto parts store, and the sheriff was a mechanic who
spoke English and had worked in Detroit. In the photograph, the Presidente is actually on the phone with the
mayor of Cienega De Flores arranging the second portrait for that day. On my first day in Mexico I finished two
portraits and knew that the series would be possible. The
Mexican politicians seemed as interested in participating in the project as the people in the States in viewing
the series. The response "Si como no" became a familiar
one to my request. Throughout the trip it didn't seem as if I
were traveling a lot. The next city was only about 5 miles
away, and I had the option to stop whenever I wished; in
every city there was a lec.der.
The title "mayor" does not conveniently translate into
Spanish. My concept of the mayor of a city is the primary
elected official. In the larger towns this title is Presidente
Municipal; in the smaller, the elected official is the
Agente Municipal, Sheriff, or Comisario. It is sometimes
difficult to locate an inexpensive hotel, but to find the
mayor of the city the search can start with asking the first
person you meet. Everyone knows the Presidente and
where his office is. There were times when, after I asked a
policeman the location of the mayor's office, he would
provide a police escort. In a smaller town an assistant
rode off on a bicycle and brought the mayor back from
lunch. I welcomed their cooperation, and they were honored to be included in the series.
The mayor of Mexico City presented the biggest challenge. As it turned out, arranging the portrait session was
as easy as walking into his office and, through a series of
intermediaries, merely asking for permission. I always
carried a letter of introduction from Tita Valencia describing the scope of the project. Unless someone spoke English the mayors were unable to ask very detailed questions. In Mexico City the shooting sesion lasted not more
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than 5 minutes. I was given an appointed time and asked
to return. In the Presidente's office I arranged the camera
and adjusted the Iights. The presidente came into the
room, greeted everyone, sat down and smiled as if he
were addressing a classroom, and the photograph was
taken. When work was completed, he immediately left.
This brief encounter was a contrast to the session with the
Presidente of Ciudad Victoria. Here the Presidente arranged a 2-hour lunch and a personal tour of the city.
Most of the Presidentes did not seem to realize that my
sole mission in Mexico was to take their portrait. They
were all proud of their cities and were quick to point out
the more traditional photographic opportunities.
There certainly is a difference in scope between community problems in Mexico City and in the small farming
community I later used. The officials of one large city
were skeptical of the feasibility of arranging the portraits.
The mayor's executive secretary seemed unwilling to disrupt the mayor's schedule and said that the smaller cities
would certainly cooperate because their Presidentes had
nothing to do, but it would not be possible to arrange
portrait sessions with the officials of the larger cities. His
advice came quite late in the project, and, in fact, I had
not been turned down by any city. Once I mentioned that I
had already completed the Presidente of Mexico City, he
seemed to adjust his ideas, and within 5 minutes I was
lighting the mayor's office.
Each photograph has its own narrative, each Presidente ruled with his or her own sense of command. None
seemed out of place. Their executive presence made my
meetings with them comfortable experiences. I was surprised at their willingness to allocate time for a project
they knew little about. To me they seemed to exhibit a
natural sensitivity to working with someone who has
an idea.
Mexican culture is revealed in many ways. Experiencing the Indian ruins, open markets, and cathedrals builds
a fascinating mystique. The mixture of European and Indian cultures paints the country as brightly as the murals
which cover the Presidentes' offices. The opportunity to
gain access to those offices allowed me and, I hope, the
viewer of the series to get a new view of the country.
I am now working on the second half of the portrait
series and plan to photograph the mayors of Texas. The
combined effort will demonstrate the visual differences
between the cultures. I am interested in exploring the
differences between the large and small towns in Texas
as well as drawing cultural comparisons between the
two countries.
The photographs of the Presidentes can tell their own
stories, and within the series each can contast itself with
the others. I don't believe I should add anything to the
photographs now. It's too late to add silver back to the
image or to ask the Presidente to adjust his position. I
think it best to remove this narrative from the photographs
and allow the viewer to look inside the image for all
the information. This text is merely a footnote to the
photographs.
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Figure 1
Cesar Santos Santos
Presidente Municipal
Monterrey, N.L.
Population: 2,000,000
Occupation: Lawyer

Figure 2
Jose Castillo Pombo
Presidente Municipal
Cuernavaca, Moralez
Population: 256,000
Occupation: Lawyer
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Figure 3
Jesus Martinez Alverez
Presidente Municipal
Oaxaca de Juarez, Oax
Population: 100,000
Occupation: Lawyer

Figure 4
Magdalena Vasquez
de Huicochea
Presidenta Municipal
Chilpancingo, Gro.
Population: 100,000
Occupation: Elementary
school teacher
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Figure 5
Homero Ibarra Montemayor
Presidente Municipal
Sabinas Hidalgo, N.L.
Population: 32,000
Occupation: Owns an auto
parts store

Figure 6
Jose Garcia Cruz
Presidente Municipal
Dolores Hidalgo, Gro.
Population: 25,000
Occupation:
Juiz Del Jigiatio Civil
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Figure 7
Ecliserio Rosas Martinez
Presidente Municipal
Villa De Tehuitzingo,
Puebla
Population: 20,000
Occupation: Farmer

Figure 8
Humberto Arendono Herrea
Presidente Municipal
Nochixtpan, Oaxaca
Population: 10,000
Occupation: Pharmacist
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Figure 9
Panfi lo Sanchez Moralez
Presidente Municipal
Chila De Las Flores, Puebl.a
Population: 9,000
Occupation: Shoe salesman

Figure 10
Salomon Arroya Vasquez
Comisario
Xuchiapa, Puebla
Population: 2,800
Occupation: Farmer
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Figure 11
Mariano Chavez Garcia
Sheriff
Plan De Los Amates, Gro.
Population: 1,300
Occupation: Brick mason

Figure 12
Rogelio Aleman Garcia
Comisario
Lomas Chapultepec, Gro.
Population: 300
Occupation: Farmer

Media Events: The Sense of Occasion 1
Elihu Katz
Critics of broadcasting argue that it has robbed society
of the sense of occasion. People used to dress up to g?
out, the crit ics say, and now they stay in to watch television only half-dressed and half-awake. The arts that
brought people together-whether popular or
highbrow-were associated with time and place and
community, marking the passing of seasons, the boundaries between sacred and secular, and the structure of
society. Now television provides culture nonsto~, with
nothing more than station breaks and co~~erc1als to
frame an experience in time, and only the l1v1ng room and
the family to frame it spatially and socially. The dim
awareness that everybody else is viewing the same programs surely does something to hold society together,
but the sense of occasion-€specially that of communal
occasion-has been dulled. This is not a judgment on the
quality of television programs, it must be emphasized,
but on their ubiquity.
.
Like all generalizations about the atomi.zing, ~eculanz
ing , and tranquilizing effects of broad.cast1~g, th1~ one too
deserves more careful formulation. It 1s unlikely, f1rst of all,
that the media alone are to blame for the decline of the
folk arts; all the pressures of modernization have had a
share. 2 Moreover, the professional performing arts seem
to be flourishing ; some people do go out.3 And as for
occasions, the media are often at their best on holidays,
such as Independence Day or Christmas, when high
standards of performance are combined with a sense of
festivity and a nostalgia for tradition. 4
There is another sense, too, in which the media break
the sun-never-sets pattern which they themselves have
created. This history of broadcasting is punctuated with a
series of programs which are so memorable that they
captivated the attention of a nation or of the world. People
dressed up to see them , and invited their friends to join
them in listening or viewing . The tenth anniversary of the
moon landing brings this genre of broadcasting to mind.
Generically, the broadcasts are known as media
events-though that is an ambiguous and overworked
term. 1 call them the "high holidays" of the media. Each of
them , for a brief moment, restored the sense of occasion
to a society or to the world , and some of them may have
had lasti ng effects.
.................
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1 should like to recall these events, and to discuss them
in this paper. They include the moon landings; the visit of
Sadat to Jerusalem ; the weekend of mourning following
the assassination of Kennedy; the coronation of Elizabeth
II ; the presidential debates of 1960 and 1976; an~ certain
sport ing events. 5 Each nation will have its own l1st, although the number of such events is remark~bly small.
Occasionally, we get a glimpse of the potent1al of such an
event which is denied us: the visit of Pope John Paul II to
Poland , for example, or the Moscow Olympics.

Media Events Defined
There are a number of defining characterist ics that are
associated with these events. First of all, they are broadcast live . They are before our eyes as they are happening ,
and thus the unique attribute of broadcasting, as distinct
from those of the other media, is brought into fu ll play. The
cameras and the microphones are on the spot and transport us simultaneously to where the event is taking place.
Second, we are talking about events wh ich are typically not initiated by the med ia. Somebody else has organized them-the Space Agency, or a political lea~er,
or the Olympic committee . To be sure, they are organ 1zed
with media coverage in mind , but unlike Boorstin's
pseudo-event,6 it is likely that these events would take
place even if the cameras were not there. There may be
certain exceptions to th is: the Eurovision contest, for
example, in which all Europe joins in the judging of popular songs. Such events might not happen at al l if the
media do not organize them , but they are borderline
cases. The paradigmatic media event is one organ ized
outside the media but which may well be transformed in
the process of transmiss ion.
The element of high drama or high ritual is essential:
the process must be emotion-laden or symbol-laden , and
the outcome be rife with consequence. Most fireside
chats, like most parades or football games or political
conventions, do not qualify in th is sense. Although they
may be broadcast live and may be organized by major
political or soCial agenc ies, they lack the electrifying
element which attracts a mass audience to something
especially moving. Indeed , the essential characterist ic of
media events may be the communal insistence that one
abandon one's other roles and commitments in favor of
viewing TV. "Stop everything and join us in the making of
history" is the compelling theme of these events. Viewing
is obligatory; nothing is more important.
That means, of course, that the events must be preplanned . They are ne ither spontaneous nor unexpected .
Part of the drama, of course , may be that the outcome is
unknown , but the event itself is expected and well advertised . Typically, the media do the advertising, just as the
1984 Olympics in Los Angeles (and , until the boycott, the
Moscow Olympics of 1980) are already be ing advertised .
Sadat came to Jerusalem on very short notice, but there

Media Events: The Sense of Occasion

was enough time to electrify the world with the news of
his coming. His decision to come was news; his arrival
was a media event. Kennedy's assassination was news;
his funeral was a media event.
These events are framed in time and space. They do
not, for example, include the Vietnam War, whatever one
thinks of the role of the media in bringing its horror into
the living rooms of the world. They do not include the
films of the Khomeini revolution. 7 They do not include the
broadcasting of Parliament, except on those very rare
occasions when the fate of the nation is being debated.
The Watergate Hearings, in which a president was faced
with impeachment proceedings, or the un-American Activities Committee of Senator Joseph McCarthy, or the
trial of Adolph Eichman may qualify. The event must be
focused enough to sustain the- attention of the
aud ience-which can sometimes be held for days in a
row-and circumscribed enough to permit a small
number of television cameras to encompass it.
Finally, one must note the centrality of personality. Each
event has a hero-an individual, two individuals, or a
team . The Salt II talks, even if they had been offered to
television , would have been accepted very reluctantly, for
they dealt in abstractions rather than personalities. This
is not to deny television's ability to dramatize and personalize even abstract issues, when called upon to do so.
These, then , appear to be the necessary conditions: (1)
live transmission, (2) of a preplanned event, (3) framed in
time and space, (4) featuring a heroic personality or
group, (5) having high dramatic or ritual significance,
and (6) the force of a social norm which makes viewing
mandatory. These conditions may not be sufficient to ensure the success of the event in sustaining the attention of
a mass audience or in accomplishing its political or ritual
purpose. But they are basic ingredients.

High Holidays
Events, of course, are central to individuals, families, and
communities: birthdays, anniversaries, holidays. They
are central, too, to the profession of journalism. Indeed,
the daily newspaper or the evening newscast is a collation of essentially discrete events or happenings, and it is
by no means certain-as we shall note below-that this
is the best way to report what is going on in the world. It is
like waiting for a hurricane to report the weather, or waiting for Mother's Day to decide how one feels about
mother.
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Western journalism differs from Eastern journalism in
its emphasis on negative events, on things that go wrong.
If the opening of a factory is news in Eastern Europe, it is
the closing of a factory that is news in the West. Freeworld journalism is about conflict: nation against nation,
man against man, man against nature. A news event,
typically, is the story of some conflict. The conflict may be
institutionalized, as in parliaments or sports, or it may be
spontaneous, as in a terrorist attack or an earthquake.
Such stories, more than any other, define the news.
Media events, however, appear to differ. Rather than
reporting conflict, they appear to celebrate the resolution
or overcoming of conflict, or if they deal with conflict, it is
conflict of the most institutionalized sort. Consider, for
example, the moon landings or Sadat's visit to Jerusalem,
or-even if we only had a glimpse of the real thing-the
visit of John Paul II to Poland. All these celebrate the
attempt to overcome conflict. Similarly, the mourning
after Kennedy's death was a period of reuniting of the
nation and reduction of tension. Even the Olympics, the
presidential. debates, or events such as the Eurovision
song contest are in the nature of a gathering together of
rivals to watch a ritual conflict, rather than a story of bitter
hostility.
Thus, media events appear to differ from news events
in that they are more concerned with the bringing together of rivals, that is, with the process of reconciliation.
Moreover, if one analyzes the rhetoric of media events
one will find, I believe, a reverence which is wholly atypical of everyday journalism. In his daily rounds, the
reporter, typically, is cynical: he distances himself from
the event. The presenter of a media event, however, often
takes a priestly role, acting as a master of ceremonies. He
whispers as Mr. Sadat takes his pi'ace on the rostrum of
the Knesset, or pronounces respectfully "the Egyptian national anthem" as the music begins. And then he is silent.
There is no chatter or commentary while the ceremony is
taking place. The narrator or commentator considers
himself-and is often considered by participants-a
member of the wedding, a celebrant.
Moreover, there are often no commercials. Even
Holocaust was screened with commercials. But not during the speeches of Sadat and Begin in Jerusalem, and
not for the whole of the weekend of mourning after John
Kennedy's assassination.
It is in this sense, too, that it is useful to think of these
media events as "high holidays." They have a sacred air,
a reverential character which differs both from the everyday world of public affairs and from the minor holidays of
everyday conflict or everyday merriment. It is as if they
are trying to tell us something about the nobility of man
and the unity of society.
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Typology of Media Events
It is clear, of course, that there are different kinds of
events grouped together here, and it is worth trying to
sort them out. Three distinct forms seem discernible.
The most noble type is what might be called the heroic
mission. It includes the astronauts, Sadat, John Paul II,
perhaps Nixon's visit to China. It is the story of a hero
defying natural law-entering the enemy's camp unarmed, flying beyond the atmosphere of the earth-Dn a
mission of exploration or reconciliation in the name of
humanity. Of course, history is full of such exploits. What
is new is our ability to follow the process of these heroic
deeds, step by step, before anyone can know what the
outcome will be.
A second type of media event is the occasion of state.
But it is only under particular circumstances that such
occasions will be treated as media events. When the
occasion marks the beginning or end of an era, such as
the funeral of Churchill, or when it opens a well of uncertainty, as in the funeral of Kennedy and the anxiety over
the succession, the nation or the world will participate,
transfixed, in the ceremony. Similarly, when the IsraelEgypt peace treaty was signed at the White House, there
was a sense of a new beginning, and indeed many observers likened it to a wedding. Michael Arlen has
likened all such events to parades, even including such
secular and minor events as the Hollywood Academy
Awards.
The third type of event is the more familiar contest, but
only when the confrontation has important symbolic
meaning. Thus, the Kennedy-Nixon or Ford-Carter debates, or the World Cup, or the Eurovision song contest
are events of this sort. Traditional rivalries are enacted
before audiences of hundreds of millions, but these rivalries are subject to shared and enforceable rules, and the
sense of what there is in common typically outweighs the
partisanship.

Dramatic Elements
Classifying media events in this way reveals the dramatic
elements which inhere in them. There appear to be three
such elements. First of all, there is the question of "programmedness": how much do we know in advance about
the choreography of the event. The moon landing, in this
sense, was highly programmed; the timetable of the
Sadat visit was much less clear.
But even where we know exactly what is supposed to
happen, there is a question of whether things will work
out as planned. Thus the risk that the program might
abort is a second element of drama: Will they make it to
the moon? Will moonmen attack them? Will they infect
the earth's atmosphere? Will they return safely? And similarly: Is Sadat really on the plane or is it a Trojan horse?

Will he leave Israel alive? Will there be a coup in Egypt
before his return?
Even where we know the program, and the chances of
aborting are small, there is a mystery in the actions of
great men, even at their funerals, which enthrall us. Will
somebody arise to attack the Queen on her coronation?
Wi II the Pope be stricken by a heart attack? Is the body
still in the coffin?8

The Live Documentary: Dilemmas of
Telling the Story
Media events are live, including state funerals, and face
the problem of how to tell a story while it is happening.
The director must choose among various pictures, the
narrator must decide what actions to remark upon, the
commentators and instant-analysts must provide a context. The media must face up to a paradox which might be
called "the Iive documentary."
Several major problems face the producers of such
programs, and each of them is implicit in what has been
said in these pages so far.
First of all, there is the problem of the choice of the
event itself. Journalism, as was noted, deals in events but
it is occupationally blind to the fact that historians do not.
History, in recent times, has abandoned events as inadequate explanations. Thus, the impulse of the journalist is to see history in Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, while
the impulse of the historian is to look to the plight of the
Egyptian economy or to the hopelessness of another war
with Israel, and so on. Historians would not assign the
onset of World War I to the assassination of Archduke
Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Sophisticated journalists, surely,
are aware of this dilemma, and it must influence them,
aware or not, in the narration of the media event. Is it
merely ritual or really critical? Of course, ritual and the
emotional response of an expectant world 1s more than
enough justification for a media event. But how often
should one use the word "historic?"
A second problem of the producer of media events is to
cope with the tension between the journalist and priestly
roles. The occasion, ostensibly, requires priestliness;
there is something of an unwritten pact between the organizers of the event and media producers. The media
are there to "celebrate" the event. But what if something
goes wrong? Or, to take a more complicated example,
what if there is something dissonant going on offstage
which a journalist might be expected to cover?
An example of this dilemma could be seen in the
coverage of the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Not far from the White House, there was a
meeting of people protesting the signing of the treaty.
The loudspeakers from the rally could be heard clearly as
background against the voic€s--of the participants and
the . broadc~sters. The journalist role obviously called for
an 1nterrupt1on of the ceremony and the dispatching of a
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camera to the demonstration; the priestly role, however,
implied a commitment to the integrity of the cerem~ny.
The Washington Post suggests that two of the Amencan
networks indeed interrupted the ceremony to cover the
demonstration while one of them did not. This difficult
choice, incidentally, confronted the Western sportscasters present at the Moscow Olympics as well: should they
keep their cameras fixed on the scheduled events, or
report unprogrammed observations, even political ones,
as well? It is obvious, from this discussion, why totalitarian countries are so wary of media events except for
those over which they have complete control. It is no
coincidence that, even if John Paul II was shown live in
Poland, we saw so little of the crowds who cheered him.
One can also be used to influence the outcome of the
event: this, of course, is the aim of the participants. NASA
could justify the cost of its space program by showing
man's first step on the moon live; Sadat wanted to
mobilize American public opinion. Sometimes it is more
cunning than that, as when journalists thought they were
misbriefed on the progress of President Carter's visit to
Jerusalem in order to bring pressure on Israel, or at least,
to enhance the drama of Carter's ultimate success.
Being used, of course, is a two-way street. The media
have much to gain from the magic of their own presentation of far-away events. Legitimacy, power, glory devolve
to the media in the performance of their role, and
sometimes-not always-this credit outweighs the income foregone from the commercial sponsorship of the
programs that have been canceled. 9 All the world is there
to see the close association of the stars of the fourth
estate with heroics and with majesty.
But the most difficult problem of all is what story to tell:
how can one tell a story without knowing how it is going to
progress and how it is going to end? Part of the anxiety
over this problem is reflected in the search for criteria of
what is to be judged as success and what to consider
failure: the search for such criteria is evident in the days
prior to the Sadat visit or in the days before any important
presidential primary. But more interesting is the fact that
one cannot tell a story without a "hypothesis" or a "model"
to guide the story in the telling. The narrators need not
necessarily have an explicit model in mind, but there is
good reason to believe that they-and their listeners a~d
viewers-must have recourse to such models. Academic
analysis of journalistic coverage of the death of John
XXIII, for example, reveals the latent conflict between the
Pope and the angel of death, in one version, and between
the doctors and death in another. 10 If our typology of the
subgenres of media events is correct, it is reasonable to
suppose that the narrator draws on the heroic mission,
the state occasion (or parade), and the contest in formulating his script and in placing his cameras. But beyond journalism, there are deeper sources for the telling
of such stories. There is a fountain of folktales and sacred
texts which narrators share with their audiences. The
story of Mission: Impossible, which underlies the report-
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ing of the moon landing of the astronauts and the meeting
of Sadat and Begin, exists not only in the iconography of
television, and not only in science fiction, but in mythology and perhaps in scripture. Such puzzles are attracting
increasing attention in the scholarly community.

Effects of the Media
The problems just recounted reflect the effect of media
events on the media and anticipate the kinds of effects
which the media may have on the events themselves and
on the vast audiences which attend them. Some research
has been done on certain media events, and more
research-including our own-is now in progress. For the
moment, most of what there is to say is speculative.
As for the events themselves, it is evident, first of all,
that they are shaped in part by the media. In totalitarian
societies, perhaps, it may be possible to keep the camera focused squarely on the dias, without zooming in, or
searching for reaction shots, or showing the behavior of
the audience. The technology of the media is such, however, that this is probably impossible to control absolutely, and this is so, a fortiori, in free societies .. ~edia
treatment of the event begins long before the off1c1al starting time, and while focusing attent.ion and excite~ent on
what is about to happen, also prov1des a context 1n terms
of which the event will be presented and explained. The
media edit the event even as it is being transmitted, and
however reverent, show dimensions of the event which
were unanticipated by the organizers and concealed
from persons present. As the Langs establ.ished in their
early study of MacArthur's return to the Un1ted States, t~e
television viewer saw a story which built slowly to the
climax of an emotional welcome at City Hall, while the
onlooker at the street corner saw only a motorcade flashing by. 11 Similarly, the millions of Americans watching
Sadat's arrival in Jerusalem had seen and read days of
preparatory messages, and just before the touchdown
heard a commentator explain parallels in the careers of
the two men and speculate about their "chemistry." One
could see Sadat, from closeup, reacting to the playing of
the Egyptian national anthem on Israeli ~oil, and ~e instructed in the symbolism of an El AI sta1rway be1ng.
locked to the door of an airplane of the Arab Republic of
Egypt.
It is equally well known that the presence of cameras
makes a difference. This is as evident in the decorum of
parliaments or of national political conventions as it was
in the orchestration of angry enthusiasm from proKhomeini demonstrators in the streets of Tehran.
The 1ive broadcast of an event shapes the event in the
making and in the telling, and arouses emotion. This
much is certain. But what difference does that make?
First of all, as has been argued from the outset, it
creates a sense of occasion. People sense not only themselves but each other, and the unity of society, nation,
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world. They identify with heroes, and celebrate them and
their achievements.
Thus, the media event provides a focus for the expression of emotion. It provided a focus for grief, as Schramm
shows in his study of the weekend of mourning after Kennedy's assassination. It provided a focus for euphoria, as
in the Sadat-Begin talks; or for the expression of wonder,
as in the moon landing; or of loyalty, as in a contest. The
emotionality of the media event is probably its central
effect.
But there are also cognitive effects. Sadat's statements
changed Israel's image of Egypt's intentions. While they
did not succeed in changing attitudes toward the ·idea of
a Palestinian state, there was a dramatic shift in the perception of Egypt. Sadat's image in the United States improved even more dramatically than in lsrael. 12
The channeling of aroused emotions and changed
opinions may well have political effects. There is reason
to believe, for example, that the mobilization of public
support liberated Sadat and Begin-at least for a timefrom the constraints of their own bureaucracies and political parties; they were freer men. They may even have
sensed that their constituencies had suddenly grown now
that they were actors on the stage of the world.
Such speculation suggests that the broadcasting of
events may make the events themselves not only different
but more important. Perhaps historians will take more
notice of the realm of the symbolic when the symbolic
and the real become so interlaced. But there are dangers
as well. The media transmit failure as well as success.
They note error immediately, as when Gerald Ford was
pinned to his mistaken statement about relations among
countries in the Eastern bloc. They may exacerbate conflict, if the priestly role is abandoned to commentary and
instant analysis. Abba Eban suggests that the danger of
"open diplomacy" is that each side sees only what it is
losing and may despair of the bargain before it is made. 14
There is the danger that public opinion may become so
inflamed that leadership may lose control, as was feared,
apparently, when Willy Brandt visited East Berlin and
when John Paul II visited Poland.
There is the danger that the media--<;ooperating with
the principal actors-may so dramatize an event as to
increase its likelihood of failure. Consider Carter's much
publicized retirement to Camp David to discover remedies for the American economy where the promise implicit therein is that he will succeed in doing so. Consider
the pressure on the Camp David negotiations on the
Middle East, however secret, with the media waiting in
the wings for the negotiators to emerge.

But most of all consider the danger of blurring political
and ceremonial processes. Walter Benjamin (1978) wrote
that communism is the making of aesthetics into politics
while fascism is the making of politics into aesthetics.
With all the positive functions of media events, examples
of media being impressed into the service of aesthetizing
politics are still fresh in our minds. Common sense is
sometimes more important than even the sense of occasion.

Notes
1 This paper grows out of a project generously supported by the John
and Mary R. Markle Foundation . It was read at the Second World
Encounter on Communication , in Acapulco, July 1979. I wish to thank
Pierre Motyl and Daniel Dayan, my two closest associates on the
" Media Events " project, for contributing to the ideas that went into the
paper.
2 This point is discussed , and relevant writing reviewed , in Thelma
McCormack (1969) .
3 Audiences for the arts are d iscussed in Baumol and Bowen (1966)
and in Dimaggio and Useem (1978).
4 The theme of nostalgia·is treated by Fred Davis (1979) . Also see Faris
(1963) .
5 Especial ly K. Lang and G. Lang (1968); Wilbur Schramm (1965) ;
James Halloran et al. (1970) ; Michael Real (1977) ; Kraus (1962) ;
Briggs (1979) . See also Michael Arlen (1979).
6 This is the sense of Daniel Boorstin (1972).
7 A perceptive account of the communications strateg ies assoc iated
with the rise of Khomeini is Tehranian (1979) .
8 This was rumored after Lincoln 's funeral. See Lewis (1929) .
9 The internal controversy over whether to cancel scheduled (and
commerc ial) programs in favor of a critical congress ional hearing is
discussed by Friendly (1967).
10 This is the account of Jules Gritti (1966) .
11 See the early paper, "The Unique Perspective of Television, " expanded by Kurt and Gladys Lang (1968) .
12 Findings from the Continuing Survey of the Israel Institute of Applied
Social Research and the Communications Institute of the Hebrew
University.
13 Thus, near the close of Sadat's grand day in Jerusalem and during a
break in the private discussions of Sadat and Begin, Walter Cronkite
asked the two men how they proposed to solve the problem of Palestinian representation in the autonomy talks, and Barbara Walters
asked about the status of Jerusalem. These provocative questionswhich were circumvented in the public events-were posed to show
that reality was fraught with unsolved difficulty. That journalists focus
on conflict, even on such ceremonial situations, was remarked by
Professor Hilde Himmelweit in commenting on an early version of
some of the ideas in this paper.
14 In a public lecture at the Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton . See
Eban (1978).
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Paul Bouissac. Circus and Culture: A Semiotic Approach.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.
Reviewed by Jean Alter
University of Pennsylvania
Is drcus a form of communication? Does it offer a message on top of entertainment? Is it a language? Does it
use one or several semiotic codes which are decoded by
the audience? Is it possible to insert the circus, as a
system of signs, in the larger networ-k of signs which define our culture? Paul Bouissac answers all these questions with a resounding YES, then expands his answer in
an extraordinary collection of essays, which despite
some disparity, manage to add up to an integrated whole.
In fact, they are arranged like individual circus acts in the
circus program: each deals with a different areaacrobats, "comedy horse," jugglers and magicians, lions
and tigers, wild horses, clowns-but all have a common
message, to wit: circus must be approached semiotically.
And just as circus acts form a harmonious and stable
pattern, so the various approaches used by Bouissac
under the umbrella of semiotics complement each other
quite convincingly.
The entire book must then be judged on two levels.
Does it tell us something interesting and/or new about the
circus? And does it expand our appreciation of semiotics
as a tool for the analysis of cultural phenomena which,
like the circus, stress a public performance? There is
little doubt about the first question. Bouissac's es$ays
have been hailed as the first significant breakthrough in
what used to be only a descriptive and historical/
anecdotal account of circuses, and this general admiration is well deserved. Bouissac had the experience of
running a circus himself, as many others had; he has
been trained in linguistics, anthropology, and structuralism, as have many others; but the combination is
indeed unique. The average semiotician, when he leaves
the safe academic fields with which he is familiar, must
deal with secondhand material and, however brilliant his
presentation, always risks being countered on factual
grounds. In Bouissac's case, theory and praxis go together. As a result, no one, after reading his book, will see
circus with the same eyes as before. Of course, if one
liked the "magic" and the "wonder" of the big top, the
enlightenment provided by Bouissac will result in a feeling of loss. But the passing of the world of make-believe
is more than compensated for by an initiation to semiotic
processes underpinning the illusions. An adult can now
return to the circus in a spirit of eager exploration: to
check on Bouissac, and perhaps to add to his findings.
Since circus is a form of communication, Bouissac's
preferred model is linguistic. In any circus act, and in
complete programs, he detects the operation of the

"double articulation," i.e., the use of a finite number of
signs in a way that generates an infinite number of ~ean
ings. In that sense, circus is (or has) a language w1th
multimedia signs of a visual, auditive, and even olfactory
nature. Separately, they have no fixed meaning, but their
various combinations produce specific messages. For
example, the same acrobatic feat performed by an artist
dressed in a "brightly colored leotard" will classify him as
a superman and evoke "anxiety and admiration," ultimately referring to "survival through biological superiority," whereas performed by an artist "dressed as a tramp,"
it will provoke "laughter" and refer to "survival through
chance" (p. 19). Furthermore, like the Russian folktales
studied by Propp, circus acts and programs have a
grammar: a stable succession of stages-from the identification of the performer, through a series of tests, to
public acknowledgment of his triumph-a pattern which
may be (purposely) disturbed but eventually goes back
to its expected progression. Within this pattern, however,
performers (and/or circus owners/managers) present individual speech acts which, says Bouissac, are never the
same except by rare intentionality (p. 23). They address a
message to the audience, and the fact that it is appreciated, and hence understood, "presupposes that the receiver shares with the sender a knowledge of a system of
rules" (p. 14), i.e., a general circus code, made up of
various subcodes corresponding to types of circus signs:
linguistic, behavioral, musical, technical, along with
those involving costumes, lighting, accessories, and so
on.
While this general model raises a theoretical question
(see below), its application to concrete types of acts
yields unquestionably seminal results, though not always
of equal interest or equal faithfulness to the model. Thus
the analysis of acrobatic acts applies mainly to cybernetic concepts leading to a kinematic representation of
transformations. Bouissac follows Ashby on stable equilibrium, instability, and disturbance, and ends with formulas accounting for ways in which an acrobat creates
and corrects/controls a disturbance in his state of equilibrium: a technical notation of a rather obvious slowmotion description of the act. At this point semiotics
intervene to qualify the technical behaviors as signifiers
which (with other surrounding signifiers) relate to
signified aptitudes for survival. Hence, as mentioned
above, the real acrobat refers to biological superiority
and the clown to biological inferiority. All this seems correct, but hardly new: we always knew that we laughed at
clowns because they appeared inferior (and often flat on
the ground) and admired acrobats because they appeared superior (way up there). No need for a semiotic
approach here.

Reviews and Discussion

The essay on the performing horse is more revealing
and controversial. Bouissac says the act contains two
separate communications, each with its own code: one
between the trainer and the horse, the other between the
two performers and the audience. One may ask: does
animal training, based on the principle of a "conditioned
reflex" (p. 56), qualify as communication, and does the
stimulus, with its one-to-one automatic response, qualify
as a sign? Or even as a "signal"? Can one speak of
communication without some semiotic intentionality
and/or consciousness on both sides? If I have conditioned the horse to nod when my hand moves slightly
toward its ear, do I view my gesture as a sign which the
horse understands because we share a semiotic code, or
as a triggering step in a mechanical sequence comparable to turning the key to start a car? A well-trained horse
has no choice but to give the expected response, but
interhuman communication always entails a degree of
uncertainty as to a correct understanding and, a fortiori,
the resulting response. Of course, one may argue that
this uncertainty (this choice) only means that we have not
learned our codes well enough, that, in a perfect society,
all communication would be conditioned. Perhaps. I suspect that the study of communication, and its very notion,
would then disappear. Bouissac's description of the conditioning which goes into the horse act is fascinating, but
really belongs neither with communication nor with cultural semiotics (though perhaps with natural semiotics,
which study relations between, say, volcano smoke and
eruption, or thermometer reading and fever). On the other
hand, if that conditioning were to be assimilated to the
conditioning of an acrobat or a juggler, and the horse
viewed as a prop over which the trainer has control,
Bouissac's 'analysis of the act as communication between
the performer and the audience would still retain all its
startling pertinence: we could still receive the message
that man's superiority over animals can be reversed, especially when the horse appears to be more intelligent
than the trainer; and we could still laugh at the latter
while admiring his skill.
Not all acts however refer to biological differences.
Jugglers and magicians, according to Bouissac, subvert
the Western belief in the manual production of goods,
since prestidigitation evokes a production without any
real work, and juggling represents work without any real
production. This is why, Bouissac says, magicians produce items related to economic activity (weaving, gardening, animal breeding: handkerchiefs, flowers, rabbits)
and jugglers juggle useless objects or objects associated with the leisure class (cigar boxes, bowling
pins, billiard balls). In turn, the "cat act" (lions, tigers) is
compared to a text where the "heroes" are modified by
names, costumes, behavior patterns, and the "villains" by
their species, size, props. The text is narratively segmented by ritual bows of the tamer, and articulated by a
poetic structure, which, in its "realistic" style, works with
metonymy-i.e., danger by contiguity (as when a Iion is
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forced to jump through an ignited hoop)-and reaches
"poetry" by the means of metaphors-i.e., anthropomorphic similes (as when a lioness kisses the tamer). In still
another essay, treatment of animals in zoos and circuses
is differentiated as referring respectively to a mythical
and ritual attitude; by stressing the ritual uniqueness
through repetition, circus is said to restore the continuity
of life. The wild-horses act, through the iconization of
animals, expresses on the contrary various semantic tensions between social and antisocial behavior, freedom
and servitude, order and transgression ... and so on.
The arguments vary, but all point to a deep connection
between the message of the act and the contextual
culture.
The vitality and success of the circus, according to
Bouissac, do not lie in any "passive enjoyment" but in
these culturally determined and shared messages. This
conclusion takes us back to the theoretical question
raised by Bouissac's model. Indeed, most of his demonstrations are quite convincing, but rely almost exclusively
on what I shall call "secondary" circus signs (costumes,
music, gestures, lights, props), which accompany the
"primary" sign (technical behavior). Clowns are an exception to this rule, but then Bouissac himself views the
clowning act as quite exceptional. In most other cases,
the message is conveyed by the secondary signs. When
a dog pushes a baby carriage, he is indeed humanized
and serves to "restore a biological continuity denied by
the contextual culture" (p. 121), perhaps evoking laughter.
But the "primary" interest of the trick lies in the technical
behavior: a type of walk that dogs normally cannot perform (the humanlike erect position is only serendipitous).
The question is: what about the "primary" sign, if indeed
it is a sign? Is the technical behavior a form of communication? Does it convey a message? Or does it satisfy only
a single need, being consumed in the process? Let us
compare the enjoyment of a circus act with the enjoyment
of a gourmet meal served in a restaurant reputed for its
cuisine. Now, like the circus, gourmet meals also have a
"double articulation" at work in individual types of dishes
and the total meal: they too follow a traditional sequence
(appetizers, fish, meat, etc.) and bring variations to each
type of dish (there are no two identical Dover soles).
Furthermore, they also have secondary messages aimed
at the cultural context (from ethnic values up to patriotic
allusions and down to low comedy, as with the "cassoulet"). And then there are the right and wrong wines,
with all their literature. In that sense, gourmet meals may
and should be viewed as a form of communication to be
studied semiotically (we are applying for a grant). But, in
the primary sense, the gourmet meal remains an experience for the mouth, the eye, and the nose, appreciated for
its own sake and not for its messages. More specifically, it
is appreciated for its "quality," which means a culinary
performance whereby (skill/art overcoming difficulty) the
meal offers a positive difference from the normal meal.
Normality and appreciation of the difference are cultur-
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ally determined, but the desire for the performance, and
its appreciation, appear to be universal. In fact, aren't the
same desire and appreciation at work when we pay to
applaud an acrobat, a juggler, or a lion tamer, who (art/
skill overcoming difficulty) performs acts beyond our
normal powers? In semiotic terms, any such performance, and all of them, may still be considered a sign, but
autotelic, almost totally collapsed on itself, drawing attention to its signifier-i.e., what we see, hear, or taste. The
signified only specifies that the particular signifier is indeed a performance-i.e., positively different in degree
from normality. And the referent is that performance-i.e.,
the sign, i.e., mainly the signifier. Any other referential
messages will come from the outside and through secondary signs. But then, isn't the primary sign at the center
of circus? By means of costumes, varied messages can
be grafted on the acrobatic act, which starts with the
performance; without the performance, there would be no
circus, only theater or pantomime. And again: does one
communicate a performance?
The questions raised by the circus prompt interest in
other types of public "shows" which value performances
and hence draw attention to the signifier. One could attempt to order them within that perspective. In theater, for
example, despite some stress on the performancequality of acting, beauty of a face or figure, harmony or
extravaganza of sets-the referential function of secondary signs dominates to the point that they are generally
viewed as primary, and priority is given to the text. A
one-person act, on the other hand, although it may use
referential material, is mainly appreciated for the
performance-not for the content of jokes but for the
manner of their telling. The circus operates like a manypeople show: it stresses the performance but also conveys messages. Bouissac's book shows that these are
subtle and concerted, and powerfully grounded in our
culture. I am not sure, however, whether they really account for the success of the circus, or whether they play
second fiddle to the sheer enjoyment of the performance.

Michael Greenhalgh and Vincent Megaw, eds. Art in
Society: Studies in Style, Culture, and Aesthetics. New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1978, xiii + 350 pp. (cloth).
Reviewed by Marie ·Jeanne (Monni) Adams
Harvard University
As befits a pub Iication on art this is a handsome book,
with an attractive print layout, sprinkled with photographs, drawings, and graphs, firmly bound, and appropriately heavy but compact in the hand. How it weighs in
as a contribution to the subject cannot be stated as a
simple sum of its parts, for a few brilliant sections outweigh the whole.
The title sweeps across a wide intellectual horizon, but
in fact the twenty-two essays stay neatly within the
bounds of art studied by anthropologists; that is, they
concentrate on small-scale societies, living , dead , or dying. The contributions stem from a symposium on art and
society, sponsored by the editors, held at Leicester University in early 1975, with the addition of three papers, all
but one drawn from Brit!sh backgrounds.
Few anthropologists focus their primary effort on visual
art in the same way they might on ritual or oral tradition ,
and fewer art historians concentrate on the art of exotic
peoples. The result is that ethnoart is a bit of everybody's
business, and the inevitable resulting miscellany shows
up clearly in this kind of book, which lacks a specific
theme or regional focus and includes a philosopher, art
historians, archaeologists, social anthropologists,
museum ethnographers, and practicing artists who are
teachers or collectors.
The resulting range of viewpoints and topics may give
this book, as the cover claims, a wide appeal, but their
juxtaposition and the ensuing seesawing quality can induce vertigo even in a tolerant reader. The extremes in
levels of expression and research caliber that characterize this compendium are illustrated by the first two
selections. Philosopher of aesthetics Richard Wollheim
offers a worthy if obscurely abstract admonition that
gleams with fashionable terms as he dismisses the
taxonomic or distinctive feature approach in favor of the
"generative," for the proper analysis of art works. This is
followed by the trivial statements of Michael Cardew, the
potter who served as a craft development teacher in
Nigeria, to the effect that pre! iterate art is comparable to
the art of children and that "others" do not have our habit
of conceptual thinking. The entire first section, with nine
essays on appreciation and aesthetics-none longer
than five pages-resembles a slightly awry Hungarian
cake with several dark tasty layers interspersed with light,
airy ones. The remaining longer articles are loosely
grouped under two headings: Methodology and Stylistic
Analysis (six pieces) and Some Ethnographic Samples
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(seven articies). It will be more revealing of the book's
qualities and generally useful to the reader to review the
contents in relation to the specific topics currently in favor
by those who study art in anthropology (see Silver 1979).
Four essays in this book stand out for their insights into
another culture and for a disciplined method and message that can inspire and guide future studies. The first
three, by Vastokas, Kaeppler, and Mcleod, can be
grouped as the search for cognitive order. Scholars of
European art assume that an art object is ordered and
that a conceptual schema Iies at the genesis of a work of
art; they proceed to discuss fine points of that order, such
as the precise relationship of twelve apostles on a
painted ceiling, or the invisible diagonal organizing a
Michelangelo scene, or the horizontal composition of an
impressionist landscape. In ethnographic art, however,
compositional devices are not readily grasped by our
viewers, so that, beginning with Boas in the early twentieth century, ethnographers have accepted the burden of
demonstrating the presence of structure or composition.
The further step of linking these compositional orders to
organizing principles in other fields of social activity was
taken but slowly in the mid-twentieth century, the major
efforts having been made by Panofsky and Levi-Strauss.
As early as 1970, Fernandez (1977), in an analysis of
the Fang of Gabon, compared the structure of an African
village layout and the popular game board and figural
sculpture of the Fang with the conceptions villagers held
of the zones of their surroundings and the shape of their
past. My own field work in Indonesia yielded such a study
(1973), in which I found a structural homology between
the tripartite compositional layout in East Sumba men's
textiles, the structure of the village and the imagined
cosmos, and the concepts regarding relationships
among marriage and trading groups. So, for Kaeppler or
Vastokas to find corresponding forms in artistic efforts
and in social order or cu:tural dynamics is not new. However, their studies are exemplary.
Vastokas concentrates on demonstrating the special
character and the primacy of tripartite and quadripartite
divisions in Northwest Coast architecture, admirably indicating her evidence in objects and ritual action and
demonstrating at each step the theoretical influences on
her own thinking. (However, I would qualify her enthusiasm for Arnheim's visual thinking.) In conclusion,
she reduces this complex analysis to a single theme: a
tension or ambiguous movement in the works of art that in
her view expresses latent cognitive-cultural tensions
characterizing the economy, social organization, and religion. This sounds too much like "total ism," the earlier
tendency to sum up a style and a civilization in one
phrase. The interpretive stress on tensions, stemming
from the work of Levi-Strauss and Victor Turner, is a
healthy reaction to many earlier studies that found harmony and stability the quintessence of art-and-society. In
most art and society there is an interplay of stability and
tension; we need to get beyond this level of generality.
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The lasting value of this essay lies in the sophisticated
analysis of certain features of Northwest Coast art style.
Using "ethnoscientific structuralism" and an elegant
compression of style, Kaeppler focuses on a specific
structure in vocal music which is given explicit formulation by Pacific Tongans as melody, drone, and decoration. She finds similarly structured sequences in work
patterns and designs of bark cloth, in social domains of
ranking, political relationships, and, exhibited on a grand
scale, in major communal ritual. She also makes the interesting proposal that these forms yield an aesthetic experience because at some level the people comprehend
the underlying structure. Because of the clarity and
freshness of insight cutting across various domains of
activity and because of my own interest in work patterns
(1971, 1977), I find this essay exceptionally stimulating
and an excellent model for studies elsewhere.
The third essay differs in its investigatory focus. Instead of accounting for what is presented to the eye,
Mcleod, Keeper of the Department of Ethnography at the
London Museum of Manki, in an interesting turnabout offers an explanation-that is, a principle-that accounts
for the absence of certain motifs, mainly domestic creatures, in Asante figurative goldweights earlier used as
units to weigh gold dust in exchange.transactions on the
former Gold Coast, West Africa. He points to the significant dichotomy between village and bush that is basic to
Asante ritual, proverbs, and myths, and then suggests
that domestic animals are representative of the category
"vi II age," and as such they are kept out of the money
system because money functions to blur or equalize
categories. This is an excellent example of how anthropo!ogical theories deriving from Levi-Strauss, Leach,
and Douglas about cognitive orders can clarify problems
in ethnoart.
The fourth essay I have singled out, Wilkinson's "Carving a Social Message," deals with visual art forms as
signs in a social system, perhaps the most familiar approach to art in society by anthropologists. Wilkinson,
who taught literature on Tabar Island, part of New Ireland
in Papua New Guinea, studied their Malanggan ritual
carvings and shows that particular combinations of
motifs belong to certain owners and identify both kin and
status groupings. The understanding of Malanggan
sculpture, the most complex carving in Melanesia, has
been plagued by lack of thorough documentation, first on
the level of what is represented, and further, on what any
item means. This article, richly informative on these
points, is clear evidence that Wilkinson's work deserves
fuller publication.
Gathercole, who works in the museum at Cambridge
University, also would see art in the frame of social sign.
Deploring the lack of information on early collections, he
recommends that we look at the motifs repeated on many
Maori objects, not only as general reminders of the
ideological continuum of gods, ancestors, and human
life, but also as signs of ethnic identity which increased in
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elaboration during the nineteenth century as acculturative pressures mounted on the Maori people.
Based on the work of the Stratherns (1971) on the body
decoration of the Mt. Hageners of Papua New Guinea,
Layton constructs a chart of the Hageners' sensory signs
to show how they combine to communicate status positions and wearers' intentions. His essay also reflects the
current fashion for elements of communication theory. He
would distinguish art from visual communication by the
features of symbol ism and redundancy, a reductive position that is further weakened by the distortion required for
the concept of redundancy when applied to art.
Faris, who provided such a splendid analysis of Nuba
body painting (1972), based on his field work in the Sudan, East Africa, spins an argument that represents
another current influencing the analysis of art; that is, a
Marxist emphasis on mode of production, the underlying
thesis being that the significant social relationships
which must be symbolized for purposes of maintenance,
celebration, socialization, and mystification stem from
·productive activities. According to Ppris, if people control
their means of production, art will celebrate human productive activity, as indeed was the situation he found
among the Nuba. Where producers lack control, such
circumstances need to be justified, and symbols will be
used for mystification in order to legitimize the exploitation . With these theorums, Faris proposes to tell why certain people use ancestor figures and to account for the
expressive character of some West African masks. He
claims that the Dogon create ancestor figures as part of
the mystique of the clan, which, having no kin or material
basis, is an ideological construct to favor the elders; the
Dan produce masks of cool arrogance because they
have a politically powerful Poro society, while lesser local
men's societies have to employ frightening masks. These
explanations were prepared before 1975, and it is hoped
that in the interval, besides correcting other errors in his
article, Faris has had a chance to reread Harley (1950) to
learn that the forceful Poro society (among the Mano)
makes much use of frightening masks, and that there is
no true Poro among the Dan (ibid.:42)-a point reiterated
in seve ral publications by field workers Himmelheber
and Fischer. What evidence there is about Dogon human
figure sculpture does not limit them, for example, to clan
rituals, temples, or groups. With several Africanists at
hand, the editors must be faulted for permitting these
hypothetical arguments based on misinformation to be
cast in permanently accessible form. More attention
needs to be given to art in relation to power structures, in
spite of this miscarried effort.
Two essays cater to the increasing interest in the situation of the living artist. Nettleship offers a fine descriptive
account of the social context of women's weaving arts,
which are no longer functional, among the Atayal of
Taiwan. His concern with creativity, presented in a vague
and groping manner, leads to the following points: the

weaver, influenced by aesthetic or nonaesthetic values,
can make selections at various points in the work process
and , to assess their innovation, these decision points deserve close study. Gerbrands, known for his publications
on the Asmat artist, continues his search for the master
artist, this time among the Kilenge of New Britain, and
provides some interesting anecdotes about a woodcarver's relations with his big-man patron and the efforts
of his apprentice.
A modest experiment in cross-cultural aesthetics is reported by Nelson Graburn, who is best known for his
studies of Eskimo art in a changing commercial context.
He asked museum audiences at Berkeley to respond to
two commercial forms of art-crafts: wooden implements
of the Cree Indians and the soapstone figures of the
Canadian Arct ic Eskimos. Judgments of the works were
markedly affected by preconceptions about Indians and
about Eskimo culture. The neat, clean wood carvings did
not fit respondents' notions of authentic Indian objects,
and their negative reactions were frequently cast in terms
of guilt about commercialization. Eskimo stone imagery,
however, fulfilled their ideas of art as evocative and illustrative of the Eskimos' imagined way of life and strugg le
with nature. Strangely enough, in this case political regrets did not come to mind.
Another issue in cross-cultural aesthetics-more
commonly called artistic influence--concerns the possible effects of African art on the artists of Paris in the early
twentieth century. It is patently absurd , as Donne points
out, to discuss the influence of African art on the Cubists
on the basis of pieces and even styles that the artists of
the time did not and could not know. Donne gives a sample of the kind of detective work required to identify which
actual pieces came to the notice of artists of that time.
Greenhalgh, one of the editors, takes up a rarely discussed problem in cross-cultural aesthetics: why Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were
indifferent to influences from Pre-Columb ian art. Not surprisingly, he reasons that the Graeco-Roman framework
of Renaissance Europe precluded recognition of the
alien style as aesthetic experience. In an erudite sketch
of scholarly work of the time, Greenhalgh shows that the
tendency to see alien art works as something wh ich can
explain religion or society had already begun in the
sixteenth century.
However changed our aesthetic apprec iation may
be, archaeologists continue to use art as a revealing artifact. Two essays in this book give a glimpse of archaeologists at work on style analysis. Roaf seeks differences in hands among a row of similar figures at Persepolis, and Frankel looks for similarities in pottery designs
to determine contacts and trade routes in 2nd millennium
B.C. Cyprus. Using familiar assumptions in style studies,
both men argue, in brief contributions, for more precise,
credible results by use of mathematical methods,
couched in a variety of charts and diagrams, than were
possible by precomputer assessment.
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Korn, an art historian, fulfills Wollheim 's directive not to
rely on distinctive features by offering a computerized
formal analysis of an extensive array of design units she
has derived from the colorful Abelam paintings collected
some 20 years ago by Anthony Forge. Most of her article
is taken up with arguing against the use of linguistic
models for art analysis, in favor of a comprehensive count
of visual regularities.
Art as a qualitative experience is difficult to deal with in
social science terms, although a few anthropologists
have attempted it. Here Swinton and Herman, who are
artists and connoisseurs, carry out this mission in a style
of personal conviction .
Most speculative of all investigations into art is the
study of its ori gins, a topic rarely addressed by art histori ans. In tune with the recent emphasis on the biological contribution to human behavior, several scholars are
finding a promising source of designs in the dancing
flickers of light, called phosphenes, that appear in interior
vision . This view is represented by Re ichei-Dolmatoff's
favorable comparison of the drawings of drug-experienced visions among a small group of Amazonian
Indians with the fifteen phosphenes standardized in
a study of European subjects.
In summary, we find that most topics in ethnoart are
touched upon in these essays: the search for cognitive
order, art as social signs, the artist and the social matrix
of production, cross-cultural aesthetics, and qualitative
experience. The notable exception is an example of psychological or psychoanalytical study. The best work belongs to those in search of cognitive order. A new note
appears in a number of the essays that is worth special
comment; that is, an awareness of negative results or a
cautionary attitude. We should not hold to a unitary view
of the Eskimo aesthetic when Swinton states that, among
the Eskimos he knows in the Baker Lake area, carvings
are admired for the very reasons they are disdained in
Graburn's reports on Arctic Quebec. Wollheim's admonition against the use of distinctive feature analysis,
Greenhalgh's consideration of a lack of diffusion, Donne
on the need of proof for claims of artistic influence, Vastakas's and Korn's warnings against the use of linguistic
models, and most vivid of all , ThurstonBhaw's wellreasoned challenge to established theories on the
chronology of Benin bronzes-all these introduce critical
notes that were absent from the positive propositions
presented in two earlier anthologies on ethnoart (Jopling
1971; Otten 1971). On this point, Art in Society represents
an advance in soph istication about methods that is
worthy of wide attention.
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Reviewer's Reply
Nahumck. Introduction to Dance Literacy: Perception
and Notation of Dance Patterns.
To the Editors
In the Spring 1980 issue of Studies, Diane C. Freedman
reviews the book Introduction to Dance Literacy: Perception and Notation of Dance Patterns, by Nadia Chilkovsky
Nahumck. In so doing, she takes Dr. Nahumck to task on
several points, notably on the question of what is meant
by "literacy" in dance. As a pragmatic practitioner of
Labanotation and an ardent advocate of dance literacy, I
find myself disturbed by high-level quibbling. Nahumck's
book is a welcome step forward in dance literacy by its
very attempt to make people aware of this valuable end
product in the use of notation. It is a tool through which a
greater understanding of and access to information in
dance is made possible.
In reading the book I too questioned at whom the book
was aimed : if for those already knowing Labanotation,
then the basic explanations were superfluous; if for those
knowing none, then insufficient. But the general focus of
the book was in the right direction, and it should arouse
enthusiastic support as an important step forward-who
else has written such a book? Nahumck is breaking new
ground. Perhaps the book needed more working through;
such books can well use trial periods before publication
to gather general reactions and eliminate the inevitable
typographical errors. There is so much that is commendable in the book, however, that seems to have been
given scant treatment in Ms. Freedman's review.
I question whether it is necessary to experience
movement sequences physically in order to become
dance literate. My husband reads Russian yet cannot
speak it, and his is not an unusual case ; others read
foreign-language publications without speaking the language fluently. Would they be called illiterate in that language? In dance there may be full understanding of the
content without the physical ability to bring the movement to life. Must one be able to act to understand
Shakespeare's plays?
Notation is not yet an integral part of the study of
dance. A few have made a start, but there is sti II a long
way to go before we achieve anything comparable to the
use of music notation in the study of music. Nahumck has
contributed a book which I see as an important step in
the right direction. It is her fate to be a pioneer, to break
new ground, and hence risk much criticism. It is possible
that others who follow may produce better books, building on her groundwork. I would like to see a review which
gathers together the positive elements in the book, providing incentive to others to produce similar works.
Dr. Ann Hutchinson Guest
The Language of Dance Centre,
London

My review of Nahumck's book was directed at an aud ience of scholars interested in visual commun ication .
This relatively new field is composed of participants
from many disciplines; communication among members of such a diversified group is dependent on conceptual -clarity. Scholarship must be evaluative if our
understand ing is to advance.
Guest is unhappy with my criticism of what she considers a pioneering effort. Yet to leave the inadequacies
of basic works unnoted wou ld be a disservice, since the
function of such works should be to provide the most
solid possible basis for further development of the field.
I do not consider insistence on conceptual clarity to be
"high-level quibbling ."
Guest's response is based on the undefended assumption that language and movement are precise ly
analogous, an assumption with which I disag ree for reasons elaborated on in my review. I did not mean to imply
that one must be able to duplicate dance movements to
understand them . But competence in a symbolic system
based on movement depends on a kinesthetic sensitivity. One way to develop this sensitivity is through study
of the Laban system.
I share with Guest and Nahumck the desire to promote
future research in this field . But I be lieve that our cause
is best served by careful scrut iny and evaluat ion of all
contributions.
Diane C. Freedman

